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ABSTRACT 
 
The pastoral areas of Tanzania have been experiencing increasing land-use pressure and 
out-migration of pastoralists to other areas. In some areas the immigrant pastoralists have 
been involved in resource-use conflicts; raising concern at various levels of governance. 
However, the underlying causes of resource-use conflicts are yet to be established. This 
study was conducted in Mkata plains and Ngorongoro Conservation Area in order to 
determine the role of local institutions in the management of common grazing lands. 
Specifically the study aimed at determining trends in land-use and resource tenure; establish 
strength of local institutions; determine factors determining resource-use conflicts in the 
study areas. The study indicated that the pastoral system in the study areas was shifting to 
agro-pastoralism, leading to high grazing intensities and rangeland deterioration. Local 
institutions were strong and plays central role in the management of communal grazing 
lands. Factors which significantly (p < 0.05) enhance local institutions include market 
integration, degradation of rangelands and local leadership. Livestock ownership and local 
autonomy are significant in Ngorongoro area; whereas, wealth differentiation significantly 
(p < 0.05) undermine local institutions in the study areas. Resource-use conflict in Mkata 
plains is mainly over crop damages by livestock. Conflicts in Ngorongoro area involve 
conservation authorities and local communities over expansion of cultivation. Factors 
significantly (p<0.05) escalating conflicts are wealthy heterogeneity and restrictive policies 
in Ngorongoro; and increasing herd size and commercialization in Mkata plains. Strong 
local leadership significantly (p<0.05) minimise conflicts in study areas, while livestock 
ownership and range deterioration minimises conflicts in Ngorongoro area Local 
mechanisms for resolving resource-use conflicts include “conflict resolution committees” in 
Mkata plains; and benefit sharing between the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority 
and local communities The study proposes a cross-linkage institutional framework for 
 iii
management of communal grazing lands. The main conclusion of this study is that local 
institutions have persisted and plays a central role in governance of common grazing lands. 
It is recommended to establish secure tenure ship of grazing lands for different pastoral 
groups and establishing of sustainable carrying capacities and grazing systems in study 
areas. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Overview 
Pastoral and agro-pastoral land-use systems in most of the developing countries are 
characterised by high dependence on communally owned land resources. These resources 
are inclusively referred to as “commons”. Ostrom (1996) refers to this category of land 
resources as “common pool resources” (CPR). In the literature there is a great deal of 
confusion between the concepts of “common pool resources” and “common property 
regimes”. The common pool resources are defined as those resources which are none 
excludible but which are subtractive. Where as, common property regimes are the property 
relations that define claims to the resources (Ostrom et al., 2002). Examples of common-
property regimes abound the rural areas across all continents and transcending all cultures 
(Netting, 1978; Ostrom, 1996).  
 
In developing countries, common property regimes provide equitable and sustainable access 
to livelihood support systems at a minimum cost (Runge, 1981, 1986).Thus; the majority of 
the world's rural populations are directly dependent on local CPR like water, forests, 
grazing lands and fisheries for their livelihoods. Resources falling under this category are 
potentially renewable and capable of being sustained in perpetuity. However, whether or not 
this potential would be realised depends on numerous factors including; the institutional 
arrangements that people adopt concerning resource utilisation. Institutional arrangements 
which are hereby referred to as conventions that societies establish to define their members' 
relationship to resources and translates interests in resources into claims; and claims into 
property rights. Nonetheless, more often formal institutions created by the state may be 
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incongruent with informal institutions (rules and customs) governing the use of CPRs, 
which may lead to environmental degradation and resource conflicts. Bromley (1992) refers 
to this situation as institutional “dissonance”. In Africa, this condition is ubiquitous in most 
of communally owned grazing lands.  
 
1.1.2 Pastoral, agro-pastoral systems and common grazing land institutions 
Pastoralism and agro-pastoralism remain the predominant land use systems in most of the 
arid and semi-arid areas of sub - Saharan Africa. These areas are characterised by low and 
highly variable rainfall, with mean annual rainfall ranging between 300 and 700 mm 
(Goodin and Northington, 1985) usually concentrated in one or two rainy seasons in a year 
separated by a relatively long dry spell. The physical environment in these areas is 
characterised by high variability of resources in space and time and is generally unsuitable 
for crop production. One of the limited ways this land can be made viable is through 
grazing animals adapted to dry conditions, because livestock are more suited to such risk 
prone environments owing to movement of animals to track the resources. This type of land 
use system also allows communities to adjust to climatic variability (Swift, 1996). The 
pastoral production systems have thus evolved and over centuries have accumulated 
traditional ecological knowledge to survive under harsh environmental conditions and 
exploit otherwise ephemeral resources in a sustainable manner. Swift (1996) defined 
pastoralism as production system in which 50% of gross household revenue comes from 
livestock or livestock related activities. Agro-pastoralism is defined as a production system 
in which more than 50% of gross household revenue comes from crop production and 10 to 
below 50% comes from livestock. Thus, livestock based economy is a mainstay for pastoral 
systems. However, to date pure pastoralism is quite rare, since most of pastoral 
communities have adopted farming or diversified to other livelihood systems, the most 
common systems being semi-pastoralism and agro-pastoralism. This led Baxter (1994) to 
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assert that pastoralism is an occupation, as well as a vocation and he extends the term to 
individuals within groups who adhere to the belief about the fundamental importance of 
livestock to their ways of life, but who have been forced by destitution or diversification to 
non-livestock livelihoods. For the purpose of this study the broad definition of the term 
pastoralism, advocated by Baxter, has been adopted. 
 
The main feature of pastoralism is herding private herd on communal grazing lands, and 
typical pastoral strategies are based on herd mobility, maximization and herd diversification 
(Lane and Swift, 1989). The widespread communal resource management institutions 
together with pastoral strategies can be seen as risk aversion devices under unfavourable 
climatic conditions. These institutions then provide the major means of production and 
existence. However, the rationale of the pastoral strategies and the associated institutions 
has remained oblivious to most observers, as well as development planners. Most observers 
accept the notion that land degradation process is causally linked with pastoral culture and 
institutions, also that pastoralist behaviour is inherently self destructive over long term 
through its impacts on the range environment, the “Hardins (1962) tragedy of commons” 
axiom. Consequently pastoralism has been judged to be irrational, economically inefficient 
and environmentally destructive (Herlocker, 1999). 
 
Recently the belief of pastoral systems irrationality, un-productivity and self-destruction has 
come under strong challenge (Lane and Swift, 1989). Results from a number of case studies 
have demonstrated that some individuals have jointly and wisely communally owned lands 
over long periods of time thus challenging the `tragedy of commons` axiom (Herlocker, 
1999). However, most of pastoral groups have been faced with profound modifications to 
their cultural environments. As a result their local institutions in some cases are unable to 
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quickly adapt to the new challenges, leading into degradation of communally owned 
resources including the range lands. 
 
1.1.3 Pastoral sector of Tanzania 
In Tanzania, the traditional pastoral and agro-pastoral land-use systems are predominant in 
semi-arid areas in central, northern and northwest regions. The traditional livestock sector 
accounts for over 95% of the national herd, which is approximated at 16 million cattle and 
ranking the third largest herd in Africa (URT, 1998). The sector also contributes to about 
18% of the National Gross Product and provides employment to approximately 3.8 million 
people (EIU, 1997). About 20- 25% of the national herd is kept under pure pastoral system 
mainly by the Maasai and Barbaig herders in Arusha and Manyara regions (Mpiri, 1995). 
The agro-pastoralists comprise of different ethnic groups including the Gogo (Dodoma), 
Nyaturu (Singida), Nyamwezi (Tabora), Sukuma  (Shinyanga and Mwanza) and Kuria 
(Mara), and accounts for about 75 - 80% of the national herd (ibid).  At present, pastoralism 
is practised by immigrant Maasai herders in more humid areas in Morogoro, Coast, Tanga, 
Mbeya and Rukwa regions. The agro-pastoralists have mainly migrated to Rukwa and 
Mbeya regions (Brockington, 2000). 
 
The pastoral lands in Tanzania are mainly held by tribal or sub-tribal communities with a 
customary right of occupancy governed through local institutions (Mwenye, 1991). 
Traditionally, the pastoral societies have evolved different local institutions for regulating 
access and use of range resources as well as resolving resource use conflicts. However, 
interventions like nationalisation and privatisation by state government have undermined 
the traditional pastoral systems and the associated land tenure institutions, rendering these 
ineffective in managing communal grazing lands (Ndagala, 1998). 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
Land tenure in pastoral areas of Tanzania is under stress. The stress emanates mainly from 
changing natural and demographic environments. Other underlying causes are social, 
economic and political changes. In the past three to four decades both pastoral and agro-
pastoral areas have been experiencing rapid population increase, with a national mean 
population growth rate estimated at 3% per annum (Kurian, 1992). This has increased 
demand for cultivation lands, forcing pastoralists to more marginal areas and triggering off 
environmental degradation process. These processes were paralleled by overall climatic 
changes, with increasing droughts. The combined effect of these processes has culminated 
into general decline of pastoral community’s welfare and increased livelihood insecurity 
(Lane, 1998).  
 
The decline also stems from both current and past governmental policies that viewed 
pastoralism as an unsustainable land use system which has to be transformed by 
sedentarisation. The Maasailand settlement scheme and Operation Barabaig development 
scheme are cases in point (Ndagala, 1998). The colonial land policies disrupted pastoral 
land tenure systems through alienation of customary lands to the state and settler farmers.  
This in turn eroded the legitimacy of traditional decision making structures, leading into the 
breakdown of these structures.  Nationalisation and villagisation policies during the 1970s 
led to wide scale alienation of pastoral lands for example the Basuto Wheat Project complex 
(Lane and Moorehead, 1996). These policies caused land tenure insecurity and created 
conditions for open access. Pastoralists were forced into the remaining atrophied common 
grazing areas, with shrinking resource base (Igole and Brockington, 1999). These processes 
culminated into massive destitution in pastoral communities, forcing an increasingly large 
number of pastoralists to change to other means of livelihoods like cultivation in marginal 
lands, wage labour and out migration (Lane, 1998).   
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Similar policy externalities were generated in the main agro-pastoral areas in the Western 
Cotton Growing Areas of Tanzania. The government subsidy on cotton led into crop 
extensification which resulted into wide-scale deforestation, loss of soil fertility and overall 
environmental degradation. This in turn led to enormous loss of grazing lands and increased 
grazing intensities. The processes have been aggravated by high human and livestock 
population densities as well as unfavourable semi-arid environmental conditions.  This 
situation forced the Sukuma herders to migrate to other regions of Tanzania (Brockington, 
2000). The recent economic reforms and trade liberalisation have created some 
opportunities, but also have posed many new threats to pastoral systems. The national 
agriculture policy of 1982 (URT, 1982a) had promoted commercial agriculture production. 
This was followed by land tenure reforms like the Land Act No.4 of 1999 (URT, 1999a) 
and the Village Land Act No.5 of 1999 (URT, 1999b) which supports land market in the 
country. These policy changes in conjunction with other sectoral policies like the  wildlife 
management Act of 1975 (URT, 1975b), have been followed by large scale privatisation of 
the remaining pastoral lands for commercial farming, hunting blocks, mining and land 
speculation. The severely affected are the pastoral areas in northern Tanzania, including the 
areas for this study. Currently, there are cases of large scale expropriation of pastoral lands 
by corrupt officials, marginalisation of pastoralists and in some areas there have been some 
forced evictions (Igole and Brockington, 1999). 
 
Loss of grazing lands, environmental degradation and high grazing intensities in the main 
pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of Tanzania has led into massive migration of pastoralists 
and livestock.  Currently, there is a steady movement of livestock from the north of the 
country to the south. The main target areas include Morogoro, Coast, Mbeya and Rukwa 
regions (Mpiri, 1995).  This has brought different ethnic groups into the same ecological 
ranges, with increased potential for environmental degradation and resource-use conflicts. 
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The perceived social and environmental consequences are arousing concern at different 
levels of governance. In particular, the consequences on resource tenure are not well known.  
In some areas the immigrant pastoralists and indigenous ethnic groups, mainly 
agriculturists, have forged complementary co-existence for example in Usangu plains 
(Kajembe et al., 2003a). Where as, in some areas the immigrant pastoralists have intensified 
the conflicting demands for natural resources for example in Ruvu basin (Ndagala, 1998). 
In some areas this led into violent clashes and loss of lives, for example in Kilosa district, 
Morogoro region (URT, 2001). Still, the underlying causes for these conflicts are yet to be 
fully established. The conflicts are, most probably, manifestations of the shortcomings in 
the local institutions governing land resource tenure and conflict management. Using a case 
study of pastoral communities in Kilosa and Ngorongoro districts in Tanzania, it is 
envisaged that this study will generate information on the capacity of local institutions with 
regard to management of common grazing lands. The results are expected to be used in 
recommending institutional innovations under similar socio – economic and environmental 
settings in Tanzania and elsewhere. 
 
1.3 Justification of the Study 
Analyses from all over Africa show that development interventions in pastoral areas have 
failed to achieve the intended goals (Kirk, 1999).  Indigenous pastoral land tenure systems 
have often been perceived as the obstacle to progress (Lane, 1998).  But, this “old 
orthodox” (Lane and Swift, 1989) or “mainstream view” (Sandford, 1983) portraying 
communal land tenure to be inherently destructive has been challenged, for example by 
Lane and Moorehead (1996). Failure to promote the participation of producers has been 
singled out as one of the main factors that led into failures in pastoral development. Current 
emphasis is on the rediscovery of pastoral traditional institutions. This is mainly due to a 
new and more positive perception of pastoral societies on the part of decision-makers. Also, 
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the need to stabilise pastoral areas in the face of recurrent climatic crises, the redefinition of 
the concept of pastoral development and the search for better technical solutions and more 
sustainable programmes. Furthermore, the past developmental interventions in pastoral 
areas ignored the cultural attributes like community needs, goals, organisations and their 
local knowledge. Realisation is now growing that pastoralists are also experts in managing 
their marginal and risky environments. Therefore, priority should first be given to 
understanding of pastoral systems and associated customary institutions under which 
resources are managed. 
 
There is now a significant shift in the approach in government policies for pastoral 
development.  The main emphasis since mid 1980s has been empowerment of pastoral 
associations to organise public goods and services; and to take active roles in the 
management of local natural resources. Moreover, the emerging theory on range 
management (the dynamic ecosystem theory) suggests that administrative reforms in the 
field of pastoral land tenure should concentrate on restoring and supporting local control of 
resources and minimising state interventions. This entails adoption of appropriate land 
tenure rules and incentives that would provide a framework within which pastoral groups 
could negotiate the use of resources in different ecological zones according to variable local 
conditions.  New tenure rules should combine the traditional system with the appropriate 
formal regulations (Lane and Moorehead, 1996).  In this situation, the local institutions 
remain critical in pastoral systems, whereby the relationship between formal and informal 
systems is a key area for reforms that will enable local institutions to play increasing role in 
the management of local common pool resources.  
 
A new paradigm on pastoral development is now being advocated. This is paralleled by 
political and economic process underway in many African countries including state 
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divestiture, devolution of power and political liberalisation.  In general, these reforms 
consider more than ever the resource interests of pastoralists. Particularly, devolution of 
decision making regarding resource tenure to lower levels to allow for more participation of 
resource users. Tenure reforms and local institutions have also, been included in the Rio 
protocols (GTZ, 1998). Past policy reforms in Tanzania adversely impacted on pastoral land 
tenure, as well as on local institutions regulating the use of common pool resources and 
conflict management.  There is a growing need for capacity building and empowering of 
local institutions for local level management of natural resources. However, only scanty 
information does exist on the types and effectiveness of the contemporary local institutions 
for the management of common pool resources. This justifies a study to analyse the types 
and potential capacity of existing local institutions for regulating use of common pool 
resources.  
 
1.4 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework underlying this study in Figure 1 is based on the theories of 
agriculture intensification, resource management, and institutional change (Binswanger and 
McIntire, 1987; Ostrom, 1990).  
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It also derives from the two models (the demand led and supply led models) that have been 
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Hyami and Ruttan (1984) introduced the “induced institutional innovation” model, which 
emphasizes on factors affecting the supply of institutional innovation. North (1995) 
expanded on this by introducing the importance of individual and shared values in the 
process of institutional changes. Binswanger and McIntire (1987) postulates in their theories 
of agriculture intensification and induced institutional innovations, that factors such as 
population growth, market and technology will induce changes in resource management at 
local level as a result of changing factor scarcities and prices. Government policies also bear 
significant impact on natural resource management and local institutions. The impacts of 
policy changes will depend on the nature of institutions (social capital) endorsing changes, 
community characteristics and natural resource endowments. 
 
The conceptual framework (Figure 1) shows that the physical, socio-economic and policy 
environment or the “conditioning factors” define the choice of possible strategies of 
resource use by stakeholders in the quest to attain socio-economic welfare. The outcomes of 
resource use are dependent on the facilitating local institutions endorsing the changes. The 
institutional arrangements determine governance of resource system, which in turn lead to 
different incentives and preferences for resource use.  
 
The outcomes are measurable in terms of change in productivity, condition of resource 
base, human welfare and equity. Pender et al. (1996) referred to these as “outcome” 
variables. There is a feedback effect between the “outcome” and “conditioning” variables. 
Whenever the local institutions fail to create the appropriate governance resource-use, 
conflicts may erupt. Consequently, this may necessitate changes on the institutional 
arrangements in order to maintain sustainable resource base and community welfare. 
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1.5. Objectives of the Study 
1.5.1 Overall objective 
The overall objective of this study was to identify and analyse the role of local institutions 
in the management of pastoral communal resources and resource-use conflicts in a view of 
advising a rational institutional framework for sustainable and environmentally sound 
pastoral development interventions. 
 
1.5.2 Specific objectives 
The specific objectives of this study were: 
i) To determine land cover/use changes and trends in resource tenure regimes 
in the study areas. 
ii) To analyse types, roles and strengths of existing local institutions in the 
management of common grazing lands in the study areas.  
iii) To analyse types and causes of resource-use conflicts and existing local 
mechanisms for conflict management in the study areas. 
iv) To assess institutional innovations in the study areas. 
v) To propose institutional framework for the management of pastoral 
communal resources and resolving resource use conflicts. 
 
1.6. Hypotheses 
The study tested the following hypotheses: 
 
1.6.1 Null Hypotheses (Ho) 
i) Socio-economic, state policies and environmental factors have no influence 
on local institutions governing co-operation in collective management of 
communal grazing resources. 
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ii) The perceived environmental degradation, crop-livestock integration, market 
integration, state policies and socio-economic factors have no effect on 
resource - use conflicts. 
 
1.6.2 Alternative Hypotheses (Ha) 
i) Socio-economic, state policies and environmental factors have influence on 
local institutions governing co-operation in collective management of 
common grazing lands. 
ii) The perceived environmental degradation, crop livestock integration, market 
integration and socio-economic factors have significant effects on resource-
use conflicts. 
 
1.7. Research questions 
In order to attain the study objectives, the following research questions were addressed: 
i) What is the trend in land-use and resource regimes in the study areas? 
ii) What are the types and efficiency of local institutions governing use of common 
grazing lands in the study areas? 
iii) Which types of resource-use conflicts occurring in the study areas? 
iv) What are local mechanisms employed in resolving resource use conflicts? 
v) Which institutional changes that have occurred in the study areas? 
  
14
CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Definitions and Concepts of Institutions and Organisations 
2.1.1 Overview 
Institutions as well as organizations are part of our daily life; the two terms are in common 
usage and are regarded as synonymous. However, in analysing institutional arrangements in 
the context of this study, a clear understanding of the term “institution” and how it is related 
to the term “organization” is critically important. This is because different meanings have 
been given to the term “institution” depending on where, by whom and for what purpose it 
is used.  Often, a preoccupation on organizational development tends to neglect the 
importance of laws and policies that are necessary for effective organizational performance 
(Bandaragoda, 2000). 
 
2.1.2 Definition and nature of institutions  
The term institution can be defined as “organized or established procedures” These 
procedures are presented as constituent rules of the society, or “rules of the game”. The 
notion that an institution is a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or 
property implies that institutions serve the purpose of shaping and stabilizing human 
actions. Institutional economists adopt a similar interpretation in which “institutions” are 
defined basically as “the rules of the game” in a society, or more formally, the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human actions” (North, 1990). Institutions set the ground 
rules for resource use and establish the incentives, information, and compulsions that guide 
economic outcomes. Institutions can be both formal and informal. The formal rules include 
the written laws, regulations and procedures while the informally established procedures, 
norms, mores, myths, practices, and patterns of behaviours form the institutional framework 
(Kajembe et al., 2000). With time informal practices also become rules in their own rights 
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when they are accepted by the society (Bandaragoda, 2000). Both formal and informal 
institutions define and fashion the behavioural roles of individuals and groups in a given 
context of human interaction, aiming at a specific set of objectives. The key characteristics 
of institutions are that they are patterns of norms and behaviour that persist because they are 
valued and useful (Merrey, 1993). 
 
In many developing societies, informal rules have a tendency to override formal rules, 
rendering the enforcement of formal rules difficult and thereby affecting performance 
(Kajembe et al., 2000).  While the coexistence of formal and informal institutions is 
inevitable, situations where some informal rules tend to contradict formal rules are 
obviously dysfunctional. Furthermore, under certain settings where there is lack of 
enforcement or due to disregard of the written laws, the formal institutions become 
ineffective, and they are replaced by a set of practices that show divergence from the 
declared laws, rules and regulations. These practices can be referred to as “rules in use” 
(Kajembe et al., 2004; Bandaragoda, 2000).  
 
Based on the definitions above and the terminologies used in practice, institutions are a 
combination of  (a) policies and objectives (b) laws, rules and regulations (c) organizational 
bylaws and core values; (d) operational plans and procedures; (e) incentive mechanisms; 
accountability mechanisms; and (f) norms, traditions, practices and customs. 
 
All institutions share a set of defining characteristics. They are systems of rules, decision-
making procedures, and programmes that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the 
participants in these practices, and guide interactions among the occupants of the relevant 
roles. Institutions arise in all areas of human endeavour. Where they arise to deal explicitly 
with matters related to human/environment relationships, they are referred to as 
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“environmental” or “resource” regimes (Young, 1999). For instance, both local 
arrangements dealing with common field agriculture in traditional societies and 
international arrangements pertaining to shared river basins are regimes that are rather 
focused in spatial and functional terms. As such, institutions vary along a number of 
significant dimensions, including types of members, size of membership, degree of 
differentiation, functional scope, geographical domain, extent of formalisation, mix of 
formal and informal elements, density of rules and programmes, structure of administrative 
organisations and links to other institutions (Young, 1999). 
 
Furthermore, all institutions operate in larger settings characterised by material conditions 
like the nature of available technologies; the distribution of power in the material sense, and 
the cognitive conditions such as prevailing values, norms, and beliefs, that affect the 
consequences flowing from their operation (Young, 1999). A key analytical objective of 
institutional analysis is to establish how institutions influence or affect outcomes arising 
from interactions among actors in various social settings and why some institutions are 
more effective than others in the sense that they exert more influence over the course of 
human interactions (Levy et al., 1995). Since institutions are not actors in their own right, 
they must influence the behaviour of those subject to their rules, decision-making 
procedures and programs - in order to be effective. In this sense, there is a distinction 
between direct and indirect effects. The direct effects arise from the operation of 
environmental or resource regime or, in other words, those institutions created to deal with 
human / environment relations. For example, the traditional systems of land tenure or water 
rights that have developed informally in small – scale agrarian societies belong to this 
category (Young, 1999). The indirect effects of human /environmental relations are the 
unintended and often unforeseen environmental side effects of institutional arrangements 
established to deal with problems arising in other issues (Runge, 1992).  
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2.1.3 Organisations defined 
Organisations are defined as networks of behavioural roles arranged into hierarchies to elicit 
desired individual behaviour and coordinated actions obeying a certain system of rules and 
procedures (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Another definition describes organisations as 
“structures of recognized and accepted roles” (Merrey, 1993). These hierarchical 
arrangements are usually referred to as organizational structures. Organisations are groups 
of individuals with definite roles and bound by some common purpose and some rules and 
procedures to achieve set objectives.  Like institutions, organisations also shape human 
actions.  
 
2.1.4 Link between institutions and organisations  
In order to conduct an institutional analysis, an important conceptual consideration is the 
link between institutions and organizations. The link between institutions and organisations 
can be seen in two ways. One-way is the perception that organizations evolve and come into 
existence through the influence of the institutional frameworks. Thus, both institutions and 
organizations are intrinsically interlinked, and together, they provide a structure for human 
interactions. Once established, the organizations in turn influence how the institutional 
frameworks develop - depending on the changing social, economic, and more importantly, 
political situations and adjust the institutional frameworks to suit the emerging demands 
(Bandaragoda, 2000). The second perception is that established organizations represent a set 
of norms and behaviours that persist because they are valued and accepted as useful. In this 
way, they play a role of institutions. As such an ad hoc committee formed for a temporary 
task is not an institution; neither is an association of resource - user group formed by the 
government officials for limited purposes at a certain stage of the project. Whereas the users 
association persisting over time and continuing to fill a need that is valued and useful to its 
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members can be regarded as an “institutionalized organization” (Merrey, 1993). Either of 
these perceptions has an important consideration for this study, that is the need to consider 
the compatibility between existing laws, customs, policies and organizational arrangements. 
Values and usefulness of the existing institutional framework as accepted by the stakeholder 
community also need to be evaluated, because necessary changes for the institutional 
framework can be formulated only on that basis. Furthermore, according to both  
perceptions, some of established organizations can be seen as agents of institutional change. 
The support of such influential organizations can also be very useful, both in conducting an 
institutional analysis and in formulating recommendations for change. More significantly, 
the real value of these organizations became more apparent during implementation of 
identified institutional strategies.  
 
2.1.5 Functions of institution 
The definitions given above indicate that institutions are humanly devised constraints to 
shape human actions. However, institutions inherently have dual purposes to constrain and 
liberate individual and group actions (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). When elaborating on 
this, Bandaragoda (2000) cites the example of laws and court systems, which restrict some 
human actions, but also provide freedom for actions in some other instances. The 
institutional framework serves to reduce the uncertainty for human actions and thereby have 
a stabilising effect on a society. However, the stabilising effect of institutions does not mean 
that institutions are static. As society and its priorities change, institutions (conventions, 
codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, laws, contracts) tend to evolve and continually alter 
the choices available to individuals (Kajembe et al., 2004).  
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There is apparently a cyclic phenomenon related to institutions, in which institutions are 
determined by human actions, which once established, in turn, determine the scope and 
character of subsequent human actions for desired objectives (Bandaragoda, 2000). This is 
an important aspect in analysing institutions for possible changes (Kajembe et al., 2004), 
and also to establish how an external facilitator could be useful in identifying and 
introducing changes. This is particularly crucial in different settings under which pastoral 
and agro-pastoral systems operate in Tanzania. In these systems, the extent and character of 
observed gaps between declared rules and rules- in-use and their implications on the 
resources and resource use relationship is not well known.  
 
2.1.5.1 Institutions and management performance 
The linkage between institutions and performance is indisputable. But, in order to establish 
how institutions contribute to, or affect performance, it is important to assess the current 
levels of institutional performance. At the outset, it must be understood that institutions 
being rules or role structures, practices and norms, do not perform.  On the basis of strength 
and validity of institutions, it is the management or actors in the organisation that actually 
affect the performance, thus the emphasis on institutions and management performance 
(Bandaragoda, 2000). North (1990) argues that from economist’s viewpoint, institutions 
affect the performance of  individuals, groups or organisations, a country or its economy 
through the effect of institutions on the cost of exchange and production. Together with 
technology, institutions determine the transaction and transformation (production) costs. 
Therefore, performance can be expected to be better in the institutional framework in which 
these transactional costs are low. 
 
Similarly, members of an organisation have some defined objectives and they endeavour to 
achieve them by being within an institutional framework and by using a combination of 
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extra-institutional factors, such as, knowledge, skills, strategies, and co-ordination. The 
institutional framework serves as a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition for 
management performance (North, 1995). Thus, a succinct definition by North (1995) is that 
an institution is the “framework within which human interaction takes place”. 
 
2.1.5.2 Effectiveness of institutions 
In the most general sense, effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which institutions 
matter or, the extent to which the outcomes of human/environment interactions differ from 
what would have occurred in the absence of these arrangements. To this, most analysts 
would add a particular concern for impacts that are positive in the sense that they contribute 
to serving, or at least to managing, the problems that lead to establishment of particular 
institutions. When construed in this way, effectiveness is a variable, and the institutions 
range from highly effective arrangements that have profound impacts on the course of 
human/environmental relations, to those with little or no impact in these relations (Young, 
1999). However, it is important to note that, some of the institutions that prove to be highly 
effective under certain conditions may be ineffective under other circumstances and that the 
same institutions may become more or less effective over the course of time. 
 
The other attributes of institutions are sustainability, efficiency, fairness and robustness. The 
institutional contribution to achievement of environmental sustainability is defined in 
ecological terms. Thus, an institution achieves a high score in terms of sustainability to the 
extent that it bolsters the capacity of relevant ecosystems to maintain themselves over time. 
Institutions are also rated in terms of production of outcomes that promote socio-economic 
objectives, including efficiency and fairness. Efficiency, in this context is a measure of the 
extent to which goals like sustainability are achieved with minimum expenditure of 
resources. Fairness refers to extent to which the outcomes conform to normative standards 
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of equitable distribution.  Finally, institutional robustness is the extent to which institutions 
are durable or stable over time (Young, 1999). 
 
2.1.5.3 Nested institutions and management performance 
Human actions are constrained by and protected by nested system of different layers of 
institutions. Basing on the foregoing discussion, and by considering both the core meaning 
of the term “institution” which emphasizes on the rules aspect and the associated common 
usage of the term that is associated with “organisations”; a much broader interpretation of 
institutions i.e. “institutional framework” tends to be adopted by most analysts.  
 
The institutional framework for management of pastoral resources, for example, will consist 
of established rules, norms, practices and organisations that provide a structure to human 
actions related to range resource management. The established organisations are considered 
in this case as subset of institutions. Thus, the overall institutional framework related to 
management of pastoral and agro-pastoral resources can be considered in three broad 
categories: policies, laws and administration (Saleth and Dinar, 1999).  Whereby; (i) 
Policies include - national policies, local government policies and organisational 
policies.(ii) Laws are formal laws, regulations and procedures, informal rules, norms and 
practices and internal rules of the organisation. (iii) Administration involves organisations at 
policy levels for resource management and organisations at implementation level for 
delivery management. A combination of the above institutional elements constitutes the 
nested institutions (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). 
 
2.1.6 Institutional framework for management of natural resources 
Institutions figure prominently as determinants in the course of human/environment 
relations. As such, faulty institutional arrangements frequently cause large scale 
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environmental problems, such as; depletion of living resources resulting from unrestricted 
access to common pool resources or environmental pollution occurring as externalities of 
privately owned resources.  
 
Conversely, institutional arrangements always play a role in solving environmental 
problems, as in cases featuring in the creation of limited – entry to avoid unsustainable 
harvest of biological resources, such as range lands (Young, 1999). or international regimes 
intended to prevent environmental problems In both cases, the fundamental premise is the 
same; institutions account for a sizeable proportion of the variance of human behaviour 
affecting bio-geophysical systems (Young, 1999). 
 
2.1.7 Local institutions 
Local institutions can be categorised into two main types: internally and externally 
sponsored institutions. Internally sponsored institutions are mainly traditional constructs and 
play major roles in the management of natural resources. Internally sponsored institutions 
therefore represent the established local system of authority and other features derived from 
the socio-cultural and historical process of a given society. They usually originate from the 
local culture, and are deep rooted in the past, reflecting knowledge and experience of the 
local communities. They include norms, rituals and customs that serve in organising people 
for the management of natural resources (Kayambazinthu et al., 2003; Kajembe et al., 
2003b).  
 
Local institutions can further be classified into indigenous and traditional institutions. 
Indigenous institutions are those, which originates within a particular community or in a 
specific locality. Communities have generated institutions over time so as to cope with 
particular agro-ecological and socio-economic environment (Appleton et al., 2000).  
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Traditional institutions include set of rules and norms based on cultural principles and 
values of specific cultural group to regulate and control social behaviour and maintain 
cultural practices. They are long established and accepted orders, codes and practices that 
have the effect of an unwritten law, handed down through generations. They encompass not 
only indigenous but also scientific and other knowledge gained from outside i.e. externally 
sponsored knowledge systems (Appleton et al., 2000). Tradition is used to distinguish 
between what today is considered to be local people established rules, from outside 
interventions that propose new rules and regulations for access to land resource to which 
people are unaccustomed. 
 
Externally sponsored institutions include formally established institutions that are governed 
by state systems of either local or central governments. They include all rules governing the 
management and utilisations of natural resources. They also encompass support from donor 
agencies for sustainable management of natural resources in a given locality. Government 
administrative structures are moderated by externally sponsored institutions in that they are 
set and established by the government for administrative purposes. Externally sponsored 
institutions influence implementation of different natural resource management 
interventions and resolving resource use conflicts (Mayeta, 2004). Institutions falling under 
this category include national policies and regulations governing access and use of various 
resources by different users. 
 
2.1.8 Factors affecting local institutions governing common pool resources 
A number of factors have been identified to affect the functioning of local institutions 
governing common pool resources. Some of the factors have direct effects, while others 
have indirect ones.  
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2.1.8.1 Factors with direct effects 
The factors that directly affect local CPR institutions are demographic pressure, market 
integration, and technological changes. 
  
(i) Demographic pressure  
Demographic pressure is generated through variations in levels of population, whether as a 
result of local changes or through migration. Increasing population can significantly 
influence the ability of users to follow existing rules and norms for resource management. 
Agrawal and Yodama (1997) reviewed the relative importance of population pressure and 
the enforcement of institutions on resource conditions. Agrawal (2002) writing on the role 
of population in resource management argues that it has a long history, for example Malthus 
(1803); where scholars link population increase with degradation of resource and 
breakdown of local resource management regimes. Much recent scholarship tends to link 
environmental degradation in relatively straightforward fashion with population growth 
(Durning, 1998). However, the debate is highly polarized. Some scholars assert that 
population pressure has an enormous effect (Myers, 1991) and others suggest the impact to 
be far more limited (Agrawal, 1995; Leach and Mearns, 1996; Varughese and Ostrom, 
1998). 
 
(ii)  Market integration 
There is a wide agreement that increasing integration in markets has usually an adverse 
impact on local institutions for the management of common-pool resources, especially when 
roads begin to integrate distant resource systems and their users with other users and 
markets (Young, 1999). As local economies become more connected to larger markets and 
common property systems and confront cash exchanges, subsistence users are likely to 
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increase harvesting levels because they can now exploit resources for cash income as well 
(Colchester and Mahoney, 1994).  
 
Market pressure may also undermine common property arrangements, in that market 
integration introduces new ways of resolving risks that common property institutions are 
often designed to address. Pooling of resources, which become possible under common 
property regimes, helps those who are subject to such regimes. It helps by allowing them to 
reduce risks they would face were they have to exploit the same resources individually. 
Furthermore, markets encourage individuals to specialize in different kinds of economic 
activities. By specializing in different occupations and exchanging surplus output, 
individual producers can alleviate the need for migration and storage of resources. In 
addition, markets form alternative arenas for the provision of credit and generation of 
prestige in ways that can undermine the importance of other local institutions (Agrawal, 
2002). 
 
(iii) Technological changes 
The emergence of new technologies may transform cost benefit ratios of harvesting from 
commons and this is likely to undermine the sustainability of local institutions. However, 
sufficient time may be needed before users adapt to new technologies. Furthermore, 
technological change is capable of disrupting existing mechanisms of coordination around 
mobility and exchange of resources among community members. It can also alter political 
and economic arrangement that defines common property regimes (Agrawal, 2002). Oates 
(1999) observes that, market integration and introduction of new technologies and changes 
that they might prompt in existing resource management regimes is not always a harmless 
process, as it may result in losers and winners.  
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Typically, new demand pressure originating from markets and technological changes are 
likely to create different incentives about the products to be harvested and rates of harvest. 
They are also likely to change local power relations as different subgroups within a 
community using common-pool resource gain different types of access and maneuver to 
ensure their gains (Peluso, 1993).  
 
2.1.8.2 Factors with indirect effects 
(i) Resource user characteristics 
The importance of characteristics of a group that manage the commons was sparked in part 
by Olson’s seminal work (Olson 1965 in Agrawal, 2002). According to enormous literature 
on the commons and collective action, smaller groups are more likely to engage in 
successful collective actions. The conclusion is supported by Baland and Platteau (1999, 
1977). Nevertheless, other scholars have remarked on the ambiguities in this assertion and 
suggest that relationship between group size and collective action is not straight forward. 
For example, Marwell and Oliver (1993) posit that, a significant body of empirical research 
established that the size of a group is positively correlated to its level of collective action.  
 
But, according to Ostrom (1997) the impact of group size on collective action is usually 
mediated by a number of variables. These include the production technology, the degree of 
excludability, jointness of supply and the level of heterogeneity in the group, whereby the 
nature of heterogeneities within groups can have multiple and contradictory effects (Hardin, 
1982). Bland and Platteau (1997) hypothesized that heterogeneities of endowments have a 
positive effect on resource management, whereas heterogeneities of identity and interest 
may create obstacle to collective action. For example, heterogeneities of interests may lead 
to different types of economic specialization and different levels of endowments, which 
could in turn lead to mutually beneficial exchange. It is also possible, in groups with high 
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levels of heterogeneities of interests, to attain collective action if some subgroups can 
enforce resource management rules (Varughese and Ostrom, 1998). 
 
(ii) State policies 
As the ultimate guarantor of property rights arrangements, the role of the state and 
overarching structures of administration have been decisive under many historical 
circumstances in governing common-pool resources. Whereas, most communities and local 
user groups have rights to craft and implement new institutional arrangements, but 
unspecified rights and settlement of major conflicts can only be addressed through state 
interventions (Rangan, 1997). The recent decentralization of control of various natural 
resources to local user groups has brought into question the differences in authority across 
levels of governance. The local community –government relationships in resource 
management is normally very complex and the outcomes are very varied. Moreover, the 
relationship is influenced by a number of reasons, which underlie the government decisions. 
That is whether the main focus is to decentralise resource management regimes or in 
response to resource related laws or national policies. Agrawal (2001) concludes that there 
is no generalised understanding of effect of governments’ policies on the CPR management 
regime, whereby various national policies indirectly affect natural resource management 
systems. 
 
2.1.9 Theories and concepts of collective action in the management of common pool 
resources 
2.1.9.1 Overview 
Under what conditions does an individual voluntarily cooperate to pursue a common goal, 
such as sharing resources with other users so as to allow the system to function? Indeed, the 
viability of the commons paradigm depends among other things to a large extent on people's 
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willingness to cooperate. However, as theory and research show, people's cooperation (i.e. 
their voluntary participation to the provision and maintenance of a collective good) cannot 
be taken for granted. Collective action theory shows that people's willingness to cooperate 
depends on a number of factors that need to be taken into account in the development of any 
resource management system whose viability is contingent upon cooperation.  Cooperation 
as a social phenomenon stands at the centre of lively academic debates, whereby a clear 
distinction ought to be made between "cooperation optimists" and "cooperation pessimists" 
(Dietz et al, 2002). 
 
2.1.9.2 Collective action optimists and pessimists 
Cooperation theorists may be divided in so-called "collective action optimists" and 
"collective action pessimists". Collective action optimists refer to those social scientists who 
assume that wherever cooperation is required for the mutual benefit of a group of people, it 
will naturally occur. Participation optimism originates from orthodox group theories 
prevailing in political science in the 1950s. These believed that the existence of a collective 
interest constitutes a sufficient motive for joint action, and that, if given a chance, people 
would try to influence decisions that affect their lives. Failures to live up to these 
expectations were considered abnormalities (Nagel, 1979).  
 
However, low participation in elections, voluntary organisations, and collective action in 
general, led political scientists to question the validity of these assumptions in the 
early1960s. The costs of participation were recognised as a factor that may induce 
individuals to take a "free ride" on other people’s efforts instead of sharing the costs or 
burden of cooperation. This has led in the late 1960s to an increased pessimism in 
economics, political science and other disciplines about people’s inclination towards 
voluntary cooperation. Three distinct paradigms have been particularly influential in 
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supporting theories about the limited opportunities for people to further their common 
interests: the "logic of collective action'', ''prisoner's dilemma" and "the tragedy of the 
commons". Although these three paradigms share some fundamental views about the 
inherent conflict between individual interests and group interests, each of them has had 
powerful influence in academic and political circles (Nagel, 1979; Olson, 1965, Melucci, 
1995).  
 
2.1.9.3 The logic of collective action  
"The logic of collective action" is a theory advanced by Olson in 1965 (Olson, 1965). The 
theory is often used to demonstrate that rational individuals are unlikely to participate in a 
group endeavour to pursue a common goal. By "collective action", Olson refers to group 
efforts to further common interests. The logic here therefore encompasses almost all acts of 
cooperation aimed at goals shared by a group of people. These goals may relate to a 
tangible goods, or to immaterial benefits, but they all have a point in common that if the 
goal is achieved, everybody benefits from it, regardless of whether he or she contributed to 
its provision. Economists refer to these sorts of group goals characterized by jointness of 
supply and impossibility of exclusion as "public goods". The theory recognised the link 
between collective action and public goods and that all group goals and group interests are 
subject to the same dilemma.  
 
Contrary to Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 1968) and to the "Prisoners 
Dilemma" (Ostrom et al., 2002), Olson theory recognize the possibility of rational 
individuals pursuing a public interest. The factors determining an individual's attitude 
towards cooperation were identified as, group size and other group characteristics and 
coercion. Olson referred to coercion as one instance of a broader group of phenomena he 
calls "selective incentive", which are material or social rewards specifically oriented 
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towards those who contribute to a collective action. Marwell and Oliver (1993) argue that 
there are many factors that may explain collective action other than those discussed by 
Olson.  
 
First of all, as pointed out by Melucci (1995), it is necessary to overcome “the Olsonian 
individualism" and a negative assumption that collective phenomena are simply empirical 
aggregations of people acting together needs to be discarded.  
 
Secondly, by considering non-material rewards as acceptable selective incentives, and by 
recognising that also "extra-rational motivations" (such as moral motivations and self-
realisation) may determine individuals' participation to collective action, it is possible to 
recognise many more situations under which it may occur. 
 
2.1.9.4 Prisoners' dilemma  
The “Prisoners’ Dilemma” originates from mathematical game theory, which was one of the 
dominant frameworks for analysing social interactions in the fifties and sixties. The 
Prisoner's Dilemma shares with Olson's theory of collective action in its generality and its 
apparent power in providing a solid basis for a profoundly disturbing conclusion “that 
rational people cannot achieve rational collective outcomes" (Ostrom, 1990). The Prisoners' 
Dilemma suggests in a clear manner that it is impossible for rational people to cooperate, a 
conclusion that bears directly on fundamental issues in ethics and political philosophy. In 
effect the paradox that individually, rational strategies lead to collectively irrational 
outcomes seems to challenge a fundamental faith that rational human beings can achieve 
rational results (Ostrom, 1990). Like Olson's logic of collective action, the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma has been applied to a broad spectrum of situations. Several theorists have relied 
on this argument to provide the essentials of a theory of state, which would be needed above 
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all to enforce contracts and punish deviants, so that social order can be maintained. It was 
also frequently used to explain the depletion of common pool resources and the failure of 
groups to provide or maintain public goods. However, its application to real life situations 
has been strongly criticised by many scholars. 
 
Runge (1992), for example, calls attention to the fact that the game represents a special case 
of joint action that can only be understood if one recognises the structure of the game as a 
function of the institutional environment in which it is embedded. Those who see in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma an inevitable human tendency tend to confuse cause and effect, and that 
the result of the game is just an artifacts of the way in which it is set up. Thus, as argued by 
Bromley (1992) it is essential to understand that the institutional structure of any game (or 
life situation) reflects the prior social purpose to be served by the human interaction under 
consideration. The existing institutional structure reflects, among other things, prevailing 
cultural and social norms regarding individualism and its relation to collective notions. In 
that sense, we can say that people behaviour (or choices) is moulded by operating 
institutional contexts.  
 
2.1.9.5 The Tragedy of the Commons  
The still widely used metaphor “tragedy of the commons” owes its origins to an article by 
Garrett Hardin which appeared in Science in 1968. Hardin (1968) was not exclusively 
concerned with common pool resources, but with what he names "no technical solution 
problems" in general. These include a broad array of problems such as population 
explosion, air pollution, deforestation, industrial waste control, and so on. The powerful 
impact of this article may partly be explained by the time and socio-cultural context in 
which it was published. It was in those years that the western world became suddenly aware 
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of the dramatic consequences of an unconcerned use of natural resources that was rapidly 
leading to their depletion and to an irreversible loss of biodiversity.   
 
However, in subsequent publications Hardin has already modified his position in which he 
argues that the “tragedy of commons” is inevitable only in a situation characterised by 
absence of management. He also distinguishes between unmanaged and managed common 
resources (Hardin, 1994; Monela, 1995). Common property regime is used to refer to 
property rights arrangement in which a group of resource users share rights and duties 
towards a resource (McKean and Ostrom, 1995). 
 
2.2 Property and Property Rights 
2.2.1 Property rights and regimes 
Natural resource use and management are governed by people's perception of the property 
rights applying to the resource in question. Natural resource management systems of sub-
Sarahan Africa operate under a variety of property right arrangements or regimes (Bruce, 
1990). The nature of property and the specification of property rights are determined by 
members of a society in question. Property rights are defined as a set of rights and 
obligations governing access of individuals or groups to the stream of benefits, which can 
be derived from a resource (IFAD, 1995). A resource regime is a structure of rights and 
duties characterising the relationship of individuals to one another with respect to a 
particular resource (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). 
 
The literature on property generally recognizes four categories of regimes: the state property 
(res publica) where claim - at least nominally - rest with the government; private property - 
where claim rest with an individual; common property or communal property regimes (res 
communes), where claim rest with a group; and open access or non property situations (res 
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nullis), where there is no secure claim (Gibbs and Bromley, 1990; Swallow, 1990).  These 
categories are usually distinguished on the basis of the ease with which potential users can 
be excluded from access to the good ('excludability'), and whether using a portion of the 
good shrinks the supply that remains ('sub-tractability'). 'Public' goods which are non-
excludable and non-sub-tractable (e.g. street lights and clean air) contrast with private 
goods, which are both excludable and sub-tractable. Common property goods lie 
somewhere in between the two, and share some of the characteristics of each; exclusion is 
difficult, and they are sub-tractable (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
Thus, private property and common property can be seen not as mutually exclusive, but as 
two types of property with a good deal in common (Bruce and Mearns, 2002). As access to 
use of common property is confined to members of a defined user group, which excludes 
other potential beneficiaries, the common property therefore has some of the attributes of 
shared private property. On the other hand, common property regime is a way of privatising 
the rights to use a resource without having to divide the resource into individual holdings 
(McKean, 1995).  
 
2.2.2 Common property versus open access regimes 
The term 'common property' has been largely misunderstood and falsely interpreted 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Over the years, 'common property' has all too often been used 
to refer both to land or resources available to all and consequently not owned or managed 
by anyone, and also to situations where access is limited to a specific group that holds rights 
in common. The confusion between the two has been aggravated by the way a 1968 article 
by Garrett Hardin on the 'tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) has been interpreted and 
understood. Though this is not explicit in the article, the situation that Hardin was 
describing was in practice one that is more accurately termed 'unregulated open access' use 
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(Ostrom, 2000). However, it was widely interpreted as applying to any situation involving 
resource used in common by several or many users.  Failure to recognize 'common property' 
as a regulated form of resource tenure and use, managed by a group of users with exclusive 
rights to do so, and the consequent presumption that such a use is destined inevitably to lead 
to degradation of the resource, has had a profound impact on thinking, policy and practice 
related to control and management of rangelands and other natural resources (Ostrom, 
1992). In particular, it has contributed to the pursuit of land distribution policies that favour 
individual private landholdings, and has helped to justify state control of natural resources, 
like forests, ostensibly to ensure protection and productive use (Bruce, 1986).  
 
There is also confusion because 'common property' is used to refer to a resource or to the 
collective system for managing the resource, or to both (Ostrom, 1992). In this study, 
therefore, the term 'common pool resource' (CPR) has been used to characterize the 
resource, and the term 'common property' (or 'common property regime') is reserved for 
situations in which the resource is managed as common property (McKean and Ostrom, 
1995).  
 
2.2.3 Roles of institutions in the management of common pool resources  
In order to regulate the use and management of a common pool resource, there must be 
institutions that authorize and secure use by a particular group of users (to the exclusion of 
others), and institutions that set rules to govern this use and monitor and enforce those rules. 
Thus, common property systems can function only if the group is organized, or can organize 
itself, to set and implement such rules, provide individual members with inputs and services 
that are more effective when organized collectively, and provide a mechanism for 
negotiation and liaison with the state and other external entities (Ostrom, 2000). 
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It is also necessary to ensure that the user group is empowered to exercise the exclusive use 
rights that it claims. Much misunderstanding and confusion has arisen in this respect 
because of failure to distinguish between the rights to use a resource and the rights related to 
the resource itself. Rights may exist or be established that enable persons, or groups of 
persons, other than the owner to use the resource or some specified output of that resource. 
This becomes particularly important in understanding uses where much of the resource is 
owned by the state, but most usage is by individuals, collective or industrial entities, 
frequently with multiple users exercising rights to different products or to use at different 
times of the year (Ostrom, 1992,). Equally, systems based on communal ownership or 
control of the land may contain tenurial niches in which individual and family property also 
exists. Common property should therefore not be confused with 'communal tenure' (Bruce 
and Mearns, 2002). 
 
The distinction between stock and flow (output) is another aspect of resource management 
that is often overlooked or misunderstood. The institutional arrangements for producing and 
using flow units are quite likely to be different from those controlling and managing the 
stock units. Problems and issues can arise separately in each, and the governance 
arrangements needed to handle both successfully are frequently complex (McKean and 
Ostrom, 1995). Perhaps the most important area of misunderstanding relates to the relative 
merits of private and common property. The preference for private property that underlies 
so much of the transfer out of common property rests on the argument that well-defined 
property rights are needed in order to ensure that the holder will use the resource efficiently 
and responsibly, and that only private property rights provide this security. However, much 
of the debate about privatisation assumes that private property is synonymous with 
individual ownership. This overlooks the fact that the definition of private property actually 
has to do with rights, not who holds them, and that much private property is held by 
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business partnerships and shareholder-owned industrial corporations, and other collective 
entities (Bruce, 1990). It is therefore argued that, "like individual parcellation, common 
property gives resource owners the incentive to husband their resources, to make 
investments in resource quality and to manage them sustainably and thus efficiently over 
long term" (McKean, 1995).  
 
2.2.4 Circumstances favouring common property regimes 
The principal argument in support of privatisation to individuals or expropriation by the 
state is based on the assumption that the cohesion and discipline necessary for effective 
collective management cannot be achieved, resulting in unregulated open access overuse 
with a 'tragedy of the commons' conclusion. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that 
circumstances no longer permit effective collective control or, more fundamentally, that the 
changing environment within which individuals must operate fosters behaviour patterns 
inimical to collective cooperation (Dietz et al., 2002). However, these arguments fail to take 
into account those factors, which encourage collective action, and the self-regulating 
capabilities of groups of users (Runge, 1986). These arguments also overlook the reasons 
why the alternatives to common property management may themselves not be sustainable. 
The same reasons that make it difficult to secure exclusion from a CPR may make it even 
more difficult to achieve the degree of separation, exclusion and protection necessary to 
privatise it. Individual private use can also lead to overuse and degradation, particularly on 
the low-productivity sites characteristic of many common pool resource areas. Equally, the 
state may not be able to control, manage or prevent degradation to a resource it has 
expropriated (Berkes et al., 1989).  
 
Furthermore, privatisation is unlikely to improve the efficiency of meeting the needs of 
those who used the resource as common property. In fact, by transferring control of the 
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resource to a limited number of individuals who thereby acquire the social and legal 
sanction to exclude others, privatisation is likely to exacerbate the problems of those 
without access to private property (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). The thrust toward 
expropriation or privatisation also tends to ignore the fact that breakdowns in common 
property systems may reflect deficiencies in policy or policy implementation, rather than 
their appropriateness for managing a resource. For example, common property seldom has 
the same degree of support in law, or elicits the same response from the authorities when 
threatened, as private property (Bruce and Mearns, 2002). The central question that needs to 
be addressed is, under what circumstances doe’s common property provide the best match 
between the resource and the economic, social and institutional context within which it is 
located? As long as resources are abundant, and pressures on them are low, the need for 
regulation and rules is unlikely to arise, and open access use is likely to be as appropriate as 
any other regime (McKean, 1995).  
 
2.2.5 Advantages of common property regimes  
Dietz et al. (2002) and McKean (1995) observe that, in many situations more than one of 
following conditions apply, particularly where people are interested in making good use of a 
resource system capable of generating multiple products:  
 
(i) Indivisibility  
The resource may have physical traits that preclude parcelling. The production system may 
not be amenable to division or demarcation. It may not be possible to establish boundaries 
around the resource system, or resources may be mobile over large territory.  
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(ii) Uncertainty in location of productive zones  
In fragile environments nature may impose great uncertainty on the productivity of any 
particular section of a resource system, and the location of the unproductive sections cannot 
easily be predicted from year to year, but the 'average' or 'total' productivity of the entire 
area may be fairly steady over the years. In this situation, the resource system is stationary 
and may even have fairly obvious boundaries, but its productive portions are not stationary. 
In such systems resource users may well prefer to share the entire area and decide together 
where to concentrate the use at a particular time, rather than parcelling the area into 
individual tracts and thereby imposing the risk of total disaster on those users whose parcels 
turn out to be unproductive in a given time.  
 
(iii) Productive efficiency through internalizing externalities  
In many resource systems, uses in one zone immediately affect uses and productivity in 
another. If these externalities are substantial, creating a common property regime to make 
resource management decisions jointly can provide a mechanism for acknowledging and 
internalizing the multiple negative externalities that are implicit in resource use in this 
setting (McKean, 1995).  
 
(iv) Administrative efficiency  
Even if resources are readily divisible into parcels, and where intensive independent use of 
adjacent parcels does not produce negative externalities, the administrative support to 
enforce property rights to individual parcels may not be available (Runge, 1990). The 
society may be too poor to support a large court system to enforce individual land titles, and 
even low-cost fencing would be expensive by the society's standards. Creating a common 
property regime in this case can be a way of substituting collective management rules, 
which function as imaginary fences and informal courts internal to the user group, for what 
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is missing. It is less expensive in these circumstances, and it is within the power of a group 
of resource users to create a common property regime (McKean, 1995). 
 
Historically, common property regimes evolved where the demand on a resource was 
becoming too great to tolerate open access use any longer, so that property rights in the 
resource had to be created, and where other factors make it impossible or undesirable to 
allocate the resource to individuals (McKean, 1995). A common property regime can also 
emerge as a way to secure control over a territory or a resource, to exclude outsiders or to 
regulate the individual use by members of the community  (Bruce and Mearns, 2002). 
Common property, like any other property or governance regime, is likely to be maintained 
only as long as it is appropriate to the changing situation in which it is found. For instance it 
is a main stay production system in most of pastoral land use systems prevalent in African 
rangelands. 
 
2.2.6 Collective action in the management of common pool resources 
Sustainable management of common pool resources is dependent, to a large extent, on the 
collective action of a group of resource users. According to Olson (1965) success in 
collective action is firstly dependent on the nature of the group such as: its size, age and 
purpose.  Secondly, it is dependent to the extent to which group characteristics are shared 
among group members such as homogeneity in origin and in goals. It also depends on the 
role of incentives in the realisation of collective action and overcoming of free-rider 
problems (Dietz et al., 2002). Such incentives may take the form of positive “joint product” 
benefits to members who participate in group activities or of “penalties” imposed on those 
who fail to contribute to the collective action. Other factors include the political will and 
psychological attitudes such as relative deprivation among group members (Hardin, 1982).   
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2.2.7 Why care about common pool resources? 
Development agencies and policy makers concerned with rural development in Africa 
should care about the future of CPRs for three related sets of reasons. First, CPRs are the 
integral part of the natural environment. Secondly, CPRs are central to rural income and 
welfare. This is especially important for the poor. Thirdly, many CPR regimes in Africa are 
now disintegrating in the face of socio-economic and environmental pressures. Modern 
economic forces have often favoured privatisation of previously common - pool resources, 
narrowing access to a smaller fraction of the population. From the other direction, new 
states have often nationalised rural resources. Legally, at least, this has destroyed common 
property institutions.  In practice, however, these institutions may continue to function in 
some form typically weakened by no longer having recognised authority (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
Common property resource regimes remain the appropriate management strategy in three 
types of circumstances.  First, where a group venture is the only practicable way of securing 
and controlling the resource. Second, where resource productivity per unit area is not high 
enough to guarantee individual and public returns needed to sustain private property regimes. 
Third, more contentious case is where new technologies could support privatization by a 
minority with access to them, but at the expenses of the poorer majority.  In such cases, 
expropriation of communal resources has led to resource-use conflicts.  This remains true in 
most rangelands and forests (IFAD, 1995). 
 
2.3 Natural Resources Tenure as a Social Institution 
Natural resource tenure refers to the terms and conditions on which natural resources are 
held and used. According to Bruce (1986) if land is the natural resource under focus, land 
tenure refers to the terms and conditions on which land is held and used.  Tenure is not a 
matter of man’s relationship to natural resource such as land but is rather a social institution.  
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It is a matter of relationships between individuals and groups of individuals in which rights 
and obligations with respect to control and use of land, for instance, are defined.  In 
traditional agrarian societies natural resource tenure is a profoundly important social 
institution (Birgegard, 1993). 
 
Access to and use of natural resources, and notably land, has been and still is the key means 
for survival for a majority of the people in Sub - Saharan Africa (SSA).  The control and use 
of land and other natural resources has been the way to sustain the family or the household, 
to maintain the clan and to enrich the tribe (Mkangi, 1983). Access to and control of natural 
resources is also a prime source of social position and power.  Therefore, land and natural 
resource tenure is a profoundly political issue. One can argue that land has significance in 
all dimensions of rural life (Birgegard, 1993).  Therefore land tenure, becomes an all 
embracing social institution. Consequently, forced changes in tenure rules have 
ramifications to the entire social fabric of rural societies (Okoth – Ogendo, 1991; Mkangi, 
1983). This fact is too often overlooked.  The analysis of tenure issues is in most cases 
reduced to a matter of land use, agriculture production efficiency, access to credit, 
fragmentation of holdings, mechanisms for conflict resolution, or the like, failing to 
recognize the wider implications of tenure. The weakness of such an analysis becomes most 
apparent when it is used as a basis for tenure reform proposals (Birgegard, 1993).  
  
2.3.1 The multiplicity of indigenous tenure systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Tenure systems in SSA show a bewildering wide diversity. Different ethnic origins, 
histories of conquest and subordination, densities of settlement, social structures, natural 
resource endowment, agriculture production systems, technology, religious beliefs and a 
host of other location and group specific factors have resulted in a wide range of natural 
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resource tenure systems. This multiplicity of tenure systems has evolved over time and is 
presently in an accelerated process of dynamic change (Birgegard, 1993).  
 
Typically, in most indigenous systems, each individual has a number of tenure rights or 
bundles of rights with respect to different natural resources. Yet, rights often differ between 
individuals and categories of individuals.  Under certain settings, several individuals may 
claim rights to one and the same resource (Feder and Feeny, 1991).  This is a typical case 
for common property regimes governing the use of say forests and grazing lands (Norohna, 
1989). 
 
2.3.2 Dynamism in indigenous natural resources tenure systems in Sub –Saharan 
Africa 
The indigenous natural resources tenure systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are not static.  A 
range of factors can lead to change in natural resources tenure systems.  Some are dramatic 
such as conquest or subordination in war, including colonization.  Natural calamities, such 
as extended drought and famine may also generate change.  Other factors occur more 
gradually such as increase in population, innovations in production technology, 
commercialisation of production, domestic migration, and re-orientation of religious beliefs 
such as the spread of Islam and the introduction of western type land laws (Birgegard, 
1993).  
 
One, clearly discernible, change in indigenous tenure systems has been observed under 
increased population pressure and the influence of commercialisation of natural resource 
use where tenure systems tend to become increasingly individualized. This trend is 
particularly clear for arable land (Bruce, 1986).    Individualization of tenure also means 
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that secondary right holders such as women see their rights diminishing.  Some see these 
changes as social disintegration (Shipton, 1988).  
 
2.3.3 Tenure reforms in Sub- Saharan African context  
In the Sub-Saharan African context, tenure reform is generally not considered to imply a 
redistribution of land or other natural resources. Rather, tenure reform refers to changes in 
the terms and conditions on which natural resources are held and used.  Reform implies an 
attempt to influence a change through interventions (Bruce, 1986). Post-independent SSA 
has seen numerous government interventions for changing natural resource tenure.  
 
Sweeping reforms in most countries declared the state as the owner of all the land.  Previous 
freehold titles were transformed to leasehold titles. In countries choosing a socialist path to 
development like Tanzania, tenure reforms started a process of collectivities of production 
on cooperative and state farms (Tenga, 1987). Few countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and 
Botswana, attempted to integrate indigenous tenure systems with government-controlled 
land administration systems. Few other countries have pushed on individualization of tenure 
through nationwide programmes. The most systematic compulsory tenure reform 
programme is that of Kenya (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991). In spite of many attempts to reform 
tenure systems in Tanzania, the most common result is that the state stands as the formal 
owner of land and other natural resources but indigenous tenure systems rule the way these 
resources are controlled and used (Shivji, 1998).  
 
The current debate on tenure reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa focuses on the possibility that 
such reforms may accelerate economic development. In this debate the analysis is often 
reduced to the economic efficiency aspects of tenure. More recently, sustainability in 
resource use has been added. This focus overlooks the profound significance of tenure in 
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the formation and functioning of the entire social fabric of a society.  Tenure reforms should 
be seen in such a broad perspective but seldom is.  An ill-conceived tenure reform is not 
only likely to fail in its development objectives, but it is also a powerful source of social 
disruption (Birgegard, 1993). The question is then what type of tenure reform, if any, can 
increase efficiency in resource use and also contribute to sustainable resource-use.   
 
2.3.4 Tenure and common pool resources 
Common pool resources (CPR) are simply resources used in common.  CPR are a sub-
category of public goods. A specific characteristic of CPR is that their use is sub-tractable 
(Ostrom, 2000). Increased ecological concerns have brought new life to an old and 
controversial debate on tenure and CPR.  The arguments against communal management 
arrangements in favour of private management systems have come out with even stronger 
force for agricultural land.  At the same time research findings on communal management 
systems and experiences from pilot development activities have questioned the privatization 
argument and suggested that there might be alternatives (Birgegard, 1993). 
 
2.4 Land Tenure in Tanzania 
2.4.1 Evolution of land tenure 
Land tenure in Tanzania, as in most developing countries, has been characterized by a 
dualism of both statutory and customary land regimes (Shivji, 1998). This heterogeneity is 
reminiscent of the political history of the country, particularly the colonial past. The most 
important political events are the establishment in 1885 of Germany administration. This 
was followed by British administration (1918 – 1961) as a “Mandated Territory” (later a 
Trust Territory) under the auspicious of the League of Nations (later the United Nations 
Organisation) (URT, 1994). The colonial era was followed by the independence under a 
government committed to the philosophy of socialism (during 1960s to late 1970s) and the 
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subsequent economic liberalization and structural adjustments of 1980s (Shivji, 1995). Each 
of these historical landmarks had significant impacts on the land tenure system in the 
country.  As such, the evolution of land tenure in the country can be examined under three 
main eras: the pre-colonial, colonial and post- independence periods ( Shivji, 1998).  
 
2.4.2 Land tenure during pre-colonial period 
Prior to colonial period, land holding in Tanzania was based on customary laws of different 
tribes. Land allocation was controlled by the recognised authorities including - chiefs, elders 
and headmen – who allocated land to individual members, on behalf of the tribe (MLHUD, 
1995). In many areas there was communal land for grazing and forest lands for gathering 
fuel-wood, and shifting agriculture was practised extensively. Such cultivation was 
practicable and viable under conditions of low population densities, abundance of land and 
subsistence agriculture. Under this system each member of the family and heir, had a 
definite share in land hold under clan tenure, but none had a right to dispose the land 
(Tenga, 1992, 2001). 
 
 
2.4.3 Land tenure under colonial administration 
The colonial administration - the Germany (1885 – 1916) and the British (1918 – 1961)- 
introduced a property regime that invested ownership of all land resources in the state, 
creating state property regime. In effect this alienated local communities’ customary 
ownership of land resources to the state and foreigners (URT, 1994). The institutional 
mechanism used to effect this was through introduction of legal instruments: laws, decrees 
and regulations (Shivji, 1998). The Germany decree “regarding creation, acquisition and 
conveyance of crown lands” of 1895 and the British land Ordinance No.3 of 1923, vested a 
radical title (i.e. ultimate ownership and control) in the state under the discretion of the 
Governor. Colonial authorities assumed that the indigenous occupants had no ownership 
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rights over the land (URT, 1994), leading to bloody “Majimaji” rebellion of 1886 – 1893 
(URT, 1994). According to Shivji (1998), this property regime was aimed at facilitating the 
exploitation of resources in the colony and asserts conquest powers.  
 
This was indeed, the beginning of the breakdown of the customary institutions for 
governing land resources. For instance the British administration, applying the indirect rule 
approach, established the Native Authorities, which usurped land-allocating functions of 
traditional land allocating authorities. The Native Authorities were gradually replaced by 
Local Government Authorities created under the Local Government Ordinance CAP 333 of 
1953. The Local Authority was an elected government; this is apposed to appointment by 
basing on hereditary rights which applied to the Native Authority (Tenga, 1987). By 1963 
the Native Authorities and African chiefs were phased out by the Native Authorities 
(Repeal) Act of 1963. 
 
 
2.4.4 Land tenure during post-independence period  
The independent state adopted virtually the same colonial land ordinance.  For example, the 
Tanganyika Land Ordinance of 1963 and subsequent land laws retained the radical title 
where all lands in the country were public lands vested on the President (Tenga, 1987), who 
holds lands in trust of all people of Tanzania (URT, 1994).  For the past 40 years until 1995, 
there has been no comprehensive land tenure policy, except some land tenure conversions 
(Okoth – Ogendo, 1991). For example - the Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government 
Lease Act, No. 24 (Cap. 523) of 1963; Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act, No. 
47 of 1966; Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Regrant) Act, No. 8 of 1966 – are among the 
legal instruments that facilitated land tenure conversions (URT, 1994). Shivji (1998) 
observes that none of these measures amounted to land reform or land redistribution.  
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Other supplementary statutes like – the Land (Law of Property and Conveyance) Ordinance, 
Cap. 114; the Land Registration Ordinance, Cap 334; the Town and Country Planning 
Ordinance, Cap. 378; the Land Acquisition Act of 1967; and the Limitation Act of 1971, all 
gave primary emphasis to the Granted Right of Occupancy (Shivji, 1994). But very little 
protection was deemed for customary tenure system under which about 95% of the land in 
the country is governed. Nonetheless, substantial changes in land tenure came about through 
other policies. More importantly the late colonial land reforms and modernisation ideology 
continued to influence and direct post-independence policies with varying, mostly, adverse 
effects on customary lands (Shivji, 1998). Modernising the traditional systems meant 
removing them from their traditional surroundings and their institutions and integrating 
them into the capitalist market institutions. These policies were implemented through a 
number of programs: settlement schemes and group ranch projects, nationalisation, 
“villagisation” operation, village titling and legislation; and economic liberalisation 
(Kihondo, 1999). 
 
2.4.5 Modernisation policies 
The modernization policies of early 1960s emphasised on land individualization, titling and 
registration (World Bank, 1961).  The Village Settlements Act, No. 27 of 1965, provided 
for establishment of the village settlement schemes. Whereby the rural settlement 
commission would be granted a right of occupancy to lands and the individual farmers 
would hold the lands under specified derivative rights (Jacobs, 1980).  The rangelands 
development projects (Range Development and Management Act, No. 57, of 1964) aimed 
at establishing of group ranches in the main pastoral areas (Jacobs, 1980). But both 
programmes failed largely because there was no participation whatsoever of peasants and 
pastoralists - in the planning, management and use of land.  The perception of the people on 
land tenure embedded in their customary systems and their land rights deriving thereof were 
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disregarded (URT, 1994; Coulson, 1982). These policy measures had in effect initiated the 
process of open access regimes. 
 
2.4.6 Nationalisation and “villagisation” policies 
Substantial changes in land tenure generally and customary tenure in particular was brought 
about by “nationalisation” and “villagization” policies of late 1960s and 1970s Tanzania, 
then committed herself to socialist production system (Coulson, 1982). The implementation 
of socialism policies was followed by nationalisation of private enterprises, whereby assets 
were taken over by parastatals including land, which was held under rights of occupancy. 
Land held under customary systems in the villages was also alienated to parastatals through 
government allocations, creating potentials for land disputes (Shivji, 1998; Lane and 
Moorehead, 1996). The “villagisation” operation was conducted during mid 1970s in 
implementation of socialism policies. It involved reallocation of existing villages and 
resettlements, peasants and pastoralists in new or old villages (Tenga, 1987) centred on 
communal production (Nyerere, 1968). However, according to Shivji (1998) “villagisation” 
was carried out without any accompanying authority in law. The result was confusion in 
tenure and the undermining of security for customary land holders. Tenga (1987) argues 
that, “villagisation” increased the possibilities of alienating village land on unprecedented 
scale. 
 
The legal instruments used to legalise land expropriation under villagisation include: the 
Rural Lands (Planning and Utilisation) Act, No. 14, of 1973. According to Shivji  (1998), 
the Act was laden by a number of shortcomings, in particular the deemed rights of 
occupancy by customary holders was never addressed by it. Another instrument is the 
Village and Ujamaa Village (Demarcation and Registration) Act of 1975 (URT, 1975a), 
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provided for the granting of “right of occupancy” to the village council. This Act was 
intended to provide villages and village lands greater security.  
 
In practice, however, village titling turned out to be yet another source of insecurity for 
customary holders. As the Act provided the village council, and therefore other government 
institutions, which control it, enfettered powers over village land.  There was no checks and 
balances in place to prevent corrupt tendencies by council members to granting land to 
outsiders against the interest of villagers (Shivji, 1998).  At local levels, titling has given 
rise to boundary conflicts.  Shivji (1998) cite cases of villages obtaining certificates under 
suspicious circumstances, for example the boundary conflicts between Sonjo and Maasai 
villages in Ngorongoro District in Arusha region. The fact that the Maasai hold the land title 
had never prevented the Sonjo claim that the former had encroached on their land (URT, 
1994). 
 
The institutional provisions of the two Acts (Village Land Act, 1967, and District 
Authorities Act of 1963) were repealed and merged in the Local Government (District 
Authorities) Act No. 1 of 1982.  However, the legal framework for village land remained 
unclear and a potential source of conflicts (Shivji, 1987). In effect villagization destroyed 
what little was left of the security of deemed rights of occupancy deriving from the 1923 
Land Ordinance.  This in effect was largely as a result of institutional clash, because a 
number of administrative structures that had mandate to allocate land were put in place 
without formally repealing the precedent authorities. The case in point is best exemplified 
by the Local Government system which was superseded by Development Councils (DCs), 
created by the Decentralisation of Government Administration (Interim Provisions) Act of 
1972 (Shivji, 1998). The DCs took over the land allocation functions and control of usage, 
but there were no formal repeal of the Local Government Ordinance. The Village and 
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“Ujamaa” village (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act, No. 21 of 1975, 
(URT, 1975a) allowed registration of villages and vested into the “Village Council” powers 
to oversee usage and transfer of village lands (Tenga, 1998). Under the Act, the District 
Development Council had to allocate land for village use to village council, but it was not 
clear whether the DDC had any land reserve for allocation to the villages (Shivji, 1998). 
The Act set up the “Village Assembly” (a meeting of all adults in the village), the elected 
village council of 25 persons, and a sub-committee consisting of five members, which deals 
with land matters. But under the law, the Village Assembly has very little power, while the 
Village Council was subject to powers of District Councils, and other government agencies 
at higher levels (URT, 1994). This had created a total confusion over the tenure regime with 
jurisdiction over the village lands. Consequently, most villagers in Tanzania have ever since 
been haunted by the apprehension about their lands (URT, 1994). 
 
The Village Act of 1975 was replaced by the Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 
No. 7 of 1982 (URT, 1982b). This Act repeals also the Local Government Ordinance, and 
incorporated the system of villages under its structures (Tenga, 1998). But this did not 
improve the security of tenure of customary title holders. The government attempted to 
normalise the situation by introducing the Regulation of Land Tenure (Establishment of 
Villages) Act, No. 22 of 1992 (Shivji, 1998). The Act sought to extinguish pre – 
villagisation customary rights in villages established during villagisation process, but the 
Act had since been declared unconstitutional by the High Court (Shivji, 1994). Thus, village 
titling has potential for devastating consequences for the land rights of the rural poor, and in 
practice it is not feasible. The National Land Policy of 1995 has abandoned village titling 
(MLHUD, 1995).  
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2.4.7 Economic liberalisation policies 
During mid 1980s the government adopted policies for liberalisation of the economy 
(Campbell and Stein, 1991). These aimed at creating enabling environment for a free 
market and to encourage foreign investors.  However, the measure contributed to land 
alienation and expropriation, particularly for lands held by customary owners in villages. 
The legal instrument which provides for economic liberalisation is the National Investment 
(Promotion and Protection) Act No. 10, of 1990 (Shivji, 1998) which was repealed by the 
Tanzania Investment Act No. 26 of 1997 (URT, 1997a). The main aim of the legislature is 
to attract foreign investors, at the expense of customary landholders.  
 
2.5 Pastoral Resource Tenure  
2.5.1 Overview 
The pastoral systems operate within localised informal as well as formal institutions. The 
informal or customary institutions are the habitual ways – not established in written law – a 
pastoral society manages its everyday affairs.  These include customary land tenure, 
inheritance, trade, rules and conventions about marriage and conflict resolution over access 
to resources. The formal institutions relevant to pastoral development include national 
constitutions and legislatures dealing with land ownership and use, property rights in 
animals or trade (Swift, 1996). The pastoral communities in dry land areas have developed a 
large array of tenure arrangements and institutions for access and use of resources, which 
are risk sharing devices. This demands high flexibility in institutions and tenure 
arrangements (Ngaido, 1999). Thus, equity remains the major concern among pastoralists 
who tend to regard their scarce resources (land, water and forage) as better managed for the 
general good under communal control (Child et al., 1984). The in-built equitable resource 
access guarantees satisfaction among members, who in turn abide to the rules (Ngaido, 
1999).  
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2.5.2 Pastoral production systems  
Pastoralism evolved as a response to two factors; medium human population densities and 
the presence of extensive rangelands, usually  marginal lands unsuitable for rain-fed crop 
production.  Pastoralism way of life entails continuous movement of animals in search of 
pasture and water. Though pastoralism faces harsh and unpredictable conditions and 
environment, it has been relatively stable over long-term in terms of providing livelihoods. 
Due to their need for widespread mobility, pastoral communities often come into contact 
with sedentary agricultural communities, who on their part, due to their increasing 
populations, increasingly encroach on the marginal pastoral land that could be converted to 
agricultural production (Shem, 2004).  
 
In East Africa and much of Sub-Saharan Africa, pastoral communities are generally found 
in dry lands, often referred to arid and semi-arid areas (ASALs).  Dry lands are those areas 
that cannot support sustained and reliable crop agriculture. Sustained and reliable cropping 
has been defined as 75% probability of harvesting the most drought tolerant traditional crop, 
usually millet in East Africa. The areas exhibit a high diversity in climate, landforms soil 
types and vegetation. Key ecological features include harsh climatic conditions that are 
characterized by low yearly rainfall (about 250-600mm), which show high variability, both 
in space, and time, coupled with year-round high temperatures (35-40°C). These climatic 
conditions result in short growing seasons often randomly scattered in space and time, low 
pasture production, and often prevalence of ephemeral and annual species (Bekure et al., 
1991). 
 
Livestock keeping is the major occupation and also the main mode of production, referred 
to as pastoralism. Today, pastoralism represents a key and widespread human land-use 
system, occupying over 25% of the earth’s land surface. In Eastern Africa, pastoral lands 
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stretch from southern Sudan down to Mozambique. Examples of pastoral communities 
within this territory include the Nuer of Sudan, Afir and Beni Amir of Eritrea, Maasai, 
Pokot, Samburu, Turkana, Rendille and Somali of Kenya, Jie and Karamojong of Uganda, 
and the Maasai and Barabaig of Tanzania (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the main pastoral groups in Africa 
Source: Bonfiglioli, 1992 
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These are only very few examples. These heterogeneous communities differ, even if only 
slightly, in objectives, strategies, needs, management styles, and the degree of movement in 
search of pasture and water for their livestock (Shem, 2004). In Tanzania, the pastoral 
population is estimated at about 250,000 people.  The main pastoral groups are: the Maasai-
speaking groups, such as the Maasai in the North and Ilparakuyo (Baraguyu, Wakwavi or 
Kwavi), in the East; and the Barabaig in the North-West. There are also a growing number 
of agro-pastoralists, including the Kuria, Sukuma, Gogo and Nyamwezi. Pastoralists, by 
their very nature, are flexible and opportunistic and can rapidly switch management systems 
and adopt other land-use systems in overall extensive livestock production system. For 
example, cattle herders could practice regular systems of transhumance for a long period, 
building up relationships with crop cultivators on their routes.  
 
However, in the event of extreme drought they switch to highly ‘nomadic’ patterns moving 
to new areas in search for pasture and water for animals, thus breaking the relationships 
established with the farmers. When the crisis passes or eases out, they may revert to their 
former pattern or adopt a total new mode of management. Based on mobility level, 
pastoralism can broadly be defined in three ways. Firstly as nomadic (pure)pastoralism, this 
essentially revolves around livestock keeping and the utilization of natural pastures. 
Nomadic pastoralists are forced to constantly move out in search of pasture and water in 
order to maintain their subsistence, namely livestock. The routes followed depend on 
environmental conditions, the state of available resources, and the livestock species being 
managed. Nomadic pastoralism is characterized by the absence of cultivation, even for 
supplementary income. In Tanzania, both the Barbaig and the Maasai have for a long time 
been known to be pure pastoralists. 
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Secondly, there is transhumance pastoralism, which involves regular seasonal migrations. 
These migrations may take place between dry and wet season grazing fields or between 
highland and lowland pastures or between pastures and salt licks. The main difference 
between transhumance and the nomadic pastoralism is that under normal circumstances 
migration patterns of the transhumants are usually predetermined. These patterns do not, 
however, imply rigidity, but are often subject to substantial deviation as need arises. There 
is strong association with higher-rainfall zones; if the rainfall is such that the presence of 
pasture is not a constraint, then herders can afford to develop permanent relations with 
particular sites, for example building permanent houses. This type of pastoralism is usually 
associated with diversification to other economic ventures such as crop production and 
fishing.  
 
Thirdly, is agro-pastoralism, which is a highly diverse form of pastoralism. Agro-
pastoralists can be described as settled pastoralists who cultivate sufficient areas to feed 
their families from their own crop production. Therefore, cultivation forms the main 
subsistence activity, but livestock rearing remains an integral part of the production system. 
By engaging in both livestock and crop production, agro-pastoralists minimize the risk of 
falling below critical threshold of disaster, and therefore maximize the probability of 
survival. Agropastoralists generally occupy zones whose rainfall can support dryland crop 
cultivation, i.e. the semi arid areas. More recently, a new category, urban pastoralists have 
sprung up. This term has been used to refer to pastoralists whose true pastoral lifestyle and 
mode of production is no longer in operation, and as a result they have either been made 
sedentary around some basic facilities provided by relief missions, government and others, 
or have voluntarily moved to urban, or trading centres in search of alternative livelihoods 
(Shemu, 2004).   
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2.5.3 Some key features of pastoralism 
It is important to point out some key features of pastoralism, which involves risk 
minimization mechanisms and pastoral traditional knowledge. 
 
 
2.5.3.1 Risk minimization mechanisms 
During their long experience and interaction with environmental uncertainty, African 
pastoralists have developed highly flexible social systems and elaborate set of both 
individual and collective-based survival strategies that allow them to effectively utilize 
harsh and extremely variable environment in order to minimize loss of livelihoods 
(Herlocker, 1999).  These include high mobility, herd diversification, herd splitting, and 
herd maximization  
 
(i)  Mobility  
The pastoral production environment is characterized by varying temporal and spatial 
variation in the distribution and quantity of rainfall and forage. As such, pastoralists and 
their livestock must possess a high degree of resource utilization mobility in response to 
unpredictable forage and water availability. The prime objective is to maximize livestock 
survival.  Two types of mobility can be identified. The first is resource utilization mobility, 
which is a response to unpredictable forage and water availability. The strategy allows 
pastoral herds to make use of dispersed forage resources when they are available, and most 
nutritious. The second type is drought-escape mobility, which involves long distance 
migration to evade drought conditions in one locality (Homewood and Rogers, 1991). 
 
(ii) Herd diversification 
Herd diversification involves keeping several species/types of livestock.  The use of 
different livestock species has ecological and economic advantages.  It allows for an 
  
57
efficient use of pasture resources and facilitates a more reliable supply of food.  For 
example cattle and sheep mainly feed on grasses but during times of herbage scarcity, sheep 
shift towards mixed feeding, and supplementing grass with low shrubs.  The overall 
scenario is that although animals lie within the same habitat boundary, they feed on 
different plants.  The diverse attributes of the different animal species are an advantage.  For 
instance goats and sheep are important in the pastoral economy due to their higher 
reproductive rate and hardiness, which makes them more suitable for herd reconstruction 
after catastrophes (Swift et al., 1996). 
 
(iii)  Herd maximization 
It is generally more rational for pastoralists to maximize a herd of animals beyond a ‘basic’ 
minimum, whatever that would be.  The herd plays an important role as risk ‘capital’ during 
stressful periods, for example during prolonged drought and livestock disease outbreaks, the 
large herds will spread thin the risk of total loss.  In the pastoral nomadic system, being 
largely isolated from national cash economies, surplus stock serve as an investment and 
some kind of insurance during periods of pasture and water scarcity, when some animals 
may be sold to purchase food grains. The herds are also necessary for building social 
alliances through transfer of animals to friends and kinsfolk as loans, especially during 
times of need. This is an essential element in a production system operating in an 
environment where government insurance or formal banks are non-existent (Bekure et al., 
1991). 
 
(iv) Splitting of herds 
With increasing dryness, pastoralists split their herds into smaller groups in order to visit 
different grazing areas simultaneously.  Thus, by moving substantial numbers of livestock 
away from areas of concentration, the rate of use of pastures around dry seasonal water 
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holes is minimized.  In effect, each range area is utilized only for a short period such that 
pastures remain in good condition. Such intermittent use of resources improves forage 
vigour and growth (Swift et al., 1996).  
 
2.5.3.2 Pastoral traditional knowledge 
Pastoral traditional knowledge (PTK) consists of a large body of knowledge generated by 
pastoral communities over time. It is unique to a culture or society, and believed to be 
consistent with coherent sets of cognitive techniques. Otherwise known as indigenous 
knowledge, traditional wisdom, indigenous technical knowledge and community 
environmental knowledge, it is made up of an elaborate system of knowledge including 
concepts, beliefs, perceptions and processes. This knowledge is acquired, augmented, stored 
and disseminated. It is developed over generations as a product of pastoralist-environment 
interactions, and through creativity and innovation. Traditional pastoral knowledge remains 
dynamic and borrows from other knowledge domains through contact. It is environmentally 
derived and embedded in the cultures of pastoral communities. Furthermore, it is adaptable, 
appropriate, and technical. Its technical nature being its capacity to provide sustainable 
environmental services. These include practical application to natural resource management 
and general human survival strategies in unpredictable environments. Until about a decade 
and a half ago, pastoral traditional knowledge was ignored and marginalized and pastoral 
communities and their knowledge were seen as primitive, irrational, simple and static.  
 
However, these negative views and beliefs have been counteracted by an increasing 
recognition of PTK by governments and international development agencies as basis for 
participatory approaches to development that have proved to be cost-effective and 
sustainable (Herlocker, 1999). PTK is closely related to survival and subsistence of 
pastoralists. It therefore provides a basis for decision making on food security, human and 
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animal health, education, natural resource management, and other community based 
activities. PTK has the capacity to blend with knowledge based on science and technology 
and should therefore be considered as complementary to scientific and technological efforts 
to solve social and economic problems (Herlocker, 1999). 
 
(i)  Characteristics of PTK 
PTK has certain unique characteristics (Shem, 2004,  Maundu, 1996) including: 
• It is generated within pastoral communities wherein it forms the basis for decision-
making and survival strategies. 
• It is location and culture specific, but allows for some degree of overlap due to 
contacting between communities or cultures. 
• It concerns with critical issues of humans and natural resource management. 
• It is oral in nature and not systematically documented. 
• It is dynamic and based on innovation, adaptation and experimentation. 
 
(ii)  Biological basis of pastoral land use  
The human population of pastoralists in arid and semi arid rangelands include many ethnic 
groups, cultures and attitudes.  Although other social factors are involved, the biological 
approach is the most helpful in understanding the root causes of the land use problems in 
range area today (Herlocker, 1999).  
 
Pastoralists depend wholly upon their livestock for food and other necessities, whereby milk 
is always the basic constituent of pastoral man diet. It is estimated that the average daily 
dietary requirement is about 2,300 calories per adult (Pratty and Gwyane, 1975). FAO 
census data in East Africa indicate that an average pastoral family consists of about eight 
individuals, half of these being children below 14 years of age (Shem, 2004).  This equals 
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6.5 adult equivalents; and it follows that the daily food need is about 15 000 calories per 
family (Shem, 2004). This can be provided by any combination of milk, meat and blood 
(Herlocker, 1999). Because milk is the pastoralist’s basic need, his herd is composed very 
differently to that of the commercial rancher (a pastoralist depending on the production of 
meat). Only lactating females produce milk, and nomadic pastoralists therefore strive to 
maintain as many females as possible.  Typically, pastoralists’ herds include 50 to 60 per 
cent of breeding females, compared to the rancher’s 20 to 25 per cent.  This, in turn, leads to 
herd with an inherent capacity for very rapid increase when conditions are favourable 
(Pratty and Gwyney, 1977).  Since, in rangeland, rainfall is always very erratic (the lower, 
the more erratic) rapid increase in good conditions leads to over-population in the bad years 
which inevitably follow.  This is one of the principal causes of overgrazing today, since the 
animals destroy or damage their environment before they die of starvation. A beef rancher, 
in contrast, is uninterested in milk except as food for his young animals, and will maintain 
no more females than are needed to breed his slaughter stock, which he will dispose 
prematurely if need be (Swift et al., 1996). 
 
Therefore a herd needed to provide for a pastoralist and his family must be composed of 
large milking stock, augmented by small stock to provide most of the meat ration. 
Ecologically, such a herd is quite sound since, for a given biomass of animals, the effect on 
range vegetation is less selective and severe. As such, the human carrying capacity of the 
land is maximized by emphasizing milk, rather than meat and can therefore support more 
people per animal (Brown, 1991).   In much of East Africa, and especially in the more arid 
areas, critical population density is less than 4 persons per km2 even when the land is in 
optimum condition; and for the range land area as a whole, including the semi-desert zone 
of northern Kenya, the mean may not much exceed the figure of 3 persons per km2.  For any 
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area, of course, the critical human population density can be calculated from the number of 
stock units required per capita for substance and the land area needed to support one unit. 
 
(iii)  Causes and remedies of overstocking 
Of the many effects of man on the range ecosystem, overgrazing is by far the most 
widespread and important.  Overgrazing successively reduces plant vigour and the carrying 
capacity of the land, leading ultimately to a depleted ground cover, invasion of dense 
unpalatable and usually thorny bush, and severe gully erosion. This point may be called the 
‘overgrazing end-point’: a stage at which economic recall to productive management is 
impossible at present day prices (Shemu, 2004). 
 
The biological argument presented above indicates that overgrazing may often be the direct 
result of human biological needs, coupled with the capacity for rapid  herd increase in good 
times resulting from the herd composition, itself dictated by these biological needs.  It is, 
however, also a common situation that a pastoralist maintains a herd far larger than needed 
for his own subsistence (Shemu, 2004). 
 
(iv) Range land characteristics and management 
Rangelands have been defined in various ways Pratty and Gwyane (1975) defined rangeland 
as those areas of the world, which by reason of physical limitations (low and erratic 
precipitation, rough topography, poor drainage, or cold temperatures) are unsuited to 
cultivation and which are a source of forage for free-ranging native and domestic animals, 
as well as source of wood products, water, and wildlife. The Society for Range 
Management (1989) has offered a more complete definition: “Rangeland is land on which 
the native vegetation (climatic or natural potential) is predominantly grasses, grass-like 
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plants, forbs, or shrubs suitable for browsing or grazing by animals”. Thus, rangeland 
represents a type of land and not a use.  
 
The vast rangeland resources of Sub-Saharan Africa including Tanzania, occupy a unique 
position in the production system of the region, in that their management is tied closely to 
the natural vegetation and wildlife. As the human population increased, lands best suited to 
tillage agriculture are encroached, leaving the vegetation of arid, non-tillable lands intact. 
Lands of inherently low productivity are left for grazing animals. Management of these 
lands is crucial and necessitates maintenance of healthy natural plant communities. 
Therefore, management of grazing is the most important phase of any range management, 
especially in pastoral societies.  
 
2.5.3.3 Importance of pastoralism and pastoral lands to East Africa’s development 
It has been argued in the past that pastoral production does not contribute significantly to 
the national economies - that goals and practices of pastoralists are characterized by 
irrationality, and that the systems are environmentally destructive. Therefore pastoral 
production systems be replaced with more “modern” production systems such as ranches. 
Economists have argued that if relief and development costs are all put together, for 
example, the per capita investment per person per year could be ten times as much in 
pastoral lands than in the agricultural lands (Ekaya, 2004).  
 
These arguments sound logical in the first instance. However, they are not based on socio-
economic analysis. Contrary to the above arguments, pastoralism and pastoral areas may be 
contributing more than their fair share to national economies when compared to agricultural 
lands.  For example Wekasa (2000) observes that in Kenya, arid and semi-arid lands, where 
pastoralism is practised over 80% of the country. The lands support 50% of cattle, 75% of 
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sheep and goats, 100% camels and 25% of human population. Pastoralism makes the best 
use of natural resources in the drylands, and is currently the most suitable production 
system to the development of arid lands of Kenya. The cost of putting these lands to 
alternative uses could be 50 times or higher than supporting the current land use.  The value 
of the livestock resource base in the arid and semi-arid lands is estimated to be about 70 
billion Kenya shillings, and the potential to grow still exists (Ekaya, 2004). 
 
2.5.3.4 Interaction between pastoralism and wildlife in East Africa 
There has always been a close and relatively harmonious association between livestock and 
wildlife in East Africa. For example, seasonal migration patterns and foraging strategies of 
the Maasai livestock and wildlife species are so similar that their niches are intermingled 
and inseparable. It has also been suggested that pastoralists have had a significant influence 
on the evolution of the ecology of their homelands and the type and distribution of wildlife 
species in the ecosystem. The ferocity of the Maasai warriors in the past kept Maasai land 
free of hunting for wild animals by Bantu tribesmen. This has contributed in the wildspread 
survival of game in their area and a blessing to east Africa as the best game parks and 
reserves are found in Maasai land (Gichuki et al., 1996) 
 
The pastoralists can be seen as “ecosystem people”, in the sense that they have evolved a 
way of life integral to the surrounding ecosystem. Thus, they have adapted to and 
influenced their environment without destroying its sustainability. Their survival strategies 
require an intimate knowledge of their environment (Shem, 2004). 
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2.6 Resource - Use Conflicts  
2.6.1 The concept of social conflicts  
There are many perspectives and therefore, definitions of conflicts. Some definitions focus 
on open struggle as criteria for the existence of conflict.  Others focus on competing claims 
to scarce resources. Robbins (1994) defines conflict as a process that begins when one party 
perceives that another party has negatively affected something that the first party cares 
about. Wallensteen (1988) define conflict as a social interaction in which a minimum of two 
parties strives at the same moment in time to acquire the same resources. Notwithstanding, 
the divergent views on the concept of conflict, a couple of general themes can be found in 
most definitions. Firstly, a conflict is viewed as mainly a perception issue, because for a 
conflict to exist the situation must be perceived as a conflict by parties involved. Therefore 
many situations that could be described as situation of conflict may be not, if the parties 
involved do not perceive the conflict. 
 
In case of resource-use conflicts, most of the parties exhibit blocking behaviour.  Since 
resources are limited and scarce, and peoples’ needs (or wants) often exceed availability, 
this leads to blocking behaviour, with both parties trying to get more of the resources than 
the other side. When one party is perceived to block the access to the resources of another, a 
conflict will probably result. 
 
Conflict theorists argued that societies are in constant state of change, in which conflict is a 
permanent feature. Conflict is often thought as the opposite of cooperation and peace and is 
commonly associated with violence. Lewis (1996) argues that many of the conflicts are 
counterproductive and destructive, leading to bad results and hostile relationships. Yet, 
conflicts have been said to play crucial roles not only for social change but also for the 
continuous creation of societies.  Therefore, conflicts should not only be viewed as a 
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dysfunctional relationship between individuals and communities that should be avoided at 
all cost, but also as an opportunity for constructive change and growth (Kisoza et al., 2004). 
According to Guerrero-Arias (1995) the term also encompasses not only the observable 
aspects of the opposing forces but also the underlying tension between them. As such, 
conflicts can be expressed at different levels including outright violence, tensions, hostility, 
competition and disagreement over goals and values. 
Resource-use conflicts may arise in any situation in which there is a clash of interests or 
ideas amongst groups of resource users. Usually, the interests and needs may be 
incompatible amongst different resource users, and sometimes these interests and needs are 
not properly addressed in natural resource management policies or programmes (FAO, 
2000).  In the context of resource conservation, resource-use conflict suggests that there is a 
group or groups whose interests are opposed to those of conservation institutions and 
authorities.  Resource use conflicts, as such, may involve disagreements and disputes over 
access to, and control over resources use (FAO, 2000). 
 
Conflicts over use of natural resources such as land, water, wildlife and forestry have been 
reported to be ubiquitous (Anyling and Kelly, 1997; Ortiz, 1999). People in different parts 
of the world have competed for use of natural resource they need to enhance their 
livelihoods. Nevertheless, the dimensions, levels, and intensity of conflicts vary greatly.  
They can be of different forms and at different levels ranging from local to global scale and 
the occurrences depend on their relevance or result form local actors who influence 
decision-making process (Oviedo, 1999). The intensity of these conflicts have been reported 
to vary enormously from confusion and frustrations among members of the community over 
poorly communicated development and or conservation policies, to violent clashes between 
groups over resource ownership, rights and management responsibility (Kant and Cooke, 
1999). 
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2.6.2 Perspectives on conflicts 
Different theorists on the role of conflicts on social relations have advocated different 
views. At the one end of the continuum, some theorists posit that conflict is harmful, must 
be avoided and that the group relationship is breaking down and not functioning. This 
attitude is known as functionalism, the traditional view of conflict (Kumar, 1998). The 
human relations view of conflict, believe that conflict is natural and inevitable outcome in 
any human relationship, and that not always destructive, but has a potential to bring about 
positive outcomes for a group relationship. This attitude is known as humanism. 
 
Another perspective believes that conflict is absolutely necessary for a relationship on 
group’s survival and effective performance. This is referred to as the interactionist or 
subjectivist approach. The structuralists believe that conflict is a dynamic force rooted in the 
structure of domination based on opposing interests. This implies that there is always an 
underlying structured conflict between the producers of economic wealth and those who 
benefit most from the economic system.  The structuralists acknowledge that a society is 
always full of conflicting interests, but that major conflicts comes from the underlying 
social structures (CWS, 1998). 
 
2.6.3 Outcome of conflict 
The analysis of any conflict is subject to variation in the theoretical view on outcome of 
conflicts. It is, therefore inappropriate to advocate that all conflicts are either good or bad.  
Whether a conflict is good or bad depends on the way it is handled (CWS, 1998). While the 
interactionists believe that conflict is an essential part of human relations, it does not 
necessarily follow that all conflicts are good. If a conflict leads to improved group 
performance in achieving goals, then is a functional constructive form of conflict. But 
  
67
where a conflict hinders the achievement of goals then the conflict is destructive or 
dysfunctional. The measure that can differentiate functional from dysfunctional conflicts is 
group performance, as groups exist to achieve goals. As such it is the impact that conflict 
has on the group that defines whether the conflict is functional or not (CWS, 1998). 
 
2.6.4 The conflict paradox 
The variation between theorists on conflict is symptomatic of the division between macro 
and the micro levels of analysis and explanations. All these theories have their strengths and 
weaknesses. Each of these theories has also different implications on the recommended 
interventions during conflict resolution processes.  Nevertheless, the conflict behaviour 
needs to take into account the social structural factors, on one hand, and behavioural and 
attitudinal on the other. Social conditions do have a significant impact on people, but it is 
the perception of individuals which makes them see certain social conditions as undesirable 
or as being the underlying cause of their problems (CWS, 1998). Any attempt that ignores 
one of these factors fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of a conflict resolution. 
A multi-faceted approach is recommended in conflict resolution process. Therein, several 
dimensions of the problem need to be considered including social structures, individual 
characteristics of parties and social attitudes, as well as the underlying social institutions 
(CWS, 1998). 
 
2.6.5 Conflict resolution philosophy and processes 
Of recent, a considerable interest is being generated in both theory and practice of conflict 
resolution. This interest is reflected in alternative dispute resolution procedures and conflict 
resolution programmes (i.e. in practical techniques and professional procedures) that are 
being developed. Resolution of conflict means changing or transforming the relationship 
between the conflicting parties by solving the problems, which lead to the conflict in the 
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first instance. The search for a reduction/ or resolution of conflict is as old as humankind. 
Lewis (1996) posits that, although assessment of conflict is necessary precursor to 
designing an effective conflict management approach, but effective assessment should 
establish the stakeholders, the historical context and other pertinent scientific, socio-
political and economic issues. 
Burton (1990) introduced the term “conflict prevention” to mean promotion of conditions 
that create cooperative relationships as a basis for identifying the cause of the conflict and 
the changes needed to remove it. As such, conflict prevention emphasizes about modifying 
the circumstances that create conflict and developing situations that mitigate conflict. The 
process invariably requires a third party facilitation to assess and analyse the interactions, 
which may lead to acceptable solutions.  The solutions must be fair and just and the 
conditions acceptable to the parties (Mckie et al., 1995). Therefore, the facilitator needs to 
have an understanding of issues and must enable the parties to understand in some detail the 
situation and circumstances of the dispute. 
 
All conflict resolution processes consist of three elements: the participation of protagonists, 
communication between parties and the decision-making powers enjoyed by the third party. 
Its nature and /or degree of these elements that determine the type and procedure adapted in 
resolving conflicts. The traditional method of seeking a conflict resolution is via a court 
settlement, where the third party – the court – has decisive authority. There is little direct 
communication and limited participation by the parties (Burton and Duke, 1990). A quasi – 
judicial arbitration involves the protagonists nominating representatives and select a third 
party to preside.  This arrangement allows for rather more participation but still limited 
communication between parties and decisive third party. Arbitration is a procedure where a 
third party is asked to make a decision following consultations with parties, this allows for 
additional participation on  a degree of direct communication, with the third party role still 
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dominant. Conciliation or mediation process represents a significant reduction in the 
decision-making powers of the third party who basically acts as an honest broker where the 
parties are prepared to interact and to communicate directly.  Finally, is the direct 
negotiation between the parties, where the role of the third party is minimal or non – 
existent (Mackie et al., 1995). 
The role of third party or facilitator in conflict resolution forum is to develop an analytical 
approach to the causes of the conflict, to increase the scope of protagonists understanding of 
the situation, to enable the parties to question information and assumptions, which have led 
to the conflict. Burton (1990) describes the problem-solving forum as “a filter to screen out 
false assumptions and implications from existing knowledge, cultural and ideological 
orientations and personal prejudices”. He posits that the main task of the third 
party/facilitator is to provide this filter. 
 
Conflict resolution is decision making process, which seeks to achieve agreements that 
explore the situation but do not either restrict or prejudice the outcome in advance. What is 
sought is a realistic basis on which to base future decisions. It is concerned with identifying 
the cause(s) of a dispute and an analytical process with four distinct characteristics: the 
solution is not an end product but a continuous process, requires a change in 
conceptualisation of the problem, deals with the conflict in its total context and the basis of 
resolution is effective problem solving (Burton, 1990). Conflict resolution requires also a 
holistic view which reaches into the aspects of human behaviour, whilst at the same time 
being politically realistic. However, most of the players in resource management tend to 
confuse between conflict resolution and conflict containment, or suppression, or an 
enforced conflict settlement, but these terms do not mean the same thing. Thus, there is still 
a strong emphasis, under various settings, on the treatment of symptoms rather than their 
causes. In particular, under protected area settings, management of conflict has been 
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regarded as a solution. It has become accepted as problem- solving, so much so that the 
terms “conflict management” and “conflict resolution” have become interchangeable 
(Mackie et al., 1995).  
 
Hence, there is considerable temptation, in most conflict situations, to focus on management 
causes to contain a conflict, rather than addressing the total situation with all its inherent 
challenges and complexities.  As Burton (1990) states, ..”the causes or sources of conflict 
between individuals and groups cannot be separated from the totality of relationships, and 
the environmental conditions that promote relationships”. Lewis, (1996) observes that …. 
“Compromises produced by conflict resolution may be better for the environment than 
forced decisions that nobody respects”. Therefore, it is critical in conflict resolution to get 
the aggrieved parties in consultative process so that they appreciate each other’s 
perspectives. 
 
2.6.6. Factors underlying resource - use conflicts 
2.6.6.1 Overview 
A number of factors have been identified to be underlying different resource-use conflicts. 
Hence, pluralistic approaches that recognize the multiple perspective of the stakeholders 
and the concurrent effects of diverse causes in natural resource use conflicts is essential for 
understanding the initial situation and in identifying strategies for promoting change 
(Buckles and Rusnak, 1999). The most important factors underlying resource-use conflicts 
include levels of resource degradation, population pressure, characteristics of resource 
users, and policies and laws governing use and access to resource. 
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2.6.6.2 Levels of natural resource degradation 
The natural resources utilized as common pool resources, are in many cases facing 
increasing degradation. This creates scarcities where the demand for the resources is 
basically greater than the supply. In turn this leads to increased competition, and ultimately 
into resource-use conflicts (Mandel, 1998). The greater unequal distribution of scarce 
resources in a system, the greater will be the conflicts of interests between dominant and 
subordinate segments of the society (Kisoza et al., 2004).   
 
2.6.6.3 Population pressure 
Population pressure has many influences on resource use conflicts (Deslodges and Gauthier, 
1996).  This can arise as a result of increased demand and competition for definitive 
resources through population increase. Alternatively, resource-use conflicts may arise from 
immigrations, where user groups with different interests and attaching different values to 
the resources share the same ecological range.  Borrini-Feyerabend (1997), reported 
migration to be one of the main contributing factors to population dynamics and 
subsequently to natural resources use conflicts.  This is because people always move from 
place to place. The immigrations may also lead to disruption of local mechanisms 
controlling use of local common pool resources creating conditions for resource-use 
conflicts. According to Borrini-Feyerabend (1996) many rural areas in developing world 
today are experiencing rapid population increase. This implies an increased demand for 
land, water, grazing lands and fuelwood. The author further argues that, increase in 
population size does not always signal a decline in environmental quality. In some cases, 
higher population density leads to agricultural intensification, higher yield per hectare and 
increased opportunity to produce for the local market. Thus, the effect of population growth 
on the local productive capacity will depend on a number of factors including soil fertility, 
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resilience of natural resource base, technologies employed by local populations and the 
political as well as the socio-economic environment at large. 
 
According to Ghimire and Pimbert (1997), population decline can also have a negative 
impact on local resources. It can be beneficial, particularly when the ecosystems left 
undisturbed revert to a richer level of biodiversity. Yet, population decline can be harmful 
to the environment, especially in cases where human managed environments provide a rich 
habitat for a wide variety of species. The breakdown of interaction between human 
communities and local systems may even lead to a net loss in local biodiversity.  
 
2.6.6.4 Characteristics of resource users 
The characteristics of resource users depend on their cultural backgrounds which include: 
ethnicity, norms, values and indigenous technologies by different resource users. According 
to Kajembe et al. (2000), people use natural resources in different ways. For example, land, 
forest, and water are not just material resources people compete over, but are part and parcel 
of a particular way of life - farmers, ranchers, fishers, loggers – ethnic identity and asset of 
gender and age roles. The cultural and religious diversity of resource users have 
implications for the way land and other resources are managed.  
 
The socially defined group may perceive themselves as having incompatible interests with 
those dependent upon particular resources, but who are unable to participate in planning or 
in monitoring its use as they are marginalized in decision-making (Desloges and Gauthier, 
1996). More importantly, the resource conflicts occur in settings that involve an array of 
culture, economic, and political arrangements that have some bearing on the outcomes of 
the conflict process (Kumar, 1998).   
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2.6.6.5 Policies and laws 
A number of resource-use conflicts have been attributed to failure of policies governing use 
of resources both at national and local levels. Lewis (1996) argues that, resource-use 
conflicts usually results from policies governing resource use that do not involve all 
stakeholders in the planning or management of the resources. Also conflicts occur if policy, 
legal and institutional contexts are being developed without the participation of resource-
dependent communities and without due considerations of their needs and aspirations 
(Desloges and Gauthier, 1996).  Sometime resource - use conflicts emanate from personal 
centered interest of policy, project or program implementers at the local level. Resource-use 
conflicts can also result from failure of the central governments to recognize and empower 
local institutions to manage the local resources (Wyckoff-Baird, 1997). At most, central 
governments lack the in-depth local knowledge, of resource management pattern, to be able 
to make and enforce appropriate natural resource management regimes. Kisoza et al., 
(2004) argues that policies and laws governing land tenure, deficiency of local institutions 
for community as well as environmental degradation are some of underlying causes of 
resource-use conflicts. Conflicts may also arise due to poor incentive structures and 
institutional framework.  
 
2.7 Resource-use Conflicts in Multiple-use Pastoral Systems 
Multiple resource use is a central feature of many production systems, in particular the 
pastoral and agro-pastoral systems. These systems typically involve complex combinations 
of resource users and uses, and different sets of rights and obligations for users. Land is the 
most important complementary resource for pastoral production systems. Because land is 
multiple-use resource it is more liable for resource-use conflicts. The conflicts may stem 
from land resource scarcity or from different ways parties perceive how land should be 
used.  This can enable a distinction of scarcity based or value based conflicts. A number of 
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authors have described pastoralism in Africa in recent years in terms of resource conflicts 
(NOPA 1992; Velded, 1992). These resource conflicts imply that the institutional 
frameworks that currently exist often fail to deal adequately with disputes and conflicts 
(Niamir-Fuller, 1994). However, the main resource-use conflict determinants in the 
different pastoral and agro-pastoral land use systems of Tanzania are not well known.  
 
2.8 Community Based Conservation  
2.8.1 Overview  
The prospects for community-based conservation have recently been of concern to a broad 
range of conservationists, social scientists, and resource management professionals.  On one 
hand, there have been increasingly greater efforts and investment in community-based 
conservation. On the other hand, there has been increasingly greater concern that 
community-based conservation is not working and that the emphasis on “community” and 
“participation” is diluting the conservation agenda (Abbot, 2000). Community-based 
approaches to conservation are in part a reaction to the failures of exclusionary 
conservation, in a world in which social and economic factors are increasingly seen as key 
to conservation success (Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997). Emphasis of community - 
participation is motivated by the idea that “if conservation and development could be 
simultaneously achieved, the interests of both conservation and development could be 
served’’. Thus, the old narrative of ‘fortress conservation’ was largely displaced by the 
counter-narrative of development through community conservation and sustainable use 
(Murphree, 2002, Songorwa, 1999).  
 
However, the results of community-based conservation experiments have been mixed at 
best, and the performance of many has been well below expectations (Barret et al., 2001). 
This has led to various debates in the conservation literature over the merits of community-
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based conservation (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999) and to criticisms from a number of 
different perspectives (Redford and Sanderson, 2000; Brosious and Russell, 2003). Two 
positions have been emerging one holds that the failure of community conservation is not 
due to the weakness or impracticality of the concept, but rather to its improper 
implementation, especially with regard to the devolution of authority and responsibility 
(Murphree, 2002).  
 
The second position holds that conservation and development objectives, both important in 
their own rights, should be de-linked because the mixed objectives do not serve either 
objective well (Redford and Sanderson, 2000). This dilemma is part of the larger debate of 
preservation versus sustainable use and the participation of rural populations in decisions 
that affect their lives. The debate has its counterparts in other environmental fields such as 
resource management and development, with respect to the merits (or lack thereof) of 
centralized resource management (Holling and Meffe, 1996), participatory development 
planning (Chambers, 1983), and the significance of local perspectives and knowledge in 
environmental management in general (Berkes and Farvar, 1989). 
 
The issue of community-based conservation can be approached from two different vantage 
points.  First, community-based conservation can be seen in the context of larger, historical 
conceptual shifts (paradigm shifts) that have been occurring in ecology and applied ecology. 
These changes are not specific to conservation ecology but have implication for it; they 
provide context and benchmarks for all areas of applied ecology. Second, in light of this 
“bigger picture,” community-based conservation can be viewed with an eye to lessons from 
emerging new interdisciplinary fields that deal with coupled systems of humans and nature. 
Researchers in several fields, such as common property and indigenous knowledge, have 
been pursuing various aspects of social-ecological system relationships.  These 
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interdisciplinary fields provide insights into the community-based conservation debate and 
may contribute to the development of a fuller understanding of socio-ecological 
interactions, providing firmer ground for a truly interdisciplinary conservation science 
(Ludwig, 2001). 
 
2.8.2 System view of the environment  
A complex adaptive system often has a number of attributes not observed in simple 
systems, including non - linearity, uncertainty, emergence, scale as self-organization 
(Gunderson and Holling, 2000).  These characteristics of complex systems have a number 
of important implications for conservation and environmental management, as can be seen 
from a consideration of non - linearity scale. The issue of non - linearity comes up with 
respect to management institutions.  The older, conventional emphasis on centralized 
institutions and command and control-resource management is based on linear cause-effect 
thinking and mechanistic views of nature.  It aims to reduce natural variation in an effort to 
make the ecosystem more productive, predictable, and controllable. But the reduction of the 
range of natural variation is the very process that may lead to a loss of resilience in a 
system, leaving it more susceptible to crises (Holling and Meffe, 1996).  
 
The issue of scale has implications for the match between institutions and ecosystems and 
for perspective that may be held by different agents.  The aspect of match address a 
question to whether a given conservation problem could be managed by a centralized 
agency or are there more appropriate structures of governance in which the scale of 
management institution is matched to the scale of the ecosystem? Often, one-size fits-all 
kinds of management and ignore scale issues.  Such mismatches of scale may be one of the 
key reasons for the failure of environmental management regimes (Folke, 2002). 
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One of the insights from complexity thinking is that a multiplicity of scales prevents 
existence of one “correct” perspective in a complex system.  Phenomena at each level of the 
scale tend to have their own emergent properties.  The system must be analyzed 
simultaneously at different scales. In biodiversity conservation, for example, different 
groups of conservationists focus on different levels of biological organization. All these 
levels are the “correct” level to consider at the same time. Similarly, a number of agents or 
actors may hold different but equally valid perspectives on a conservation problem.  
Redford and Sanderson (2000) emphasizing this phenomenon by stating that “….they 
(forest people) may speak for their version of a forest, but they do not speak for the forest 
we want to conserve”. 
 
2.8.3 Humans as part of the ecosystem 
2.8.3.1 Socio-ecological systems 
There is general agreement that we can ill afford to consider humans separately from natural 
resources, especially in today’s heavily human-dominated world (Gunderson and Holling, 
2000).  It has become increasingly important to incorporate the dynamic interactions 
between societies and natural systems, rather than viewing people merely as “managers”.  
There is little agreement, however, on how this can be accomplished, conceptually or 
methodologically. 
 
Berkes et al. (2000) use the term social-ecological system to refer to the integrated concept 
of human in nature.  A number of different terms are in use to denote the idea of humans as 
part of ecosystems.  One of them is the dwelling perspective of Ingold (2000), which refers 
to the “… practical engagement of humans with others of the dwelt-in ecosystem”.  This 
practical engagement, building knowledge and ecological relationships, is the basis of 
repositioning humans back into the ecosystem.  It involves the “skills, sensitivities and 
  
78
orientations that have developed through long experience of one’s interaction with a 
particular environment”. The social-ecological system has many levels. The links between 
social and environmental systems are different at the level of the community as they are at 
the level of the nation state. For example, Gibson and Mark (1995) work on political 
economy of conservation in four African countries, shows that the forces operating at the 
level of the nation state (many of them related to the peculiarities of post-colonial 
governments) are quite different from those at the levels of region and community.  
 
Putting humans back into the ecosystem requires using all possible sources of ecological 
knowledge and understanding as may be available.  Using knowledge and perspectives from 
the community level can help build a more complete information base than may be 
available from scientific studies alone (Berkes et al., 2000).  The partnership of local 
communities with scientists is not an unusual phenomenon.  Details of such research 
collaboration, and its positive outcomes for ecosystem management, have been 
documented, for example, by Olsson and Folke (2001) and Blann et al. (2003).  
 
2.8.3.2 Involvement of local communities in conservation of natural resources 
Brosious et al. (1998) observes that the term community, in community-based conservation 
is a gloss complex phenomenon because social systems are multistage. The term 
community also idealizes a great deal of complexity.  It idealizes images of coherent, long-
standing, localized sources of authority tied to what are assumed intrinsically sustainable 
resource management regimes. However, as many conservationists know, it is often 
difficult to find a cohesive social group to work with in the field.  Communities are elusive 
and constantly changing.  A community is not a static, isolated group of people.  Rather, it 
is more useful to think of communities as multidimensional, cross-scale, social-political 
units or networks changing through time (Carlson, 2000). Hence, it is more productive to 
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focus not on communities but on institutions, defined as the set of rules actually used, the 
working rules, or rules-in-use (Ostrom, 1990). The focus here should be to examine those 
institutions that mediate between social and ecological systems and focus on the dynamics 
of these institutions: their renewal and reorganization, learning and adaptation, and ability to 
deal with change (Berkes et al., 2003). 
 
2.8.4 Approaches to analyzing environmental conservation problems 
Kates (2001) contends that many of our environmental problems, including those related to 
conservation, do not lend themselves to analysis by the conventional, rational approach of 
defining the problem, collecting data, analyzing data and making decisions based on the 
results.  There is too much uncertainty; targets keep shifting, and the issues must often be 
redefined. These make a class of problems that Ludwig (2001) and others called “wicked 
problems” those with “no definitive formulation, no stopping rule, and no test for a 
solution”, problems that cannot be separated from issues of values, equity, and social 
justice. Ludwig (2001) argues that where there are no clearly defined objectives and where 
there are diverse, mutually contradictory approaches the notion of an objective, 
disinterested expert no longer makes sense. Hence, a new kind of approach to science and 
management must be created through processes by which researchers and stakeholder 
collaborate to define important questions, objectives of study relevant evidence, and 
convincing forms of argument.  This kind of research referred to by Kates (2001) as 
sustainability science require place-based models because understanding the dynamic 
interaction between nature and society requires case studies situated in particular places. 
 
To deal with the implications of complex systems, working partnerships can be build 
between managers and resource users. This is done for example, in adaptive management, 
which recognizes, as a starting point, that information will never be perfect (Holling, 2001). 
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The use of imperfect information for management necessitates a close cooperation and risk-
sharing between the management agency and local people. Such a process requires 
collaboration, transparency, and accountability so that a learning environment can be 
created and practice can be built on experience.  
 
This approach, bringing the community actively into the management process, is 
fundamentally different from the command-and control style. These three conceptual shifts 
in ecology toward systems view, inclusion of humans in the ecosystem, and management by 
participatory approaches are related. They all pertain to an emerging understanding of 
ecosystems as complex adaptive systems in which human societies are necessarily an 
integral part we cannot abandon.  
 
2.8.5 International Institutional framework f or conservation of biodiversity 
There are a number of international environmental treaties and agencies that provides 
framework for conservation of biodiversity. Among them, the Convention of Biological 
Diversity stands as a general framework. Article 8 of the Convention calls for, the 
establishment of protected areas and definition of management guidelines. (McNeely, 
1997). 
 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) recognises six wildlife 
management categories: Category I - Strict Nature Reserve/Wilderness Area - protected 
area managed mainly for science or wilderness protection; Category II - National Park- 
protected area managed mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation; Category III - 
Natural Monument/Natural Landmark - protected area managed mainly for conservation of 
a specific natural feature; Category IV - Habitat and Species Management Area - Protected 
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area mainly for conservation through management intervention; Category V - Protected 
Landscape/Seascape - protected area managed mainly for Landscape/Seascape protection 
and recreation; Category VI - Managed Resource Protected Area - protected area managed 
mainly for the sustainable use of natural resources, associated cultural resources, and 
managed through legal or other effective means (IUCN, 1994).  
Internationally accepted criteria for defining protected areas (IUCN, 1994) now recognise a 
wide spectrum of categories ranging from strictly protected nature reserves to managed 
resource protected areas. The inclusion of a category in the list, which allows the 
sustainable use of resources in protected areas, is particularly noteworthy in this context. It 
is implied that protected areas should be managed in ways that sustain both local livelihoods 
and the conservation of nature. This view sharply contrasts with the conservation thinking 
that has informed much of protected area management during the past century. 
The follow-up of various biodiversity agreements and conventions has led to policy goals, 
measures and instrument debates on international, national and local arenas for decision-
making. The Biodiversity Convention stresses conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable 
use and aspects of equity and fair sharing of benefits. It also emphasizes on ethical, cultural, 
scientific and economic dimensions of biodiversity management. Local participation is 
stated as a key element to “ensure the implementation” in the national follow-up strategies 
(CBD, 1992). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0 STUDY AREAS AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Description of the Study Areas 
This study covered two areas namely Mkata plains in Kilosa district and Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area in Ngorongoro district (Figure, 3).This section describes the setting of 
the study areas including the attributes of the ecological and social environment.  
 
3.1.1 Description of Kilosa district 
3.1.1.1 Location 
Kilosa district is one of five districts of Morogoro region, and covers an area of about 14, 
2445 km2. It is located in east – central Tanzania, 300km west of Dar - es - Salaam, and 
bounded between 5o55’ and 7o53’ S; 36o50’ and37o30 E.  Kilosa is bordering Kiteto district 
(Manyara Region) and Handeni district (Tanga Region) to the North; Mvomero district to 
the East; Kilombero district (Morogoro region) and Iringa Rural district (Iringa Region) to 
the South and Mpwapwa district (Dodoma Region) to the West (KDC, 2000).  
 
3.1.1.2 Administrative organization  
Administratively the district comprises 9 divisions, which are subdivided into 37 wards and 
101 villages.  The institutional framework determining the administrative structures in 
Kilosa district is provided by legislations guiding reforms of local government authorities in 
Tanzania. 
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Figure 3: Location of Kilosa and Ngorongoro districts  
Source: SUA. Remote Sensing Laboratory 
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Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania through Act No. 15 of 1984 which render 
existence of local government authorities’ constitutionally sanctioned (Max, 1991). The 
local government comprise of two tiers of government authorities including the district 
council and the village council. Under the law the village council is corporate body which 
can sue or be sued, enter into legal contract and own property (Max, 1991).  
 
The Regional Administration Act No. 19 of 1997 (URT, 1997b) provides for district 
authorities to interact directly with the central government ministries or Non- governmental 
organizations on issues of concern to their areas of jurisdiction. As far as the environment is 
concerned the Regional Administration Act of 1997 which amended the Local Government 
(District Authorities) Act of 1982, establishes three standing committees: Economic Affairs, 
Works and Environment Committees. More importantly, the district authority duties have 
been explicitly laid out with regard to the environment. The Act states that, "… local 
authorities in performing their functions shall provide for the protection and proper 
utilization of the environment ...." (Liviga, 1999).  
 
3.1.1.3 Topography and climate 
The district can be characterised into three physiographic units, which also constitute 
different agro-ecological zones: mountains and uplands, plateau (cultivation steppe) and 
flood plains (KDC, 1997: Shishira et al., 1997). The highland zone is part of the Eastern 
Arc Mountains with altitudes up to 2200 m a.s.l. The plateau (cultivation steppe) zone is 
mainly located in the north of  the district. It reaches an altitude of about 1100m a.s.l., and is 
characterized by plains and dissected hills with moderately fertile, well drained soils. The 
flood plains lie at about 400 to 550 m a.s.l and are dissected by three main rivers Wami and 
Mkata rivers draining Eastwards and Ruaha river draining South – East wards. 
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The climate of Kilosa is a typical tropical semi - arid type regulated by seasonal movements 
of the Inter-tropical Convergency Zone (ITCY) (Misana et al., 1997). The district 
experiences bimodal climate with an average of 8 months of rainfall. The short rains start 
from October to January, followed by long rains from mid-February to May peaking in 
April (Nduwamungu, 2001). The topography has local effect on rainfall. Whereby, mean 
annual rainfall ranges between 1000 – 1400mm in southern flood plain, while further North 
(Gairo Division) has a mean annual rainfall of 800-1100mm. The highland forest areas 
receive up to 1600 mm of rainfall annually (KDC, 1997, Nduwamungu, 2001). Temperature 
in Kilosa town is about 25 0C. 
 
3.1.1.4 Vegetation 
The vegetation of Kilosa district is complex (Table 1), but four main vegetation types have 
been described as the most dominant types. These include: natural forests, woodlands, 
bushland and grassland (Shishira et al., 1997; Misana et al., 1997; Nduwamungu, 2001). 
Most of the natural forests are found at the higher altitudes (1400-2200 m.a.s.l.) where there 
is higher rainfall and are protected as forest reserves. The vegetation is typically 
characterized by miombo woodlands in the mountains and hilly areas and in the pied plains, 
while bushlands and grasslands are found in the alluvial plains (Misana et al., 1997).  
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Table 1: Land cover types for Kilosa District 
Land Cover Types Area km2 Percentage
Forest plantation 13.78 0.09
Natural forest 910.98 6.26
Dense woodland 4,595.02 31.55
Open woodland 1,422.27 9.77
Woodland with scattered cultivation 1,460.38 10.03
Bush land with emergent trees 570.58 3.92
Wooded grassland 730.95 5.02
Wooded grassland (seasonally inundated) 39.55 0.27
Bushed grassland 688.97 4.73
Open grassland (seasonally inundated) 200.70 1.38
Grassland with scattered cropland 1,162.10 7.98
Cultivation 1,301.83 8.9
Cultivation with tree crops 78.29 0.54
Inland water 0.69 0.00
Permanent swamp 72.65 0.50
Open bush land 208.02 1.43
Bush land with scattered cropland 691.07 4.75
Urban Area 15.32 0.11
Grand Total 14,563.57 100.00
 
Source: KDC (1997) 
 
The dominant woodland species include: Brachystegia sp; Combretum sp; and Albizia sp 
(Sishira et al., 1997) while the dominant grass genera are Andropogon, Heteropogon, 
Panicum and Themeda (Mwilawa et al., 1997). The dominant tree species in bushlands 
comprise Acacia sp, Commiphora sp, Combretum sp, Dichrostachys and Albizia sp. While 
grassland woody species include Balanites aegyptiaca, Dalbergia melanoxylon and various 
Acacia sp (Shishira et al., 1997).  
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3.1.1. 5 Wildlife and conservation value 
Kilosa has a number of game reserves including Mikumi National Park and Selous Game 
Reserve. The available estimates of wildlife population in Mikumi national park are given 
in Table 2. A central feature of Mikumi national park is parts of Mkata plains where large  
 
Table 2: The wildlife population of Mikumi National Park in 1986 
Type of animal Estimated number
Wildbeest 12,500 
Buffalo 12.000 
Zebra 3,000 
Elephant 2,000 
Impala 1,500 
Warthog 1,000 
Baboon 500 
Ground horn bill 200 
Eland 200 
Sable antelope 100 
Hartebeest 100 
Giraffe 100 
Hippopotamus Data not available 
Leopard Data not available 
Lion  Data not available 
 
Source: KDC (1997)  
 
herds of animals including giraffe, elephants and hippopotamus - from adjacent wooded 
grassland and woodlands co verges on the plains.  
 
3.1.1.6  Socio- economic profile of Kilosa district 
The human population during 2002 census was 489,513 with a growth rate of 2.2%, and a 
population density of 33 persons per km2. The average household size is estimated at 4.6 
(National Census, 2002). About 80% of the population live in rural areas, while the 
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remaining live in relatively large centers such as Gairo, Kimamba, Mikumi and Kilosa 
town.  
 
There are three major indigenous tribes: Kaguru (48%) in the north, Sagara (30%) in the 
central zone and Wavidunda (20%) in the south. Other minority tribes (2%) include 
immigrant sisal and sugarcane estate workers and pastoralists Maasai and Barbaig, and the 
agro-pastoralists Gogo and Sukuma. The district has a highest livestock population 
accounting to 70% of livestock population of Morogoro Region. The livestock population in 
1997 was estimated at 187,051 Cattle; 12,263 goats, 8,652 sheep and 710 donkeys (KDC, 
2000). The increasing number of immigrant pastoralists, with large livestock herds has led 
into high competition for land and water particularly between crop cultivators and herders. 
In some cases this has flared up into violent clashes (Kisoza et al., 2004). 
 
The main economic activity is peasant farming, producing both food and cash crops. 
Whereby, the main food crops are; maize, rice, cassava, sweet potatoes and coconuts. While 
cash crops are simsim, sunflower, cowpeas and sisal. Production level is generally low and 
most of the produced crops are sold outside the district (KDC, 2000). 
 
3.1.2 Description of Mkata plains 
Mkata plain occupies parts of Kilosa and Mvomero districts in Morogoro region, whereby 
the plains extending in Mvomero district form part of Mikumi National Park and Mkata 
state ranch. The plains are bounded between 50 4” to70 15 `` S; 370 00’’ to 370 55 “E, and 
cover approximately 7,000 km2. The plains are bordered by Uluguru Mountain in the north - 
west and south eastern parts.  Parts of Eastern Arc Mountains of Nguru, Ukaguru and 
Usagara border the plains in the northwest, and Lubungo and Lukobe Mountains in the 
south eastern parts (Figure 4).  
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The plains are generally low laying land with a slope ranging from 0.2 to 2 percent and a 
general elevation not exceeding 500 m (a.s.l). The area is comprised of both flood plains 
and pied Mont plains. It is drained by four major rivers namely Mkata, Mkondoa, Msowero 
and Wami draining eastwards. Most parts of the area are seasonally flooded. The climate in 
the plains is characterised by some variations. The north-western parts experiences high 
mean annual rainfall, ranging between 1100 and 1200 m, distributed in the bimodal mode. 
The south-eastern parts, receive relatively lower rainfall with a mean annual rainfall of 
about 800mm in a similar bi-modal pattern. The central parts receive even lower rainfall, 
with a mean annual rainfall of about 730 mm.  
 
The main land-uses in the plains include subsistence farming, large scale farming (estates) 
and transhumance pastoralism practised by immigrant pastoral tribes from Northern 
Tanzania. Four villages under study in Kilosa district are located in the Central and 
Northern parts of Mkata plains. 
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• Adopted from J. Nduwamungu 2001 
 
Figure 4: Location map of Mkata plains in Kilosa District 
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3.1.3 Description of Ngorongoro district 
3.1.3.1 Location 
Ngorongoro district is one of the five districts of Arusha region in Northern Tanzania.  It is 
located at about 400 km on the North - West of Arusha town. The district covers a total area 
of 14,036 km2 and bounded between 1034” and 3042” S; and between 34047” and 3606” E.  
It borders Karatu district (Arusha region) in the south, Monduli district (Arusha region) in 
the East, Meatu district (Shinyanga region) in South-West, Serengeti Nation Park in the 
West, and in the North it borders Naorok division in Kenya. 
 
3.1.3.2 Administrative organisation  
Administratively Ngorongoro district is divided into 3 divisions; these are further sub-
divided into 14 wards and 31 villages. Due to high conservation value of the area the entire 
district has, since 1959, been designated various status of reserved lands including Loliondo 
Game Conservation Controlled Area in the northern parts including Loliondo and Sale 
divisions. Where as, Ngorongoro division in the south is congruent with the Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area (NCA) - a multiple land-use area which combines both wildlife 
conservation and habitation of Maasai pastoralists (Figure 5). The district is also part of  the 
ancestral land of Maasai pastoralists, which also harbours high concentration of wildlife 
populations that coexisted with the pastoralists.  
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Figure 5: Map of NCA in relation to Ngorongoro District  
 
Furthermore, the area is a part of the Serengeti – Ngorongoro – Maasai Mara ecosystem, a 
cross border “biosphere reserve” which supports large populations of wildlife. Both 
Loliondo Game Controlled Area and Ngorongoro Conservation Area were excised from the 
Serengeti National Park in 1959, and the resident Maasai pastoralists were evicted from the 
eastern Serengeti plains and moved to Loliondo area and Ngorongoro highlands.  
 
Politically the Ngorongoro district constitutes one parliamentary constituent, and has an 
elected district council. Nevertheless, the institutional framework operational in the district 
is characterised by overlapping jurisdiction between the district authority and other 
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corporate bodies. For instance the NCAA, alongside other central government organs, have 
some mandate of maintaining law and order in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, while 
TANAPA  and the Wildlife Division reserve some rights of access in the Loliondo area. 
 
3.1.3.4 Topography and climate 
Ngorongoro district is characterised by different topographic features including the open 
plains, highlands, highland plateaus and depressions. The open plains occupy vast areas of 
the district including: the Serengeti, Salei and Angata – Salei plains. The plains are 
interrupted by highlands, hills, craters and escarpments. The main highland areas are 
located in southern parts of Ngorongoro Conservation Area. These include the Crater 
highlands - a vast volcanic massif with several calderas (Ngorongoro in the central parts, 
and Olmoti and Empakai in the eastern parts). Other Mountains are Lemogarat and Oldeani 
in the central parts,; while Lomalmalasini and Kerimasi Mountains are located in the east. 
Oldonyo Lengai, an active volcanic Mountain, lies at the edge of Salei plains and the Rift 
valley. The main highlands in Loliondo area are the Ololoswani highlands (Potkanski, 
1994). The altitude varies from about 1,000m on the Rift valley floor (a.s.l.) to 1,500 and 
1,700 m (a.s.l.) on Salei and Serengeti plains peaking to 2,100 and 2,800m. (a.s.l) on  the 
highland plateaux .The crater highland records up to 3 000 m (a.s.l). 
 
Ngorongoro district has a great variation in climate due to the different land forms and the 
associated dynamics of air masses. The area lies within the semi-arid zone and experiences 
highly seasonal and variable rainfall. Whereby, the local topography modifies the large 
scale tropical weather patterns leading to variable rainfall patterns. The area experience 
short rains starting from October end up in December; while long rains start in February and 
end up in June. The highlands receive about 1000 mm rainfall per annum, decreasing to 
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between 800 – 1000 mm on the plateaux and below 600 mm in the rain shadow areas of 
Serengeti and Salei plains (Homewood and Rogers, 1991).  
 
3.1.3.5 Vegetation 
The vegetation of Ngorongoro was described by Herlocker and Dirschl (1972), Homewood 
and Rogers (1991) and Misana (1997). The area is characterized by grassland, open 
woodlands, closed woodlands and open and thick forests in areas of altitude between 1,100 
and 1,300 metres (above see level).  The dominant tree species in highland forest area 
include Podocarpus spp, Olea capensis, Fagaropsis angolensis, Juniperous procera, and 
Olea spp, The dominant species in woodland vegetation types include Euphorbia bussei, 
Commiphora spp, Acacia xanthophloea, Acacia seyal, Acacia tortilis, and Acacia 
drepanalobuim.  Grasses that have been identified and found in both woodlands and open 
grasslands are Panicum minimum, Sporobolus pyramidalis, Digitaria macroblephara, 
Themeda triandra and Cynodon dactylon. 
 
The crater highlands forests and Northern Highlands Forest Reserve (NHFR) forms the 
main catchment areas in the NCA. These are the major sources of water for the people, 
wildlife and livestock in adjacent plains to the west as well as for agricultural areas in the 
south and east of the NCA. Much of the drainage in the area, comprise of small internal 
streams flowing either in the craters, or into depressions such as Olbalbal depression that 
may hold water for up to 10 months in a wet year. The natural water supplies are very 
limited and water supply is especially precarious during the dry season (Potanski, 1994). 
 
3.1.3.6 Wildlife and conservation values 
Wildlife species that are found in Ngorongoro district are more or less similar to those 
found in Serengeti National Park because together with this Park, NCA, Maswa, Ikorongo 
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and Grumeti Game Reserves in Tanzania and Maasai – Mara National Reserve in Kenya, 
makes the greater Serengeti – Mara ecosystem.  Animals move freely in all these protected 
areas because the migratory routes are still intact.  Animals particularly zebra (Equins 
burchelli), wildebeest (Cannochaetes taurinus) and elephant (Loxodanta Africana) utilize 
the Loliondo game reserve in wet seasons which start in November through to May. The 
most abundant species in the area include: wildebeest (Cannochaetes taurinus), zebra 
(Equins burchelli), gazelles (Gazella spp), impala (Aepyceros spp) and hartebeest. Others 
include giraffe (Giraffe giraffe), Lion (Panthera leo), the leopard (Panthera felis) and hyena 
(Caricutta caricutta).   
 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area is a unique multiple land use area comprises of geological 
features of high outstanding scenic beauty and highest concentration of mammalian wild 
game which exhibits a magnificent seasonal migration. The central attraction of the area is 
the crater (Ngorongoro crater) - one of the largest inactive, unbroken and unflooded 
calderas in the world. The crater floor teems with large carnivores, herbivores, primates and 
birds. The crater has one of Africa's largest wildlife concentrations. It is also a home to a 
small and isolated relict of the black rhino population which was once a common and 
widespread group across southern and eastern Africa. It was been approved as Biosphere 
reserve in 1982. 
 
In addition to wildlife the area has an outstanding cultural heritage. The NCA has 
palaeotological and archaeological sites over a wide range of dates. The four major sites 
are: Olduvai gorge, Laetoli site, Lake Ndutu site, and the Nasera Rock Shelter. The variety 
and richness of the fossil remains, including those of early hominids, has made Ngorongoro 
one of the major areas in the world for research on the evolution of the human species. 
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Olduvai Gorge has produced valuable remains of early hominids including Australopithecus 
boisei (Zinthanthropus) and Homo habilis as well as fossil bones of many extinct animals. 
Nearby, at Laetoli, fossil hominid footprints of Pliocene age have been found. These 
conservation values led to its inscription on the UNESCO World Heritage sites list in 1979. 
 
3.1.3.7 Socio- economic profile of Ngorongoro district 
The Ngorongoro district total human population in 2002 national census was 167,900 with a 
density of 4. 4 people/km2. The projected population growth rate from 1988 to 2002 was 
3.4% per annum (national census, 2002). Typical to the pastoral areas, Ngorongoro district 
is generally sparsely populated. But recently it is has been experiencing rapid population 
increase.  The main ethnic groups in Ngorongoro district are the Maasai pastoralists which 
constitute the majority ethnic group (95%) residing in both Loliondo and Ngorongoro areas. 
Others are the Sonjo agro-pastoralists (1%) restricted to Loliondo area, the pastoral Tindiga 
(1%) and Barbaig (3%) found in Lake Eyasi escarpment area, and the Ndorobo gatherers 
who have been assimilated in various Maasai sections (Runyoro, 2001). Other ethnic groups 
reported to be living permanently in the area are to a large extent employees or those who 
retired from government service and have decided to settle in the area.  These are referred to 
as “Waswahili” however are reported to have very little influence in everyday life decision-
making  
 
While the Maasai may seem to constituting one group (95%), there are also differences 
within this group that may be sources of conflicts.  The differences are largely due to origin 
of the different Maasai groups.  There are six major groupings of the Maasai, namely Purko, 
Laitayok, Kisongo, Loita, Salei and Sonjo (agro-pastoralists).  The Purko Laitayok, Lita, 
Laitayok and Salei are found in Loliondo area.  Kisongo Maasai are found in Ngorongoro 
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area and are widely distributed in Kiteto, Simanjiro district (Runyoro, 2001). The Loita 
Maasai have recently immigrated from Kenya, and they are frequently involved into 
resource-use conflicts with other Maasai clans as well as the Sonjo who have settled in the 
area for a long time. 
 
Most areas in Ngorongoro district are semi-arid plains, which cannot support crop 
cultivation, and only limited areas are suitable for cultivation. The main economic activity 
in the area is pastoralism with limited cultivation. However, the area that has been 
converted to cultivation is on increase. This is particularly so in the highland areas. The 
total arable land available is estimated to be 50,000 ha, and the total land under cultivation 
is 10,250 ha (ARCO, 1997). Ngorongoro district, like other pastoral areas, have very limited 
social services like schools, health facilities and transport network. The district total road 
length is 515 km, and road density is about 0.04 km/ km2 (ARCO, 1997). The roads present 
in most areas are dry weather tracks, which are not passable during rain seasons. 
 
3.1.4 Description of Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
The NCA is situated at 30 15’ S and 350 30’ E in northern Tanzania.  It lies at the western 
edge of the East African Great Rift Valley and covers about 8,292km2. The NCA 
headquarter is located approximately 160km NW of Arusha Town, the tourists’ center of 
northern Tanzania.  
 
The NCA is part of Serengeti-Maasai Mara ecosystem (Figure, 6).  Ecologically the area is 
diverse and can be categorized into fiver zones: the crater highlands, Salei plains, Gol 
Mountains, Serengeti plains and Kakesio/Eyasi escarpment. The altitude within the five 
zones varies from 1,000 m (a.s.l) on rift valley floor to 1,500 to170 m (a.s.l.) on the Salei 
and Serengeti plains, rising to 2,800 m (a.s.l) on the highland plateaux then peaks to 3, 000, 
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(a.s.l.) on the crater highlands. The NCA is within the semi – arid zone of Tanzania, with 
rainfall ranging between 260 and 1890mm.  Typical of semi-arid environments, the rainfall 
is highly seasonal and variable within and between seasons and years.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Ngorongoro Conservation Area in relation to Serengeti – Ngorongoro – 
Maasai Mara “Biosphere Reserve”. 
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The large scale tropical weather patterns is locally modified by local topography For 
instance, the windward side of the crater highlands receives relatively higher rainfall than 
the rain shadow side. Where as larger part of the NCA is on the rain shadow.  
 
Table 3: Main Land Units of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Unit Altitude Land form Vegetation 
type 
Crater highlands  2000 – 3000m Volcanic plateau with 
extinct volcanic peaks and 
calderas  
Forest, 
woodland 
with grassland 
glades  
Angata /Salei 
Plains  
1750m Flat  Grasslands  
Oldongyo Ogal 
Hills  
1750 – 2200m Rifted and eroded hills  Grassland and 
bushland  
Serengeti Plains  1750 – 2200m Extensive plains  Grasslands  
Eyasi / Kakesio 
scarp  
1000 – 2000m Steep scarp, rolling plains 
and low ridges  
Bushlands, 
woodlands, 
wooded 
grassland  
 
Source: Herlocker and Dirschl, 1972 
 
The relative coverage of vegetation types were described by Herlocker and Dirschl (1972). 
These include health, bamboo, evergreen forest, highland woodland, lowland woodland, 
medium grasslands, short grasslands, sand dunes grasslands. The NCA is a part of the 
Serengeti Ecosystem, and is utilised as a main wet season grazing area for the majority of 
Serengeti’s migratory herds numbering approximately 1.5m wildebeest (Cannochaetes 
taurinus); 470,000 (Gazella spp),  and 260,000 zebra (Equins burchelli). Other important 
animals are buffalo (Syncerus caffer) and elephant (Loxodanta Africana).  
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The human population dynamics of NCA is featured by resident Maasai characterised by 
temporary in – and out – migration which creates alternating peaks in the overall trend of 
populations increase. The current human population is estimated at 52,000, with a 
population growth rate of 2 – 3 percent per annum. The pastoral Maasai have inhabited the 
NCA for almost two centuries, and co-existed with the wildlife of the area.  The indigenous 
Maasai social and economic life centers on livestock.  Cattle, sheep and goats form the basis 
for their subsistence. Their pastoral economy is basically subsistence oriented and pure 
pastoral diet of milk, blood and meat is still highly valued.  However, in practice 
agricultural foods now form a very important part of the diet and replace the pastoral diet, 
particularly during drought and at the height of dry season (Homewood, 1995; Galvin et al., 
1994). 
 
3.2 Methodology  
The primary data for this study consisted of both ecological and socio-economic data. The 
ecological data were collected through range inventory surveys and GIS data acquisition 
techniques. While socio-economic data were collected through PRA approaches and 
questionnaire surveys.  
 
3.2.1 Ecological data collection and analysis 
Collection of ecological data involved range surveys as well as processing and 
interpretation of satellite imagery of parts of Mkata plains, Kilosa district and Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area, Ngorongoro district.  
 
3.2.1.1 Land-cover changes determination 
A combination of Geographic Information System (GIS) methods and information 
generated through community resource mapping and transect walks during PRA exercises, 
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were used to determine land-use and land cover changes, and trends in access to range 
resources in the past 25 years in the two study areas. Data sources for GIS methods included 
available aerial photographs (of late 1950s and early 1960s), topographic maps (1975) and 
Landsat satellite images (of 1975, 1991 and 2000).  Local communities provided timeline 
data, which together with geo-referencing using GPS supplemented information obtained 
during, transect walks.  
 
A combination of these data sets generated local knowledge, which was used as an input to 
information obtained through conventional GIS methods. Map features and delineated 
vegetation classes were digitised using ArcView software and processed following standard 
GIS procedures. Change detection analysis was conducted by using overlays generated from 
GIS land cover/use maps plus local perception information.  
 
The geo-referenced topographic maps for each of the study area were produced using 
ArcView, ArcInfo and Erdas Imagine softwares. Change detection matrix tables were 
developed and used for quantification of land cover changes. Assessment of major land 
cover classes and the detection of changes associated with these classes were carried out 
through a number of steps shown in the methodology flow chart illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Change detection flow chart 
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3.2.1.1.1 Reference input materials 
The materials used in the assessment of land cover classes and land cover change detection 
includes: 
i. Topographic map sheets at a scale of 1:50000 (UTM zone 37 south) for Kilosa 
district and topographic sheets UTM zone 36 south, for Ngorongoro conservation 
area. These are the best available detailed maps covering the two study areas. 
ii. Landsat MSS scene 169/65 of 27th July, 1975; Land sat TM scene 167/65 of 15th 
July 1991, Land sat TM scene 167/65 of  August, 2000; Landsat MSS scene 169/62 
of 17th April, 1975, Landsat TM scene 169/62 of 27th April , 1991, Land sat TM 
scene 169/62 of 20 April of 17th  2000. 
iii. A number of small scale maps (1:1,000,000 scale) describing different attributes of 
the study areas (villages, road net work map, relief maps and administrative map) 
for Kilosa and Ngorongoro districts were reproduced from various documents. 
 
3.2.1.1.2 Pre-processing of the satellite images 
 
Three sub scenes of the same size one from the landsat MSS and the other two from 
Landsat TM image – for each of the two study areas – were extracted from the full satellite 
scene using ERDAS imagine version 8.3.1 
 
3.2.1.1.3 Interpretation of satellite images 
(i) Colour composition for visual interpretation 
A number of band combinations were tried on the seven bands of the TM image. 
Subsequently the colour composition from Landsat TM bands 4, 5 and 3 combinations 
proved to produce the best image for visual interpretation of physical and vegetational 
features. A number of subset for the landsat TM developed as training areas were enhanced 
and printed for use in ground truthing. 
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(ii) Collection of ground truthing information 
Ground truthing was based on the Landsat TM image of 2000. The enhanced colour 
composite image printouts were used for training purposes in the field. The villages that 
were randomly selected for socio-economic household and range surveys were also used as 
training areas. At each of the survey sites, the recognizable features on both the ground and 
the colour composite print outs were marked on the colour composite print out. The 
identification of features was done through first locating easily-observable features such as 
roads, railway lines, river networks, plantation boundaries, there after were related to other 
features such as vegetation types. The features were georeferenced using GPS. The local 
community members provided the onsite local knowledge including administrative 
locations (names of village, ward, and division), type of present land cover and use, and 
land cover changes. Additional information on landscape and soil features (texture and 
relief) was also recorded. 
 
Despite the small changes in land use/cover which have taken place in the last three years, 
several land cover details were identified in the field; from the enhanced colour composite 
print outs for the landsat TM images of 2000. The following land cover classes were 
identified for Kilosa and Ngorongoro districts; with the corresponding characteristics on the 
4-5-3 colour composite. 
 
a) Closed forest: deep red, speckled 
b) Woodland: Bright red, smooth (dense woodland, montane health) as speckled (open 
woodland) 
c) Bush land: Pink, smooth (dense bushland), bright pink scrubland speckled (open 
bushland), smooth red (Highland grassland) 
d) Grassland: Blue-green plus red or pink speckles (open shrubland) 
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e) Intensive cultivation (e.g. sisal estates, sugar cane plantation, rice fields) pale cream 
or reddish. 
f) Riverine  vegetation: bright red 
g) Water features (lakes, dams): black 
h) Settlements: grey/mauve. 
i) Road network: grayish crooked lines network. 
 
Some of the details which were obtained on the Landsat TM image with a spatial resolution 
of 30x30m were lost or reduced on the Landsat MSS image with a spatial resolution of 
79x79m. Hence, by taking into consideration these factors, the land cover classes were 
generalized into 4 main categories. 
 
The main land cover types retained for classification were: 
a) Bare land: including areas with no active vegetation, these have lowest NDVI values 
(ranging from -1 to approximately -0.27 for the MSS image and between -0.69 to 
approximately -0.40 for the TM image). This class include bare soil (recently 
cultivated areas, overgrazed areas, rocky area etc) and water bodies (like lakes, 
dams, and rivers). 
b) Grassland/cropland: comprising sites with very low active vegetation, thus with 
(lower) NDVI values (ranging from about -0.26 to approximately -10.01 for the 
MSS image and from about -0.39 to approximately +0.25 for the TM image). This 
class comprises mainly of grasslands, farmlands and shrub grasslands 
c) Woodland: this has high active vegetation and relatively high NDVI values varying 
from about +0.02 to approximately +0.25 for the MSS image and from about +0.26 
to approximately +0.50 for the TM image. The class includes the woodlands, 
thickets and bushlands. 
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d) Closed forest class has the highest active vegetation, thus the highest NDVI values 
(ranging from about 0.26 to approximately +0.54 for the MSS image and from about 
+0.51 to approximately +0.65 for the TM image). The class comprise of closed 
woodlands, and montane forests. 
 
(iii) Image classification 
The study combined both visual and digital image classifications. The digital image 
classification mainly based on the grey scale ranges of the calculated NDVI, used to 
establish main vegetation cover units. Two methods were used for digital image 
classification the density slicing method (Richards, 1993) and level slicing method 
(Lillesand and Kiefer, 1987). The slices which are intervals of series of brightness value 
corresponding to the ranges of NDVI values, these were established basing on the grey 
scale images and on training printouts. 
 
A number of indices are used in remote sensing to create output images by computing 
mathematically the digital number (DN) values of different bands. The Normalized 
Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is by far the most commonly used in vegetation. 
According to Cohen (1994) the NDVI is simple to compute and exhibits strong relationship 
with a number of vegetation characteristics. A combination of supervised classification and 
visual classification was used to classify the land cover types in all study areas. 
 
3.2.1.2 Range inventory surveys 
Data on range condition and trends were measured using the method described by Range 
Improvement Task Force (1985). Generally, four or five range condition classes are 
recognized: excellent, good, fair, and poor. Differences between condition classes are 
somewhat arbitrary since they rarely form a continuum from badly depleted ranges to those 
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with maximum cover and productivity. Differences in range condition are often indicated 
by differences in species composition, but range condition is generally defined as departures 
from some conceived potential for a particular range site. A range site is defined as “a 
distinctive kind of rangeland, which in the absence of abnormal disturbance and physical 
site deterioration, has the potential to support a native plant community typified by an 
association of species different from that of other sites” (Society for Range Management, 
1974, 1983). The method used in this study was adopted from Dyksterhuis (1958). This 
approach is ecological, in that range condition is measured in degrees of departure from 
climax. The approach assumes that climax can be determined for each range site. Excellent 
condition class would represent climax, and poor condition, the most removed from climax. 
The following ratings were used to determine condition: 
 
 
Range condition 
 
Percent of climax 
Excellent………………………………. 76-100 
Good…………………………………… 50-75 
Fair…………………………………….. 26-50 
Poor…………………………………….. 0-25 
 
Originally, species occurring on each site were classified by their reaction to grazing as: 
decreaser, increasers, or invaders. Decreasers are highly palatable plants that decline in 
abundance with grazing pressure. Plants classified as increaser I types are moderately 
palatable and serve as secondary forage plants. They may increase slightly or remain stable 
under moderate grazing. As grazing pressure increases or as range condition reaches fair 
condition, these species also decline. Other plant species present in the climax vegetation 
but that are unpalatable may increase under grazing pressure or as site deterioration occurs. 
These species are classified as increaser II plants. Invaders are species that encroach onto 
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the site from adjacent sites in later stages of deterioration. Type I invaders may eventually 
decrease if forced utilization occurs at later stages of deterioration. Type II invaders are 
generally unpalatable and increase through final stages of deterioration. 
 
(i) Range inventory sampling design 
A systematic sampling with a random start was adopted in this study; to setting transect 
lines in sampled range sites. A range site is considered as an association of range species 
which is distinct from other sites in terms of proportion of species as well as productivity. 
Quadrant surveys were conducted on 1-km line transects set in each of the range sites 
(distinct ecological units) identified during community resource mapping, 3 transects were 
set in each of the range sites. Sampling units were 0.5 x 1m2 quadrants set at 100 m intervals 
along each transect. Data on vegetation cover, forage yield, species composition and range 
condition were recorded.  Data on forage yields were determined by a dry and weigh 
method.   
 
ii) Percentage plant cover and species composition determination 
Plant cover was estimated concurrently with forage yield determination. In each sampling 
unit (quadrant), the leaf spread as basal area of the under growth herbaceous plants was 
recorded as percentage ground cover.  Corresponding estimates of bare ground was also 
recorded.   
 
iii)  Forage yield determination 
Potential forage yield was determined in each of the study village.  Transects were set in 
different range units, which were identified in each village during transect walks. A clipping 
technique described by Pieper (1978) was used for forage yield determination. Vegetation 
sampling was carried out on a 1 km geo-referenced transects which were set along the 
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catena in each of the range sites. The sampling units were 0.5 x 1m2 rectangular quadrants. 
Ten samples were taken from each transect at 100m intervals. Vegetation were clipped to 
ground level and weighed to obtain total fresh weight. Sub-samples for dry weight 
determination were drawn from samples and put into paper bags. Thereafter the sub-
samples were oven dried at 280 C in order to determine the dry weights proportions. 
 
iv) Range condition determination 
Range condition was determined according to the method reported in the Range 
Improvement Task Force handbook (1985). Range condition is based on estimated health of 
a rangeland under study, and the method is applied to open grassland and shrub lands. 
Range condition trend has been defined as the “direction of change in range condition” 
(Society for Range Management, 1989). Generally, trend is considered upward (or 
improving) or downward (declining) or stable. Trend ratings were initially used to establish 
conditions for livestock grazing as indicated by increasing productivity, cover, and 
succession toward climax conditions. Thus, to say whether a trend is upward or downward, 
one must specify the use or criteria used. If the trend is used to correspond to succession 
stages, upward trend would be toward climax and for downward trend - one must specify 
the use or criteria used. In this study a range condition trend is applied with respect to 
grazing cattle. 
 
Paced transect was used to determine range condition. The paced 1 km transects run along 
transects previously used for determining potential forage yield. A 3/4 cm diameter metal 
loop placed immediately in front of foot was used as sampling point.  A total of 100 points 
were scored in each transect. Hits on vegetation, litter, rock and base ground were recorded. 
The composition score was determined from a rating scale (Appendix 3) 
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The range quality was computed using a formula: 
                                      n 
RQ = ∑ (i Hi) 
          i= 1 
 
Where: 
RQ  =    range quality 
   i    =    the score of range unit 
Hi    =    proportion ith range quality 
              n    =    number of range units 
 
3.2.1.3 Animal counts 
To determine the actual stocking rates and herd mobility, livestock counts were conducted 
in homesteads in all of the study villages. The actual counting was carried out by the 
interviewers during both dry and wet seasons. However, the data obtained were in most 
cases approximate figures, obtained through recall by head of household. Moreover, a large 
proportion of herders are reluctant to disclose to outsiders the actual number of cattle they 
own. In order to guarantee quality of the data the researcher conducted sample counting in 
each village. In Ngorongoro Conservation Area where there are regular livestock 
vaccination programmes, the number of livestock was counter checked using the 
vaccination records.  
 
Livestock herd mobility was computed for each herd. The formula for computing herd 
mobility was adapted from Range Improvement Task Force handbook (1985), given as: 
 Mo = Ni/Not 
  Where: 
Mo   =    livestock mobility 
Ni     =   number of animal moved from the area 
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Not   =    total population of animals in the area at time t 
 
3.2.2 Socio-economic data collection and analysis 
3.2.2.1 Description of socio-economic research design 
A longitudinal study design was adopted for this research. The design allowed for the 
collection of data from more than one point in time for comparison purposes. The design 
was considered to be the most appropriate for this study taking into consideration the 
mobile nature of the pastoralists, the spatial-temporal variation of range resources and the 
dynamic nature of resource - use conflicts.  Furthermore, a combination of methods was 
used in the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, that is, triangulation. The 
results from each of the research methods were integrated in the overall results. The data 
collected by different methods provided a reliability check, while at the same time provided 
additional insights into particular issues and relationships. This approach allowed multiple 
measurements of the same variables (Monela, 1995). Qualitative methods provided an 
insight into reasons for some issues arising from the quantitative methods. They 
particularly, answered the questions of why and how. 
 
3.2.2.2 Research phases 
The study was carried out in two phases. Phase one involved reconnaissance surveys of the 
study area followed by PRA exercises. During this phase the researcher obtained research 
permits from the Regional, District, Division, Ward and Village government authorities. A 
permit to conduct research in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area was processed through the 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism.  At this stage the 
researcher got familiarised with the social settings of the study areas, and selected the study 
villages. The questionnaires were pre-tested during this phase, in order to identify 
weaknesses, ambiguities and/or omissions before they were administered. Fifteen 
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households, from Kiduhi village in Kilosa district, and Oloirobi village in Ngorongoro 
district were selected for pre-testing the questionnaire.  These villages were not included in 
the subsequent field surveys. During the second phase the detailed formal questionnaire 
surveys were carried out. 
 
3.2.2.3 Sampling design 
Both probability and non-probability sampling methods were used in the selection of study 
units. A purposive procedure was employed to select the divisions and wards that have high 
population of pastoralists and high prevalence of resource - use conflicts. A stratified 
sampling procedure was used to select two pastoral and two agro-pastoral villages from 
each of the study areas. In case of Ngorongoro Conservation Area, the main farming 
systems are pastoralism or agro-pastoralism, while in Mkata plains there are villages that 
were set aside for pastoralists, mainly for the immigrant Maasai and Barabaig pastoralists.  
 
The agro-pastoral villages in this study are defined as those in which the pastoralists coexist 
with cultivators (in Mkata plains) or where the majority of pastoralists have adopted crop 
production (Ngorongoro Conservation Area). Two divisions (Kimamba and Magole) and 
four wards (Kimamba, Rudewa, Msowero and Dumila) were selected from Mkata plains. In 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area one division (Ngorongoro) and four wards (Kakesio, 
Enduleni, Nainokanoka and Naiyobi) were selected for the study. The four wards from 
Mkata plains are located on the central parts of the flood plains; where the district 
authorities had designated the pastoral villages.  
 
On the other hand the Ngorongoro division coincides with the jurisdiction of Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area. The study villages in Mkata plains include: Twatwatwa and Mabwegere 
(pastoral villages), Mbwade and Msowero (agro – pastoral villages). The study villages in 
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the Ngorongoro area include Kakesio, Irikeepus (pastoral), Enduleni and Naiyobi (agro-
pastoral) (Table 4). 
 
A sampling frame for this study was the names of all household heads from the village 
registers, obtained from the village government offices; these were used in selecting the 
households for the interviews. The households interviewed were selected by a random 
sampling procedure, using a table of random numbers. According to Boyd et al (1981), the 
sampling intensity should not be less than 5 percent.  The number of households in the 
study villages ranged from 90 to 1,053. 
 
Table 4: Sample size and sampling intensity in the study villages in Ngorongoro Mkata 
plains and Conservation Area  
Mkata plains Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Village No. 
HH 
Sample 
size 
Sampling 
intensity 
(%) 
Village No. 
HH
Sample 
size 
Sampling 
intensity 
(%)
1. Msowero 1,700 170 10 Naiyobi 1,053 105 10
2. Mbwade 146 30 20 Erikeepus 816 81 10
3. Twatwatwa 250 37 15 Enduleni 840 84 10
4. Mabwegere 90 30 30 Kakesio 175 35 20
Total 2,186 267 2,884 305 
 
Key: HH – House hold 
 
In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample size for satisfactory statistical inferences a 
minimum of 30 households was targeted for each study village. Therefore the sampling 
intensities for this study ranged between 10 and 30 (Table, 4).   
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3.2.2.4 Units of analysis for socio-economic data 
A unit of analysis is the one from which information is obtained or a unit whose 
characteristics we describe (Kajembe, 1994). In most of pastoral and agro-pastoral 
production systems, decisions are taken both at household and supra household levels. 
These levels are the basic units of analysis for this study. A household is defined as family 
members living in specific area, sharing a pot and having one household head as a decision-
maker (Ishengoma, 1998). The household structure among the crop cultivators is relatively 
simple, mainly consisting of husband-wife-children and relatives. However, a more 
complex household structure characterized most of polygamist Maasai pastoralists. In this 
case a polygamous family (Olmerei) occupies a certain home-steady or boma (enkang), in 
which each wife has a separate house (enganji). Within the “boma” there may be separate 
houses for relatives, whose presence is more fluid.  A pastoral household (enkang) in this 
study is defined as a group of people who normally share dwelling houses or encampment, 
claim a kinship relationship, sharing responsibilities for managing a communal herd and 
may or may not eat from a common pot, but they are under the authority of one person. The 
household head is the ultimate decision maker. Thus, in pastoral communities the household 
was determined by shared encampment and claim to a communal herd.  
 
According to Kajembe (1994) supra household levels include either a community or an 
interest group. A community is defined as a group of people living in a particular area or a 
group of individuals with some common characteristics. The communities, however, are 
relatively heterogeneous. On the other hand an interest group is defined as a group of people 
with more or less common goals and relatively homogenous in terms of resource 
endowment. 
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3.2.2.5 Data collection methods 
Both primary and secondary data were collected during this study. Secondary data sources 
included: documentary materials (government reports, research reports, village records and 
various publications); obtained from libraries and district offices. Primary data were 
obtained from selected study villages and households through PRA approaches, household 
surveys and informal discussions with local people. 
 
(i)  Socio-economic surveys 
The socio-economic surveys were conducted under two stages. The first stages involved 
Participatory Rural Appraisals and Focused Group Discussions, this was followed by 
Interviews. The use of a combination of different research methods was justified by the fact 
that it allowed for cross checking and verification of data obtained through different 
methods, that is, triangulation.  
 
(ii)  Participatory Rural Appraisal 
Participatory Rural Appraisal aimed at involving the community members to evaluate their 
own situation and familiarize the researcher with the real world of the local people in the 
study areas. Furthermore, PRA arise self-critical awareness of the attitude on part of the 
researcher towards the people (Matata et al., 2001). 
 
The tools used in PRA include problem ranking, needs assessment, wealth ranking, trend 
diagramming, transect walks, and village resource mapping.  During village resource 
mapping exercises, villagers in a participatory manner, drew village resource maps using 
locally available materials. During transect walks a researcher was accompanied by village 
leaders and elders to verify the resources indicated on the resource village map drawn by 
villagers. The main features and geographical units were identified and geo-referenced 
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using a hand-held Global Positioning System (GPS). These were then transferred to a large-
scale (1: 50,000) village map. The type of information obtained through PRA include: 
trends in land-use changes, conditions in rangelands, accessibility to natural resources, the 
existing local institutions governing  accessibility and use of natural resources, main risks 
felt by people, types of resource - use conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms at local 
level. 
 
(iii) Formal interviews 
A structured questionnaire was used for household interviews, and a sample of the 
questionnaire schedule is attached as Annex 2. The household questionnaire was translated 
into Swahili. This aimed at minimizing mis-interpretation of questions that could have 
arisen among different interviewers. As most of the Maasai respondents could not express 
themselves sufficiently in Kiswahili, most of the interviews with this group were conducted 
through Maasai speaking interpreters. The type of data obtained through structured 
questionnaire include: general information on main economic activities, farm sizes and 
livestock ownership, livestock mobility and pastoralists’ migration patterns, access and 
management of grazing lands, local institutions governing communal resources, resource-
use conflicts and mechanisms for conflict resolution. 
 
(iv)  Focus group discussions 
Focused group discussions were conducted with three groups in each study village. The 
groups included men only, women only and mixed group including equal number of men 
and women. Each group included youth representatives of respective sex. The separation of 
sexes was adopted because according to most pastoral tribal customs, women may not feel 
free to speak in presence of men. The criterion for selection of the group members was the 
willingness to participate in the discussions. 
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Focused group discussions normally generate large body of knowledge about the 
community (Mikkelsen, 1995; Borrini–Feyeraben, 1997), and are cheaper and quicker to 
conduct than individual interviews (Katani, 1999). The focus group discussions were 
envisaged to fill in gaps of missing information and help to clarify issues which arose from 
formal interviews. The type of information obtained through Focused Group Discussions 
include: people perceptions on effectiveness of local institutions for governing natural 
resources, changes in tenure-ship of natural resources, ratings of resource - use conflicts and 
their underlying causes, rating of the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms, 
peoples’ attitudes towards externally sponsored institutions and incentives to preserve 
existing local institutions. 
 
(v) Informal interviews 
Informal interviews were carried out with government officials, village government leaders, 
traditional leaders, and extension workers.  These were considered as key informants. 
According to Meteric (1993) key informants are people who are accessible, willing to talk 
and having great knowledge regarding the issues under discussion. At the regional level, 
officials interviewed included: 2 Regional Administrative Secretaries, 2 Regional 
Agricultural Advisors, 2 Regional Livestock Development Advisors – each from Arusha 
and Morogoro regions respectively. Officials interviewed at district levels include 2 District 
Commissioners, 2 District Executive Directors and 2 District Agricultural and Livestock 
Development Officers – each from Kilosa and Ngorongoro districts respectively. Others 
were: the District Land Planning Officer, District Community Development Officer, District 
Water Engineer, and District Cultural Officer in Kilosa.  
 
The functional officers interviewed in Ngorongoro Conservation Area include the 
Conservator of Ngorongoro Conservation Area; Community Development Director, Natural 
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Resource Management Director and the Principal Ecologist. Below district levels the 
interviewed officials included: 3 Divisional Executive Officers, 8 Ward Executive Officers, 
4 Councillors, 8 Village Chairpersons and 8 Village Executive Officers. Others were 4 
Agricultural and Livestock Development Field Assistants, and 6 Traditional Leaders. The 
information obtained through these interviews include: main land-use systems, existing land 
tenure systems, demographic changes, main resource - use conflicts, and mechanisms for 
resolving resource-use conflicts. The interviews were guided by a checklist (Appendix 1). 
 
(vi) Participant observation 
When carrying out participant observation the observer becomes part of the situation being 
studied (Kajembe and Wiersum, 1998).  Participant observation allowed validation and 
understanding of the community incentives to retain or change common property 
institutions. The method was also used to gain more understanding on the capacity of local 
pastoral institutions in the management of communal resources and resolving resource-use 
conflicts.  Kajembe (1994) emphasises that the method allows tying together discrete 
elements and information collected by other methods. 
 
3.2.2.6 Socio-economic data analysis 
A combination of data analysis methods including: content and structural - functional 
analysis for qualitative data and a Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 
11.5) was used for quantitative data analysis. The qualitative data obtained during PRA 
exercises were analysed in collaboration with the communities and the findings were used 
along with the quantitative data to triangulate and enrich the understanding of the social - 
cultural changes of communities under study. 
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(i)  Content and structural – functional analyses of qualitative data 
A content analysis of the components of verbal discussions held with respondents was 
carried out. The recorded dialogue was broken into smallest units of information, themes 
and tendencies. In this way the information was organised in a more objective and 
systematic manner (Kajembe, 1994). This aided the researcher in ascertaining beliefs, 
values and attitudes of respondents. Structural-functional analysis sought to establish 
relationship among social facts, and how these relate to the physical surroundings. 
Structural - functional analysis in this study helped to understand the existing types of local 
institutions and their effectiveness in organisational performance, and in resolving social as 
well as resource-use conflicts. 
 
(ii)  Quantitative statistical analysis 
Both descriptive and inferential statistical analyses were carried out for quantitative data. 
The completed questionnaire schedule was coded, cleaned and the open ended questions 
were categorized and transformed into a form amenable for further analysis. A Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 11.5) was used in analyzing the quantitative data. 
 
(iii) Analysis of factors affecting strength of local institutions governing management 
of common grazing lands 
Following substantive conclusions of Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990), Baland and Platteau 
(1996), Agrawal (2001) and Stern et al., (2002) about 30 - 40 factors have been identified to 
affect performance of common-pool resource management regimes. However, not all of 
these factors are independent of each other. Some of them are empirically correlated. 
According to Agrawal (2001) currently there is no reliable way of assessing the degree of 
correlation among these and other variables that have emerged as important. Furthermore, 
because the effects of some variables and interaction effects among variables may also 
  
120
affect outcomes, any careful analysis of sustainability on the commons needs to incorporate 
interaction effects among variables. In this case the researcher need to explicitly take into 
account the relevant variables that might affect success, then the number of selected cases 
must be (much) larger than the number of variables.  
 
Taking these facts into consideration the factors affecting strength of local institutions under 
study were analysed by developing a logistic model to test the likelihood of socio-economic 
and environmental factors, which affect the performance of local institutions.  
 
(a) Dependent variable 
The institutional performance as a dependent variable was determined by developing a 
cooperative index, as the measure of communities under study to participate in cooperative 
management of communal grazing lands. The co-operative index is a multivariate index 
comprising of five variables each having a score of 1 for presence or score of 0 for absence, 
and is given as: 
 
Cooperative index = 
• Local community mobilization      =     1 
• Existence of  rules governing use  
     of common grazing land …………. =    1 
• Monitoring of rules………………. =    1 
• Local enforcement of rules ……….=    1 
• Conformance to rules…………….. =    1 
• Total score            ……………….. =    5 
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The co-operative index ranges from 0 to 5, and a mean score was computed for each study 
area, as a measure for institutional strength. 
 
(b) Independent variables 
Since a large number of causal variables may affect outcomes of participation in 
management of common pool resources, therefore outcomes are multiple causative i.e. 
different variables may lead to similar outcomes. Thus, in order to minimize the multiple 
causative effects and contextual issues (i.e. actual settings of sample units), the conceptual 
causal chains adopted from Agrawal (2001) were developed in order to specify a model to 
test the hypothesis. The following causal chains were developed:  
 
Strength of local institution   = f  (Strong enforcement; Predictable benefits flow; 
Recognition by government)  +  Error 
Strong enforcement               = f  (Dependence on resources; Migration level; Social 
capital) + Error 
Dependence on resources       = f  (Market pressure; Population pressure; Income 
level)   + Error, 
 
Therefore: 
Strength of local institutions = f  (Income level; Population pressure; Market Social
capital; Migration level; Predictability of resource 
flow; Recognition by government) +  
Error…………………………………………(1) 
 
Then logistic model 1 was developed to test factors affecting cooperation in management of 
common grazing lands. 
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The logistic regression model 1 specification was of the form, 
                      Ln p(Yi = 1)  =  γo +∑ γ1 Z1 +……  +∑ γkZk   ………………………(2) 
                      1 – p (Yi = 1)                                              k=1 
             Where: 
Y1 = dependent variable indicating herders co-operation in management of 
communal grazing lands expressed as co-operation index.  
Z1 ……Zk were the independent variables 
The independent variables are: 
Zi = Population pressure (a dummy variable) expressed as family size 
        compared to village average 
Z2 = Integration to market 
Z3 = Wealth category 
Z4 =Economic diversification 
Z5 = Herd size 
Z6 = Strength of local leadership  
 
 (iii)   Logistic regression analysis for prediction of occurrence of resource-use  
          conflicts 
A logistic regression analysis was adopted to analyse the likelihood of occurrence of 
resource-use conflicts. The dependent variable – occurrence of resource-use conflicts – was 
conceived as a dichotonomous dummy variable with the responses: “yes” for high conflict 
magnitude with value 1, or “no” for none to low conflict magnitudes with value “0”.  The 
conflict magnitude in each study village was rated on conflict scale with scores: violent 
clashes (6), animosity (5), disagreements (4), arguments (3), tensions (2) no conflict (1). 
Score 4 was used as a cut off point for high magnitude of resource-use conflicts. 
 
The logistic model predicts the likelihood of occurrence of the event (Menard, 1995),   
which is predicted by odds (Y = 1). That is the ratio of the probability that Y = 1 to the 
probability that Y ⁄= 1. 
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This was given by equation:  
                        Odd Y = P(Y = 1)/(1 - P(Y = 1 )…………………………………(3) 
 
The logit (Y)  is given by the natural log of Odds ;    that is 
                      ln p(Yi = 1)  =  log Odds = logit (Y)………….......……………….(4) 
                      1 – p (Yi = 1) 
Where:  
            Yi = ith observed value of resource use conflict 
 
The logistic regression model II specification was of the form: 
                      Ln p(Yi = 1)  =  βo +∑ β1 X1 +……  +∑ βkXk     ……………....…(5) 
                      1 – p (Yi = 1)                                          
 
Where; 
Yi   =  dependent variable, resource-use conflict 
Xi  = explanatory variables (X1 =  Perceived  environmental degradation); X2  = Crop- 
livestock integration); X3 =  State policies, X4 = socio-economic factors; X5 = market 
integration (proxied as distance to market  in km); 
 
The statistic significance of relationship between independent variable and the predictors 
was tested by the Model – Chi square at a significance level of p (< 0.05). A proportional 
reduction in the absolute value of the log-likelihood measure, RL2, was used to test the 
model goodness of fit. The static forms of models were adopted in this study. 
 
3.2.3 Study Limitations  
The following are the limitations, which were experienced during data collection stage of 
the study: 
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i) Most of the study villages were not easily accessible by motor vehicles during 
rain season which interrupted field data collection. This problem was overcome 
by visiting the particular villages on foot which prolonged data collection period. 
ii) The mobile nature of pastoral production system delayed data collection due to 
frequent absence of head of households who are spokesmen on issues related to 
livestock production. This was overcome through revisits of the study villages, 
which was taken into consideration when selecting a longitudinal study design 
adopted in this study. 
iii) Most of pastoralists were reluctant to disclose the actual number of livestock 
they own in fear of taxation by the local governments. A solution to this problem 
was attained through building trust with local communities particularly through 
participatory research approaches like transect walks which involved fully the 
local communities. 
iv) The hierarchical and closed nature of Maasai society required a lengthy period 
for building rapport with the communities in order to facilitate data collection 
process. Good relationship between the researcher and local communities was 
facilitated through local teachers and livestock field officers who were employed 
as enumerators and interprators during this study. 
v) Owing to long term conflicts and mistrust between Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area Authority and local communities, most respondents were suspicious of the 
researcher because was sometimes accompanied by the NCAA staff members. 
Improved relationship and free expression by local communities did take place 
when the research started to visit only in company of interprator. 
vi) During the data collection period Kilosa district was recovering from violent 
clashes between farmers and pastoralists. Therefore some of responses with 
regard to resource-use conflicts were reflecting the positions of different ethnic 
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groups; while some respondents were reluctant to discuss the issue. Prolonged 
study period and revisiting helped to build trust that enabled the conflicting 
parties to confide with the researcher. 
vii) Some of the data were based on memory recall by respondents; these are 
considered to be a close approximation of the variables which were intended to 
measure. This limitation was overcome by verifying data obtained using one 
method through triangulation. 
 
Despite of the limitations encountered during this study, but sufficient measures were taken 
to overcome them. Therefore, the data obtained were sufficient to allow for the inferences 
made from the study results. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Land Cover and Land use Changes in Mkata Plains and Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area 
4.1.1 Land cover/Land use categories in Mkata Plains 
4.1.1.1 Distribution of main land cover types in Mkata plains 
The distribution of major land cover/use types for the study area in the northern parts of 
Mkata plains are shown in Figures 8, 9, 10 and Table 5. The sub-scenes cover the northern-
parts of Mkata plains on an area of 104,411.9 ha (1, 441.1 km2). The August 2000 sub-
scene was employed in ground truthing of features delineated from satellite images on 
ground. It was assumed that three years difference from the time the satellite images were 
taken and when the field surveys were carried out between March 2003 and June 2004 was 
not long enough to allow substantial changes in main land cover types. Therefore, the 
features delineated on satellite imagery were representative of features on ground in March 
2003 and June 2004.   
 
Table 5 show areas and percentage coverage of the main land cover types identified on the 
studied satellite image sub-scenes. The main land cover types in Mkata plains are grasslands 
accounting for 48.8% of the total area and consisting of open grassland (5.2%), bush 
grassland (20.12%) and wooded grassland (23.55%). Other main land cover types are 
cultivation area accounting for 18.6%, bush lands comprising 15.15% and woodlands 
comprising 11.6%. 
 
  
127
 
 
 
Figure 8: Map of land cover types of northern parts of Mkata plains in July 1975  
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Figure 9: Map of land cover types of northern parts of Mkata plains in July 1991 
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Figure 10: Map of land cover types of northern parts of Mkata plains in August 2000 
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Table 5:  Distribution of land cover types in northern parts of Mkata plains in July 
1975, July 1991 and August 2000 
Cover type July, 1975  
July, 1991 August, 2000 
 
Area cover    
(ha) 
% 
cover 
 Area 
cover (ha) 
% 
cover  
Area 
cover  (ha) 
%  
cover 
Grasslands:       
• Grassland 16,055.4 15.5 4,233.2 4.10 5,380.3 5.2 
• Bush grassland 25,754.9 24.84 19,416.4 18.73 20,856.8 20.12 
• Wooded 
grassland 12,499.0 
 
12.10 14,867.3 14.34 24,414.5 23.55 
Sub-Total 
(Grasslands) 54,309.3 52.38 38,516.90 37.15 50,651.6 48.85 
       
Bushlands:       
• Bush land 3,086.0 3.0 15,569.9 15.02 10,683.4 10.30 
• Shrub land - - - - 5,026.6 5.02 
Sub-Total 
(Bush lands) 3,086.0 3.0 15,569.9 15.02 15,710.0 15.15 
       
Woodlands:       
• Closed woodland 7,246.1 5.6 6,961.8 6.31 5,529.5 6.32 
• Open woodland 5,865.4 7.0 6,541.8 6.71 6,556.1 5.33 
Sub-Total 
(Woodlands) 13,111.5 12.65 13,503.6 13.02 12,085.6 11.65 
       
Cultivation area:       
• Small hold farms 6,859.2 6.62 13,985.6 13.5 18,584.9 17.93 
• Sisal plantation 12,908.6 12.50 5,713.8 5.5 766.9 0.74 
Sub-Total  
(cultivation area) 19,767.8 19.07 19,699.4 19.0 19,351.8 18.64 
       
Fallow land - - - - 551.9 0.53 
Riverine vegetation 13,392.9 12.90 16387.8 15.8 5,327.2 5.18 
       
Total Area 103,677.5 100.0 103,677.6 99.99 103,677.7 100.0 
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Riverine vegetation type comprises of a mixture of different vegetation types and 
constitutes 5.18% of the area.  
 
Table 6 show the net area change of main land cover types including bushlands, grasslands, 
woodlands, cultivation area and riverine vegetation. The overall net changes in main 
vegetation cover types  from 1971 - 2000 include an increase of +12,624.0 ha of bush lands, 
equivalent to four-fold increase and  a net loss of –(2,657.7 ha) in grasslands which amounts 
to – (6.7%) loss. The reverine vegetation experienced a net loss of – (3,065.7 ha) which is – 
(60.2%) loss. The cultivation area has undergone a slight loss of – 416 ha equivalent to – 
(0.2) percentage. The loss probably is that cultivation area that reverted to bush and fallow 
land. Nonetheless, the changes in vegetation cover types were not uniform neither 
unidirectional. However, it can be asserted that vegetation changes are tending to formation 
of woody vegetation types dominated by bush lands and wooded grassland. This confirms 
the non-equilibrium theory, which explains the vegetation dynamics in savanna ecosystems. 
 
According to this theory the grasslands and bush lands are transitory sub-climax stages to 
woodland vegetation climax. Nduwamungu (2001) described a woodland regeneration cycle 
in Kilosa district, whereby the “miombo” woodlands exhibits a dynamic state - some open 
woodlands replenishing into closed woodland, while some woodlands remains open in 
response to other factors such as edaphic and climatic factors. The changes in open 
grassland could be relates to increasing grazing pressure in the area during period under 
consideration.  
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Table 6: Net area change of main land cover types in Mkata plains between 1975 to 
1991 and 1991 to 2000 
Land cover 
Net area change 
1975 - 1991 
Net area changes 
1991- 2000 
Overall net cover 
changes 
1975 - 2000 
Type 
Area (ha) 
 
%  
cover 
change 
Area 
 (ha) 
% 
cover 
change 
Area  
(ha) 
 
% 
 coverage 
 
Bush land +12,483.9 +404.5(33.7) +140.0 +0.9(0.08) +12,624.0 +409.1(34.1) 
Grasslands -15,792.4 
 
-40.8 (-2.5) + 12,134.2
 
+31.5(2.6) -2,657.7 -6.7(0.6)
-Open    
grassland -11,822.2 
 
-73.6 (-4.5) +1,147.1
 
+27.1(2.3) -10,675.1 -66.5(-5-5)
-Bush grass 
land -6,337.6 
 
-24.5(-2.1) -1,440.4
 
+7.2(0.6) -4,898.1 -19.0(-1.3)
-Wooded 
grassland +2,368.3 
 
+18.9(1.6) +9,547.2
 
+64.2(5.3) +11,915.5 +95.3(7.9)
Woodlands + 392.1 -40.8(-0.25) -1418.0 -10.5(-0.9) -1,025.9 -7.8(-0.7)
Riverine 
vegetation +2,994.9 
 
+26.9(1.9) -11,060.6
 
-67.0(-5.6) -3065.7 -60.2(-5.0)
Cultivation  
area -68.4 
 
-8.16(-0.3) -347.6
 
-1.8(-0.15) -416.0 -2.1(-0.2)
 
• Numbers in brackets are annual percentage changes 
 
The increased grazing pressure probably interfered with natural vegetation succession 
cycles.   
 
The riverine vegetation cover type experienced an initial annual increase of + 1.9 percent 
followed by a rapid annual decrease of – (5.6 percent). The results suggest an increased 
demand for wetland areas for growing irrigated crops during dry seasons. This is also, 
indirectly related to increase in human population with associated increase demand for 
cultivation land.  
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The cropland cover class consisting of smallholder farms and plantations has in overall 
increased by +9.2%. During the period starting from 1975 to 1991, the sisal plantations had 
in overall decreased by (-9.2%) of the respective area in 1975.  At the same time the small 
holder farms had increased by + 11.4 %. These changes in cultivation area can be associated 
with the collapse of sisal industry in the area in mid-1970s, when previous sisal plantation 
workers started to cultivate on sisal estates. The increase in cultivation area could also be 
attributed to general population increase and expansion of agricultural land in Mkata plains.  
 
The results on land cover changes in Mkata plains suggest a progressive change from 
grasslands towards woody vegetation (Figures, 11 and 12). This is a common directional 
succession process that has been reported to be taking place in East Africa rangelands and 
other similar savanna ecosystems (Herlocker, 1999). Increasing grazing pressure has been 
identified as one of the factors driving successional changes in arid rangelands which favour 
dominance of woody vegetation. The history of study villages in Mkata plain indicates that 
from 1940s, immigrant pastoralists had progressively been settling in the area. This has in 
turn led to increase in grazing pressure, which has triggered off successional vegetation 
changes tending towards woody vegetation cover types. According to Archer and Smeins 
(2004) grazing animals affect plants directly and indirectly. 
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Figure 11: Woodland regeneration in Mkata plains 
 
 
Figure 12: A secondary savanna woodland in Mkata plains  
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Over time, this may cause directional changes in community structure and function. Sala et 
al. (1988) suggests that grazing influences interact with climatic variability and other 
variables to cause changes in plant communities at various spatial and temporal scales. 
Thus; the impact of livestock grazing on ecosystems varies in relation to the evolutionary 
history of the site and the level of grazing pressure. 
 
According to Archer and Smeins (2004) the grassland or savanna systems that occur in 
areas climatically and edaphically capable of supporting trees and shrubs, prolonged grazing 
may decrease the capacity of grasses to competitively exclude woody plants, while at the 
same time reducing fire frequency and (usually) intensity by preventing the accumulation of 
fine fuels. Salihi and Norton (1987) argues that where grazing has reduced plant and litter 
cover, sealing of soil surfaces via raindrop impact and hoof compaction may reduce 
infiltration and increase erosion and runoff. In addition, germination and survival of 
perennial grasses may be greatly reduced on such sites and recovery of surface soil 
properties following cessation of grazing may require decades. Collins et al, (1987) argues 
that certain levels and combinations of grazing or disturbance increase overall plant species 
diversity by decreasing the capacity of competitive dominants to exclude other species and 
by creating gaps available for occupation by other species. However Connell (1978) points 
out that above certain frequencies or intensities, disturbance typically lowers diversity. This 
phenomenon of increased diversity at moderate levels of disturbance has been termed the 
“intermediate disturbance hypothesis” Discussing on impact of grazing, Tothill and Mott 
(1985) observes that grazing animals in combination with other human activities, have 
caused the degradation of woodlands in Africa, Asia, and India. On the other hand, grazing 
has also been implicated in the spread of bush in Africa, desert and thorn scrub in North and 
South America, and acacia and eucalyptus woodlands in Australia, at the expense of 
grasslands and savannas. Increased grazing intensity may favor woody plants by decreasing 
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herbaceous standing crop, reducing fire frequency and intensity, and enhancing the 
dispersal and germination of woody plant seeds. Other researchers observes that 
quantitative and historical assessments indicate woody plant abundance has increased 
substantially in grasslands during the last century in Africa (van Vegten,1983), Australia 
(Harrington et al., 1984), India (Singh and Joshi, 1979), North America (Smeins, 1984), and 
South America (Schofield and Bucher, 1986). Emmanuel et al., (1985) argues that the 
remaining grasslands and savannas may become increasingly susceptible to woody plant 
encroachment in response to anticipated global changes that may generate warmer, drier 
climates characterized by greater variability.  
 
4.1.1.2 Land cover change detection matrix between 1975 to 1991, and 1991 to 2000 in 
Mkata plains 
As from July 1975 to August 2000 Mkata plains had experienced substantial vegetation 
cover changes, which were determined from processed satellite image sub-scenes. 
However, a simple analysis based on subtracting areas may be inaccurate and misleading; 
therefore it was important to be supplemented with change detection matrices analysis. 
Table 7 and Figure 13 show the land cover change detection matrix for 1975 and 1991 and 
estimates of change in terms of area and percentage, using 1975 as base year.  
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Table 7: Land cover change detection matrix between July 1975 and August 1991 in 
Mkata plains 
Land cover type Area changes(ha) % change
Bushed grassland to cultivated area 2,117.0 -2.0
Grassland to cultivated area 1,499.7 -1.4
Wooded grassland to cultivated area 508.9 -0.5
Riverine vegetation to cultivated area 4,095.0 -3.9
Sisal plantation to small hold farms 7,311.9 -7.00
Sub - Total 15,532.5 -14.9
  
Woodland to bush grassland 141.9 -0.1
  
Bush to thicket 2,316.0 +2.2
Open woodland to closed woodland 439.6 +0.4
Grassland to shrub land 27,996.7 +26.8
Open woodland to wooded thicket 3,375.8 +3.2
Sisal plantation to bush grassland 151.1 +0.1
Su-Total 34,279.3 +32.9
Unchanged Land cover  54,457.9 52.1
Total 104,111.9 100.0
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Figure 13: Map of land cover changes between 1975 and 1991 on northern parts of 
Mkata plains 
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The major changes that occurred during the period under consideration were conversion of 
different land cover types to cultivation area totalling to 15,532.1 ha, equivalent to 14.9%. 
Other changes involved either succession or retrogression processes. The succession 
processes involved conversion to higher stages of succession towards woody vegetation 
climax.  A total of 34,256.6 ha (33.0 %) progressed in a succession cycle, where as the area 
that regressed to bush grassland amounted to 141.9 ha, equivalent of 0.2 percent. The land 
cover changes, which represent advancement in the succession cycle include change of 
grassland to shrubland (woody regeneration) (+26.81%), bushland to thicket (+2.2%), open 
woodland to thicket (+3.2%), open woodland to closed woodland (+ 0.4%). However, some 
of land cover changes that are characterised as advancement in ecological succession are 
considered as degradation for other land-use, in this case rangeland. Therefore, conversion 
of grassland to shrub land as well as change of open woodland to thicket that are associated 
with loss of grass cover is considered a degradation of rangelands intended for livestock 
grazing. 
 
Table 8 and Figure 14 show the land cover change-matrix in Mkata plains between 1991 
and 2000. The main land cover changes that took place during this period involved 
conversion of different land cover types to cultivation area totalling up to 11,276.7 ha 
equivalent to 10.8% of the land area. Another main change involved retrogression of 
various land cover types from a climax of woodland (or forest) cover to other intermediate 
stages, which amounted to 6,912.9 ha or 7.2 percent of the total area.  
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Table 8: Land cover change detection matrix between 1991 and 2000 in Mkata Plains 
Land cover type Area changes (ha) % Change
Bush grassland to Cultivation area 1,096.8 -1.1
Closed woodland to Cultivation area 443.4 -0.4
Thicket to Cultivation area 1,979.0 -1.9
Wooded thicket to Cultivation area 565.3 -0.5
Riverine vegetation to Cultivation area 1,581.4 -1.5
Sisal plantation to small hold farming 5,630.8 -5.4
Sub -Total 11,276.7 -10.8
 
Closed woodland to Open woodland 1,163.7 -1.2
Wooded grassland to Shrub land 860.2 -0.8
Thicket to Shrub land 3,302.5 -3.2
Wooded thicket to Open woodland 1,595.5 -1.5
Sub- Total 6,921.9 -6.7
 
Bush grassland to Wooded grassland 6,022.3 +5.8
Grassland to Woody regeneration 665.2 +0.6
Open woodland to Closed woodland 382.7 +0.4
Wooded thicket to Closed woodland 379.2 +0.4
Sub-Total 7,449.4 +7.2
Land cover unchanged 78,019.3 75.3
Total 103,677.3 100.0
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Figure 14: Map of land cover changes between 1991 and 2000 on northern parts of 
Mkata plains  
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The changes that occurred on grasslands include conversion of 6,033.3 ha (5.8%) of bush 
grassland to wooded grassland, and conversion of 1,096.8 ha (1.1%) bush grassland to 
cultivation area. Others were change of 860.2 ha (0.8%) of wooded grassland to shrub land. 
The land cover types that advanced in a succession cycle amounted to 7,449.4 ha (+7.2%) 
including change of 6,022.3 ha bush grassland to woody grassland (+5.8%). The land cover 
types that retrogressed were closed woodland to open woodland (-1.1%), wooded grassland 
to shrub lands (-0.8%), wooded thicket to open woodland (-1.5%). While no notable 
changes that took place on 75.2 % land cover of 1991 values (Figure 14). The results 
suggest that changes occurring on different vegetation types are multi-directional and 
caused by a wide range of factors. 
 
Nonetheless, the change-detection matrix results were similar to the trend in vegetation 
changes established from net cover change analysis that indicates the main trend is 
conversion of grass cover types into woodlands. These results are similar to findings by 
other researchers, for example Herlocker (1999) who concludes that the ecological 
succession in the savanna ecosystems tends to move towards a climax of woody vegetation. 
Thus under savanna ecosystems both overgrazing as well as under grazing may result into 
regeneration of woody vegetation. 
 
4.1.1.3 Range condition and trends in the study villages in Mkata plains 
Table 9 presents species composition, vegetation cover, and forage yield in Mkata plains. 
The results show that the dominant grass species in the three of the four study villages 
(Twatwatwa, Mabwegere and Mbwade) were “decreaser” annual grass species including 
Bracharia spp, Urochoroa spp and Commelina spp.  
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Table 9: Species composition, vegetation cover and forage yield in the study villages in 
Mkata plains 
Village Species composition  (%) 
Composition
Vegetation 
cover (%) 
Forage 
Yield 
Kg/Dm/Ha
Msowero Brachiaria deflexa 25.0 65.0 3,200.0
 Dichanthium spp 7.1  
 Echnochloa spp 1.8  
 Urochloa pullulans 25.0  
 Leptochloa spp 15.5  
 Heteropogon contortus 1.8  
 Cyperus rostundus 3.6  
 Fimbristris spp 5.4  
 Commelina 
benghalensis 5.4
 
 Sporobolus cordofanus 5.4  
 Indigofera spp 3.0  
   
   
Mbwade Sporobolus cordofanus 52.0 40.0 1,050.0
 Commelina 
benghalensis 
25.0  
 Unkown Weed spp 23.0  
   
   
Twatwatwa Urochloa pullulans 61.0 55.0 2,170.0
 Brachiaria deflexa 29.0  
 Leptochloa spp 5.0  
 Dichanthium spp 3.0  
 Heteropogon contortus 2.0  
   
   
Mabwegere Commelina 
benghalensis 
17.9 50.0 1,807
 Sporobolus cordofanus 44.0  
 Cyperus rotundus 23.1  
 Fimbristris spp 15.0  
 
Key:  DM =  Dry matter 
 
The rangelands were also being encroached by “increaser” species including Sporobolous 
spp and Dicanthium spp. Dominance of these “increaser” and “decreaser” species is an 
indication that the range condition at the three villages was declining. The dominant grass 
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species composition at Msowero village consists of “decreasers” - Brachiaria deflexa, 
Urochloa pullulans, Leptochloa spp and “increasers” Dichanthium spp, and Sporobolus 
cordofanus species. These species indicates that the range trend at Msowero was stable. 
Traditionally, plants have been classified as decreasers, increasers and invaders with respect 
to their response to grazing (Dyksterhuis, 1949 in Archer and Smeins, 2004). 
 
However, the functional response of a given species to grazing can vary from site to site and 
across topographic and edaphic gradients. The invaders, typically annuals or unpalatable 
(and sometimes toxic) perennial herbaceous or woody plants are often undesirable for 
livestock production because they displace more palatable grass species, are of lower 
nutritive value; or have low, erratic, or highly seasonal productivity.  
 
The estimated forage yield varied from 3,200 kg DM/Ha at Msowero village; 2,170 kg 
DM/Ha at Twatwatwa; 1,807 kg DM/Ha at Mabwegere and 1,050 kg DM/Ha at Mbwade 
village. The results indicate that the forage yield in the villages under the study were 
moderately to low productive (Table, 9). The vegetation cover was 65% at Msowero, 55% 
at Twatwatwa, 50% at Mabwegere and 40% at Mbwade village. The low vegetation cover 
(50% and below) indicates increasing risks for soil erosion. A relatively low vegetation 
cover at Mbwade village could be related to high bush encroachment. The poor range 
condition in the study villages in Mkata plains could be attributable to high grazing 
pressure. The KDC (2000) livestock estimates in the study villages in year 2000 totalled up 
to 92, 711 Livestock Units Equivalent (LUE). 
 
Table 10 shows range condition trend on the villages under study. The results indicate that 
the range condition class at Twatwatwa and Mabwegere villages was fair with condition 
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score of 54 and 50 % respectively, but with a declining trend. While the range condition 
class at Mbwade village was poor with a condition score of 24% with a declining trend.  
 
Table 10: Range condition trend in the study area in Mkata plains 
Village Condition score (%) Class Trend
 
Twatwatwa 
Mabwegere 
Msowero 
Mbwade 
 
54 
50 
60 
24 
 
Fair 
Fair 
Good 
Poor 
Declining
Declining
Stable
Declining
  
The range condition class at Msowero was rated good with a condition score of 60% and in 
a stable state. The range class gives an indication of the vegetation cover (thus site erosive 
capacity) as well as presence of palatable grass species for particular herbivores in this case 
livestock. A low range condition score and a declining trend indicate a deterioration 
process. The fair range condition at Mabwegere could partly be attributed to strong local 
institutions, which limits the number of livestock that could be grazed on the village lands. 
It could also be attributed to high mobility by herders from the village, suggesting that 
livestock mobility is an important management strategy which easy pressure on grazing 
lands. If well co-ordinated this strategy could enhance sustainability of rangelands. On the 
other hand the fair to poor condition class and a declining trend in three villages 
(Twatwatwa, Mbwade, and Mabwegere) suggests that the village lands are subjected to high 
grazing intensities that have induced a deterioration process. Whereas a stable range 
condition at Msowero village suggests that the stocking rate in the village is at sustainable 
level. 
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4.1.1.4 Trends in land - use in Mkata plains 
The main land use practices in the study villages in Mkata plains are shown in Figure 15 
and Appendix 4. The results show that more than half of respondents (56.7%) were agro-
pastoralists combining both farming and livestock keeping and less than a quarter of 
respondents (22.1%) were engaged in pure pastoralism, while 23.27% of respondents were 
practising subsistence farming. This indicates that extensive forms of land - use are the 
dominant production systems in the study area, therefore land is a major resource needed 
for subsistence production. Furthermore, the results indicate that farming is being practised 
in both agro-pastoral and pastoral villages with exception of Mabwegere village where there 
are no cultivators. The absence of cultivation at Mabwegere village is probably due to land 
scarcity experienced there and high livestock population, so that the available land is only 
utilized for livestock keeping. The land use systems practised in Mkata plains could also be 
associated with ethnic composition in the area.  
 
Land use practices in Mkata plains
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Figure 15: Land use practises in the study villages in Mkata plains 
Key: TWT- Twatwatwa, MBG – Mabwegere, MSW – Msowero, MBD – Mbwade 
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Results in Figure 16 and Appendix 5, show that Maasai who accounts for a third of 
respondents (33.0%) are the majority. Other ethnic groups including the Pogoro (31.1%), 
Gogo (10.6%) and Sagara (9.1%). It is important to note that whereas the study area is 
located within the Sagara territory, but the majority of residents in this study were mainly 
immigrant ethnic groups. This can be attributed to demographic as well as historical 
processes that led to high immigrations in the area. The processes continue to influence land 
uses and resource tenure in the area to date. According to Koponen (1994), towards the end 
of 1890s, the Germans introduced plantation economy in the area. This was followed by 
expropriation of customary lands which were transformed into lease hold farms, hence 
attracted a large number of immigrant estate workers from different parts of Tanzania. The 
immigrations continued during the British administration (1918 – 1961). The immigrant 
labourers were settled in dispersed squatter settlements within estate holdings, where they 
were allowed to cultivate (Kopenen, 1994). Following the collapse of sisal estates during 
1970s these settlements had established themselves as foci of multi- ethnic villages’ 
characteristic in the study area. 
 
Ethnic composition in Mkata plains
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Figure 16: Ethnic composition in the study villages in Mkata plains 
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Another demographic process, with a direct bearing on the present land use practises, was 
the immigration of the nomadic pastoralists into the study area (Kisoza et al., 2004). At the 
advent of the Germany Colonial rule in Tanganyika during 1880s, the Maasai pastoralists 
were undergoing a southward territorial expansionism mainly thorough raids and military 
conquest of farming tribes (Beidelman, 1960). By 1885, the Maasai pastoralists had settled 
in the northern part of Kilosa at Gairo, neighbouring Mkata plains. Suitable resource 
condition and economic factors in Mkata flood plains had attracted a number of immigrant 
pastoralists, and by 1940s and 1950s they had settled in the area. The collapse of sisal 
industry during mid 1970s, led to abandonment of most of the sisal estates and most of 
former employees settled on the leased farms and started cultivation. During this study there 
was a second generation of the descendants of immigrant workers. Establishment of 
commercial estates and the immigration of plantation workers and pastoralists into the study 
area continue to influence on demographic composition, land use patterns and resource 
relationships in the area to date. 
 
Co-existence and sometimes overlapping of different land use systems, associated with 
rapid population increase has increased pressure on land resources and strained 
relationships between different user groups. This is particularly prevalent between the 
pastoralists and farmers. For example Beidelman (1960) reported increasing farmer/ 
pastoralist tension in Mkata plains by late 1950s. Increasing social conflicts between 
farmers and pastoralists prompted the local government in Kilosa district during mid 1960s 
(acting on directives of Prime Minister’s Office) to establish settlements for pastoralists. 
The designated pastoral villages include: Twatwatwa, Mabwegere, Kiduhi, Luhoza, Mfilisi 
and Msowero. These villages are located within Mkata Plains. The establishment of pastoral 
villages had attracted more immigrant pastoralists, which in turn led to significant land use 
pressure in the study area. 
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Most of areas designated for pastoral villages when first allocated were unoccupied bush 
lands, which were considered as expansion areas by indigenous tribes, but regarded as open 
areas by government officials. Most of these areas lack basic infrastructure like roads, 
health services and schools. Nonetheless, the areas are endowed with permanent water 
sources from swamps and rivers. The main rivers draining these areas include: Miyombo, 
Wami, Mkata, Msowero, and Kikundi rivers.  
 
Patchy wetlands and valleys bottoms which retain sufficient moisture to support plant 
growth, are multiple use areas needed by both farmers and pastoralists. These areas have 
increasingly contested by these groups. The sites are used as key grazing areas by the 
pastoralists during dry seasons, at the same time they are increasingly being used by farmers 
for irrigation purposes. During “villagisation” programme in mid 1970s, the pastoral 
villages were transformed into pastoral “Ujamaa” villages. This was followed by the 
nationalization of sisal estates, and expansion of the Mkata State Ranch. However, the 
nationalization of the lease hold sisal estates did not result in the redistribution of land to the 
local communities. The nationalized estates were transferred to a private corporation, the 
KATANI limited. 
 
Figure 17 and Appendix, 6 present livestock ownership in the study villages in Mkata 
plains. The results indicate that 39.3% of respondents own livestock, whereby the Maasai 
form a majority of cattle owning ethnic group. However, there is a differential distribution 
of livestock holds in different study villages. All respondents in Twatwatwa village said that 
they own cattle, while in Mabwegere village the respondents owning cattle accounted for 
70%. In the study villages which are shared by both pastoralists and farmers only the 
Maasai and Barbaig own cattle. The key informants revealed that other ethnic groups are 
being discouraged from keeping cattle, due to a tendency of Maasai warriors to steal  
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Livestock ownership in Mkata plains
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Figure 17: Livestock ownership by respondents in Mkata plains 
   Key: TWT- Twatwatwa, MBG – Mabwegere, MSW – Msowero, MBD - Mbwade 
 
livestock from them. This can partly be explained by an imbedded Maasai culture, which to 
some extent condones a practice of warriors to stealing cattle from other tribes for purposes 
of starting their own herd.  
 
This makes some economic sense to a pastoralist family, in that youth obtaining cattle 
through alternative means, reduce a demand for cattle redistribution from family herd. 
However, this practice was decried by most Maasai elders interviewed at Twatwatwa and 
Mbwade villages. This is most probably due to increasing integration of immigrant Maasai 
into the mainstream economy. It may also be due to high penetration of religion and 
schooling among Maasai communities in Mkata plains. 
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Cattle distribution among respondents is given in Figure 18. Results show that cattle 
distribution among the pastoralist in Mkata plain is highly skewed. Whereby, 26.9% 
respondents own between 1 to 30 heads of cattle, 18.6% own between 31 to 100 cattle and 
27.9 % own between 101 and 500 cattle. Much wealthier livestock owners comprise a very 
small fraction (7.7 percent) with livestock holdings ranging from 500 to 1,000 cattle.   
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Figure 18: Distribution of livestock holdings by herd size categories in the study 
villages in Mkata plains  
Key: TWT- Twatwatwa, MBG – Mabwegere, MSW – Msowero, MBD – Mbwade 
 
During focus group discussions it was realised that households owning below 30 heads of 
cattle are considered poor. The results imply that 26.9% of cattle owning respondents can be 
categorised as poor. 
 
The pastoral villages under this study constitute more or less contiguous ecological unit, in 
which the pastoralists practice extensive pastoral production system.  However, the 
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pastoralists have permanent homes in their registered villages.  Only part of livestock herd 
is moved seasonally between wet and dry season grazing areas. Land resources in pastoral 
villages are owned communally, whereby right of access is derived from residence in the 
village or kinship to members residing in respective villages. It should be noted that 
pastoralists from neighbouring villages are restricted access to grazingland in other pastoral 
villages.  Livestock mobility remains an important production strategy used by all 
pastoralists in the study villages.  Whereby a grazing cycle starts on the village lands during 
rain seasons and then moved to dry season grazing areas at beginning of the dry season.   
 
During Focused group discussion it was reported that livestock mobility is based on two 
strategies; short range and long range mobility.  The short range mobility involves moving 
of livestock from respective villages to a wetland located in Mkata ranch in Tindiga / 
Luhoza area. Livestock herds from all the study villages converge at the wetland areas 
during the dry seasons.  These areas had been used for grazing by Maasai pastoralists since 
1930s and were annexed into a Mkata National Ranch during mid 1970s. Nonetheless, the 
pastoralists have continued to use these wetlands for dry season grazing, and some 
pastoralists had even settled in parts of this wetland area for almost 8 decades.  
 
During this study the National Ranching Co-operation (NARCO) - a holding company for 
state ranches – decided to sub lease the wetland area to private investors. Few pastoralists 
resident in wetland area, managed to organise themselves into a pastoralists association and 
sub-leased 1,000 ha grazing block. Conditions set by NARCO in order to qualify to be sub-
leased a grazing block include a commitment to operate a commercial livestock enterprise, 
producing a business plan for the intended enterprise and paying a lease fee amounting to 
TShs 4 million (USD 4, 000) per 1,000 Ha grazing block. These conditions were not 
understood by most of pastoralists, and most of them do not consider operating a 
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commercial livestock enterprise under existing environmental and market conditions as 
viable venture. Moreover, those pastoralists who managed to obtain a sub – lease were 
mostly motivated by a need of attaining tenurial security rather than engaging in 
commercial livestock production.  
 
Following privatization of the wetlands most of the pastoralists from the study area have 
lost access to important dry season grazing area. On the other hand, most of pastoralists 
who were residing in the wetland area have lost grazing areas all together. Options available 
to them include moving to the available general land or forcibly grazing into the farms. 
Thus privatising of wetland areas, by a state corporation, has in effect reduced the size of 
communally owned pastoral grazing areas. This implies increased resource-use conflicts. 
 
Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) is also selling a number of the abandoned sisal farms to 
new investors. However, there is no transparency on the disposal process of these state 
farms. Furthermore, there is no policy so far on how to dispose these public estates. In 
particular, there is no guidelines to redistribute the lands to the immigrant descendants (on 
their second generation) now cultivating the abandoned sisal farms. The indiscriminate 
privatisation may end up in eviction of these local inhabitants, leading to increased 
competition for land resources with farmers. Figure 19 and Appendix 7 show respondents’ 
opinion regarding land availability in Mkata plains.  Mixed opinions were expressed by the 
respondents from different study villages. The majority of respondents (54.8%) were of the 
opinion that land is adequate and 45.2% considered the land to be scarce. 
 
  
154
Land availability in Mkata plains
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Figure 19: Response distribution on land availability in Mkata plains  
 
Yet, there are variations in responses from different study villages, mostly reflecting 
location specific demand for land. More than half of respondents (56.8%) in Twatawatwa 
village reported about land shortages. This is probably due to high livestock population in 
the village. Data from the district livestock census (KDC, 2000) indicates that the cattle 
population at Twatwatwa village account for one third of the district total. As such there is a 
general concern for scarcity of grazing lands. During the time of the study, Twatwatwa 
village was experiencing high influx of pastoralists who were evicted from villages 
designated for farmers. The eviction aimed at separating farmers from pastoralists as a 
measure to reduce resource-use conflicts in Kilosa district. However, this measure increased 
pressure on land resources in the receiving villages including Twatwatwa. Most of 
respondents (50.6 %) in Msowero said that land is adequate. 
 
These results can be explained by the fact that Msowero village which is shared by both 
farmers and pastoralists has a relatively low population of resident pastoralists. Only 15 
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pastoral households were recorded as resident in the village. Furthermore, during Focused 
group discussion in Msowero it was reported that the KATANI Limited, had recently 
transferred a total of 2,000 ha to the village government for agricultural purposes. This 
might have alleviated the land scarcity felt in the village. On the other hand, Msowero 
village has a mixed population, with a high number of immigrant ethnic groups including 
descendants of former sisal workers and immigrant pastoralists. Some of these ethnic 
groups are experiencing severe shortages of land, 34.7% of respondents in the village 
reported to experience land scarcity. 
 
In the case of Mbwade village which is also shared by both farmers and pastoralists, 43.3% 
of respondents said that land is adequate while 26.7% reported about land scarcity. Farmers 
and pastoralists in Mbwade village have different demands for land. In the case of 
pastoralists Kilosa district government has recently relocated them to an abandoned ranch 
neighbouring the village where land for grazing is plentiful. 
 
However, in the case of farmers they are facing serious land shortage, as the village was 
originally a squatter camp designated for plantation labourers, squeezed between leasehold 
farms. As a result the village is highly populated with immigrant tribes without any 
customary rights to neighbouring general lands or abandoned leased farms. Land shortages 
in the village has compelled some farmers to start cultivating in leasehold farms, while 
others have to travel to nearby villages searching land for cultivation. Such land scarcities 
have significant implications on resource-use conflicts in Mkata plains.  
 
Figure 20 and Appendix 8 show land holding categories in the study villages in Mkata 
plains. The majority (30.5 %) of respondents owns between 0.5 and 1.0 ha, and 24.6% own 
between 1.1 and 2 ha. Where as 15.7% of respondents owns between 2.1 and 5.0 ha.  Only 
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the minority (1.6% and 0.8%) of respondents own between 5.1 and 10.0 ha respectively. 
These results show that land holding in Mkata plains is highly skewed, ranging from 0.5 to 
12 ha per household. Furthermore, the results indicate that the Maasai pastoralists have 
locally established different claims to communal village land. Whereby, the pastoralists use 
village grazing lands communally, at the same time they also establish de facto individual 
rights to land they cultivate. 
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Figure 20: Response distribution on land holdings in study villages in Mkata plains  
 
A high tendency of establishing individual ownership of land was observed in Twatwatwa 
pastoral village. This can be explained by the fact that Twatwatwa is highly integrated in the 
market economy with a high number of entrepreneurs who had diversified to other 
economic activities. During the in depth interviews it was reported that most of the 
pastoralists in Twatwatwa were engaged in cattle marketing. The high market prices for 
cattle encourage pastoralists to accumulate large herds and adopting farming as a means for 
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meeting household food requirements.  McCabe et al. (1997) observed a similar strategy in 
Ngorongoro conservation area, where the Maasai are adopting agriculture to enable them to 
restock. 
 
However, no any respondent from Mabwegere village said to own land. These findings can 
be explained by a differential availability of land in the two pastoral villages, whereby 
Mabwegere village has a relatively small land area with high livestock population, therefore 
all the available land is used for communal grazing. Therefore local institutions in 
Mabwegere prohibit cultivation. This study shows that the study villages in Mkata plains 
are generally facing serious land shortages and that pastoralists have locally adopted 
different tenure systems. Other studies that reported land scarcities in other areas of Kilosa 
district include studies by Shishira et al. (1997), and Misana et al. (1997).  
 
Furthermore, the recent liberalization of the economy has also brought about other land use 
dimensions in the study area. A number of local investors and civil servants from urban 
areas are purchasing land from the local people as well as state sisal estates and ranches 
offered for sale. This is in turn creating absentee landowners. Others are entering into joint 
ventures with foreign investors to purchase the mortgaged sisal farms.  
 
So far there is no clear policy, or a transparent process for dispersing off the abandoned 
sisal farms. In particular there is no policy for redistributing this land to small holder 
farmers and the pastoralists now facing serious shortage of land. Most of the farmers and 
pastoralists are now using abandoned sisal estates for grazing or cultivation. However, with 
growing population and large areas tied, by long-term leases, land availability might be a 
serious problem in the area. At present, there is not much land left for extensive cultivation. 
This is partly due to the fact that other land uses like Mikumi National Park, Mkata ranch, 
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Sisal estates and Selous Game Reserve does occupy areas, which could be suitable for 
agriculture. It can be speculated that land scarcity may force land hungry peasants to open 
up the more fragile areas, particularly the wooded hilly areas. Shishira et al. (1997) reported 
similar land scarcities in the northern plateau areas of Kilosa district in Gairo division, 
where people are forced to cultivate in highly degradable sloping areas. 
 
4.1.2 Land cover/Land-use categories in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
4.1.2.1 Main land cover types in Ngorongoro Conservation Area  
Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) is ecologically diverse and can be categorized into 
five zones: the crater highlands, Salei plains, Gol mountains, Serengeti plains and 
Kakesio/Eyasi escarpment. A comprehensive vegetation cover types of NCA was first 
described by Herlocker and Dirschl (1972), who delineated eight cover types:  
(i) Montane health,  
(ii) Bamboo forest,  
(iii) Evergreen forest,  
(iv) High woodlands,  
(v) Low woodlands,  
(vi) Medium grasslands,  
(vii) Short grasslands and  
(viii) Sand dunes grasslands.  
 
A system used in this study to describe vegetation cover types of Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area was adopted from Herlocker and Dirschl (1972) and Pratt and Gwyne (1977) 
description of East Africa vegetation.  
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The distribution of main land cover types of Ngorongoro Conservation Area is shown on 
Table 11 and Figures 21, 22 and 23. Table 11 shows that the main land cover type in 
Ngorongoro area is grassland which cover 35.3% of the area. The grasslands here refer to 
short grass and medium grass plains found in lowland and mid altitude areas. These are 
differentiated from highland grasslands, which are dominated by tall tussock grass species 
restricted to the highland areas. The highland grasslands comprise 4.3% of the area.  
 
Table 12 show net area cover changes from 1975 to 1991, and 1991 to 2000, with. 1975 as 
base year for computing the net area and percent cover changes. Land cover types that 
experienced substantial changes include forests, woodlands, bush lands and grasslands. The 
results show that from 1975 to 1991 the forest cover increased by +52.4% followed by a 
decrease of – (3.8%) between 1991 and 2000. The increase of forest cover can be attributed 
to a ban on cultivation imposed from 1975 to 1991.  
 
The woodlands increased substantially between 1975 and 1991 with an 11.9 fold increase 
followed by a decrease of –(6.2%) between 1991 to 2000.The slight decrease in wood lands 
by - (6.2%) between 1991 and 2000 might be due to relaxation of a ban on cultivation 
starting from 1992 as well as increased settlement and high concentration of livestock in 
mid-altitude woodland areas. 
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Table 11: Distribution of land cover types in Ngorongoro Conservation Area for 1975, 
1991 and 2000 
Land cover type 
Area cover 
(Ha) 1975
% 
Cover  
1975 
Area 
cover (Ha) 
1991 
% 
Cover 
1991 
Area cover 
(Ha)  
2000 
%
Cover 
2000
Forest 93,128.6 11.6 141,940.6 17.7 138,437.0 17.2
Montane health 24,235.4 3.0 24,235.4 3.0 24,235.5 3.0
Woodland 11,066.2 1.4 143,417.5 17.9 142,735.7 17.8
Scrub land 165,290.2 20.6 117,737.2 14.7 118,971.6 14.8
Bushland 28,048.5 3.5 40,012.2 5.0 40,012.0 5.0
Grassland 449,875.1 56.0 282,977.0 35.2 283,307.1 35.3
Highland grassland 25,438.8 3.2 32,453.2 4.4 34,187.1 4.3
Cultivated area 108.9 0.01 16,909.1 2.1 17,695.9 2.2
Bare ground 31.2 0.004 807.7 0.1 1,021.7 0.13
Wetland 3,863 0.5 44.0 0.01
Water body 3,000.0 0.4 3001.0 0.4 2,408.5 17.8
Total 802898.6 99.9 802898.4 100.0 803056.5 100.0
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Figure 21: Map of land cover types of Ngorongoro Conservation Area on              
January 1975 
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Figure 22: Map of land cover types of Ngorongoro Conservation Area on              
January 1991 
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Figure 23: Map of land cover types of Ngorongoro Conservation Area on              
January 2000 
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Table 12 show net area cover changes from 1975 to 1991, and 1991 to 2000, with. 1975 as 
base year for computing the net area and percentage cover changes. Land cover types that 
experienced substantial changes include forests, woodlands, bush lands and grasslands. The 
results show that from 1975 to 1991 the forest cover increased by +52.4% followed by a 
decrease of – (3.8%) between 1991 and 2000. The increase of forest cover can be attributed 
to a ban on cultivation imposed from 1975 to 1991.  
 
The woodlands increased substantially between 1975 and 1991 with an 11.9 fold increase 
followed by a decrease of -6.2% between 1991 to 2000.The slight decrease in wood lands 
by - (6.2%) between 1991 and 2000 might be due to relaxation of a ban on cultivation 
starting from 1992 as well as increased settlement and high concentration of livestock in 
mid-altitude woodland areas. 
 
Table 12: Net area and percentage land cover changes for 1975 to 1991 and 1991 to 
2000 in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Land cover type 
Net area 
change 
(Ha)  
1975-1991  
%  
Cover  
change 
 
Net area 
change 
(Ha) 
1991-2000 
%  
Cover 
change  
Overall  
area 
change 
(Ha)  
1975 -2000 
Overall
%
 Cover 
Forest +48 812.0 +52.4 -3 503.0 -3.8 +45 308.4 +48.7%
Montane health 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Woodland +132 351.3 1195% -6818.0 -6.2 +181 651.5 11 89.8
Scrub land -48 152.8 -29.13 +1 234.4 +0.75% 0.0 
Bushland +11 973.7 +42.7 0.0 0.0 +11 963.7 +42.7
Grassland -166 898.1 -37.1 +330.1 +0.1 -16 656.8 -37.0
Highland grassland +7  014.4 +27.6 +1 733.9 +6.8 +8 748.3 +34.4
Cultivated area +6 10.1 +56.02 +786.8 72.0 +17 587.0 +161.5
Bare ground +7 75.8 +2486 +214.0 +685.8 +9 90.0 +31746
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A high decrease in grasslands amounting to – (30.1%) occurred between 1975 and 1991 this 
was followed by a slight increase of + 0.04 between 1991 and 2000. This decrease might be 
attributed to conversion of grasslands into other woody vegetation formation. A slight 
increase in grassland area that occurred between 1991 and 2000 might be attributed to 
increase in cultivation area. 
 
In overall, the scrubland had decreased by – (26.38 %), whereby between 1975 and 1991 
the scrubland decreased by – (29.13 %) followed by a slight increase of +0.75 percent 
between 1991 and 2000. This implies that a scrub land is probably a transitory stage of plant 
succession process toward a climax vegetation type for lowland plains in NCA.  
 
 
The increase in woodlands and forests could be attributed to implementation of 
conservation policies of NCAA, as well as by the introduction of agro-forestry in areas 
bordering the NHFR as alternative source of energy. The decrease in forest area during 
1991 to 2000 can be due to increased cultivation in high land areas, particularly in the North 
East areas, where the NHFR boarders farming communities in Karatu and Monduli districts.  
During the period under discussion, the highland grasslands increased by + 34.4 %. This 
increase can be attributed to a progressive invasion of highland areas by an invasive grass 
species Eleusine jaegeria (manyatta grass) (Figure, 24). According to Makacha and Frame 
(1986) Eleusine jaegeria is unpalatable grass species with relatively low nutritive value to 
cattle and wildlife. Therefore, an increase in this species is an indication of retrogressive 
process taking place in NCA highlands. Although the area under cultivation is relatively 
small in size, but between 1975 and 1991 it experienced a substantial increase of + 56.02% 
followed by an increase of 72.0% between 1991 and 2000. This increase occurred 
notwithstanding a ban on cultivation imposed between 1975 and 1992. This implies that 
  
166
cultivation has become an integral part of household livelihood coping strategies among 
NCA Maasai, which is undertaken in order to improve household food security. 
 
  
 
Figure 24: Tussock “manyata” grass Eliusine jaegaria envading Ngorongoro            
high lands  
 
The observed increase in cultivation between 1991 and 2000 is related to a partial lift on a 
ban to cultivate when gardening farming of 0.5 ha per housewife and her children was 
allowed. The results further refute claims by some NCA officials that high influx of 
immigrants in the area is the main cause of expansion of cultivation.  
 
4.1.2.2 Land cover change detection matrix for 1975 to 1991 and 1991 to 2000   in 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area  
The land cover detection matrix was used to determine the actual direction of land cover 
changes. Tables 13 and 14 and Figure 25 shows the direction of change and net vegetation 
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cover changes in terms of absolute area and percentages. Both retrogressive and 
successional vegetation changes have taken place in NCA during the period under 
consideration. Table 13 shows that extensive vegetation changes involving 29.8% of NCA 
total area have occurred between 1975 and 1991.  
 
Table 13: Land cover change detection matrix map for Ngorongoro Conservation   
Area between 1975 and 1991 
Land cover type Area changes (Ha) % change 
Bushland to Cultivated area 2 556.1 -0.32
Bushland to Woodland 11 229.0 +1.4
Forest to Cultivated area 18 715.9 -2.33
Grassland to Bareland 467.4 -0.06
Grassland to Bushland 7 507.9 +0.93
Grassland to Cultivated area 15.8 -0.002
Grassland to Highland grassland 16 502.7 -2.1
Grassland to Scrub 151 530.9 +18.87
Highland grassland to Cultivated area 147.3 -0.018
Scrub land to Bareland 297.2 -0.04
Scrub land to Woodland 45 951.9 +5.72
Woodland to Scrub land 692.6 -0.09
Unchanged land units 547 284.6 68.12
Total 802899.3 100.0
 
 
The results indicate that most changes involved conversion into cultivation area, whereby 
the high level of conversion - (2.33%) occurred in forest areas. This probably is due to high 
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rainfall levels in forested areas in both highland and mid-altitude areas that have attracted a 
lot of farmers. Furthermore, the Northern Highland Forest Reserve is on the north - east and 
north-south bordering farming communities - in Karatu, Mbulumbulu and Odean areas - 
which were reported to encroach on forest reserve. 
 
Other cover types that were converted to cultivated areas include grasslands - (0.002 
percent), highland grassland -(0.018 percent) and bush land -(0.32 percent). A low level of 
conversion of grasslands to cropland can be attributed to the strong institutions governing 
use of communal grazing lands, which prohibits illegal burning or unauthorized tilling of 
grasslands. It was observed during the study that farming is restricted to high sloping areas, 
and steep vallies which are not considered by local communities as prime grazing areas. 
 
The changes that involved loss in forest and woodlands were most probably 
anthropogenically induced due to high livestock grazing pressure, land clearing for 
cultivation or forest damages. According to Misana (1989, 1997) and Perkin (1995) forest 
losses in NCA are due to burning in NHFR by pastoralists, encroachment by farming 
communities, cutting of  building poles, and harvest of green wood for charcoal burning, as 
well as damages of forests and woodlands  by elephants. Change detection analysis involves 
two time lines (1975 to 1991, and 1991 to 2000), which were associated with distinct 
institutional changes that took place in NCA. Between 1975 and 1991 more restrictive 
policies were implemented in the area including a ban on cultivation and prohibition of 
grazing in the crater areas and the NHFR. 
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Figure 25: Map of vegetation cover changes in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
between 1975 and 1991 
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The restrictions resulted in disruptions on traditional Maasai pastoralists grazing cycles, 
leading to prolonged grazing periods in pastoral villages. This increased grazing intensities 
which triggered of ecological changes that eventually culminated into reduction in forage 
yield. 
 
Table 14: Land cover change detection matrix map for Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area 1991 - 2000 
Land cover type Area changes (Ha) % change
Cultivated area to Forest 713.2 +0.09
Forest to Cultivated area 1170.2 -0.15
Forest to Highland grassland 1830.9 -0.23
Forest to Woodland 355.2 -0.04
Highland grassland to Woodland 99.8 +0.01
Woodland to Bareland 214.1 -0.02
Woodland to Cultivated area 329.7 -0.04
Woodland to Grassland 330.1 -0.04
Woodland to Scrub 487.4 -0.08
Unchanged land units 797367.4 99.3
Total 802898.0 100.0
 
The period starting from 1991 to 2000 was associated with lifting of the ban on cultivation 
and allowing controlled access to prohibited grazing areas. This period was not associated 
with any dramatic changes in vegetation cover types or wide scale conversion to cultivation.  
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Figure 26: Map of vegetation cover changes of Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
between 1991 to 2000 
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This implies that pastoral local institutions in the area, preserves common grazing lands and 
that pastoralists resort to cultivation as a measure to cope with increasing household food 
insecurity caused by a decline in per capita livestock owned in pastoral households.  
 
These results emphasise a fact that extensive pastoral land use is an important component 
for maintaining of the savanna ecosystems of East African and that disruptions on 
traditional pastoral systems may lead to ecological changes detrimental to both wildlife 
conservation as well as pastoral livelihoods. 
 
This study establishes a linkage on loss of grasslands and disruption on traditional pastoral 
land use system. The study gives a general indication that the ecosystem in Ngorongoro 
area is undergoing changes, which favours dominance of woody species at the expense of 
grass species.  
 
These changes implies a threat to the wellbeing of grazers both domesticated and wild game 
which are dependent on grass for grazing. As a result the livelihoods of pastoralists who are 
dependent on livestock herd productivity are being threatened. In turn the pastoralists are 
resorting to cultivation, which in the long run may be detrimental to sustainability of both 
the pastoralists and the ecosystem in general.  
 
4.1.2.3 Range condition and trends in Ngorongoro Conservation Area  
The species composition and vegetation cover in the study villages in NCA are shown in 
Table 15. The results indicate that the dominant grass species at Kakesion village were the 
increasers Eragrostis spp, and Hyperrhenia spp. but the decreaser species including 
Themeda triandra were also well represented.  
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Table 15: Species composition, vegetation cover and forage yield in the study village in 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Village Species composition  Species 
composition % 
Vegetation cover 
(%) 
Forage 
Yield 
Kg/DM/Ha
 
Kakesio 
 
Eragrostis congesta        
Hyperrhenia spp             
Themeda triandra           
Aristida spp                      
Chloris pynothrix             
Setaria spp                       
Cynodon species              
 
47.0 
23.0 
13.0 
4.0 
6.0 
6.0 
1.0 
 
65.0 
 
4,700.0 
 
Enduleni 
 
 
Themeda triandra               
Hyparrhenia variabilis     
Heteropogan contortus       
Dicanthium spp                  
Setaria pallidefusca           
Pannisetum spp                  
Ocimum spp                       
Forbs                                  
Acacia seedling                  
Salanum spp.                     
Unknown weed spp1 
Unknown weed spp 2 
 
40.0 
21.0 
5.0 
4.0 
6.0 
4.0 
8.0 
2.0 
4.0 
4.0 
1.9 
0.1 
 
60.0 
 
4,400.0
 
Irkeepus 
 
Eleusine jacgeri                
Pennisetum schinferi         
Hyperrhenia sp                 
Dicanthium spp.                
Themeda spp.                    
Accacia seedlings 
 
62.0 
9.0 
24.0 
1.0 
2.0 
2.0 
 
40.0 
 
4,652.0
 
Naiyobi 
 
Eleusine jaegeri                
Pannisetum schimpheri    
Uknown weed spp 1 
 
85.0 
14.0 
1.0 
 
 
40.0 
 
2,400.0
 
The range trend at Kakesio was rated as stable. In case of Enduleni village the increaser 
species Themeda triandra and Pennisetum spp were present. The increaser Dicanthium spp 
was also present, as well as the woody species. The grass species composition present at 
Kakesio indicates retrogression. The vegetation cover in the study villages was 65% at 
Kakesio, 60% at Enduleni, 40% at Irkeepus and 40% at Naiyobi. The results indicate that 
low land cover at Irkeepus and Naiyobi poses high erosion risks. The results generally 
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indicate that range condition trend in the two villages was declining. Studies by Maskini 
(2001) and MNRT (1998) in the area arrived to similar conclusions. 
 
The estimated forage yield in the study villages was: 4, 700 kg DM/Ha at Kakesio; 4,400 kg 
DM/Ha at Enduleni; 4,652 kg at DM/Ha Irkeepus; and 2,400 kg DM/Ha at Naiyobi. The 
results indicate that rangeland at Kakesio was the most productive. This is most probably 
due to low grazing pressure by cattle in the village. Most of the livestock herds are usually 
moved to mid altitude and high altitude areas. The apparently high forage yield in the 
highland villages at Irkeepus and Nayobi does not imply that the rangelands in these areas 
are potentially productive to livestock. This is because the dominant and most abundant 
grass species Eleusin jaegeri is least nutritive to cattle.   
 
The range condition and trends in the villages under the study are shown in Table 16. The 
results indicates that range condition at the study villages were rated to be in good condition 
at Kakesio (71% condition score), fair condition at Enduleni (55% condition score); and 
poor condition in both Irkeepus (25% condition score) and Naiyobi (20% condition score) 
villages. The range trend was determined from the vegetation composition and vegetation 
cover. The range condition trend in the study villages in the NCA is probably related to 
trends in the land use patterns in the area. The observed declining range condition in the 
midland and high land areas (Enduleni, Irkeepus and Naiyobi) is attributed to the changed 
grazing patterns by Maasai pastoralists. Whereby, livestock are grazed for prolonged 
periods on mid and highland grazing areas. 
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Table 16: Range condition and trend ratings in the study villages in Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area 
Area Village Condition 
score (%) 
Class Trend
 
Ngorongoro area 
 
Kakesio 
Enduleni 
IrKeepus 
Naiyobi 
 
71 
55 
25 
20 
 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Poor 
 
Stable
Declining
Declining
Declining
 
Therefore, causing high grazing intensities in these areas Runyoro (2001) estimate of the 
livestock population in the study villages in 2000 amounts to 42,795 LUE. 
 
The recent increase in wildebeest populations that transmit Catarrh Malignant Fever (CMF) 
- a fatal disease to cattle - had prevented the pastoralists from using of wet season short 
grass plains in the lowland areas during wet season (Runyoro et al., 1995). This has in turn 
led to retaining the livestock in the dry season grazing areas in the highland areas. 
Continuous grazing in the highland areas has brought about some ecological changes, and 
set on the process of range degradation. These processes had partly been compounded by 
the conservation policies. These, include imposing a ban on using fire as range management 
tool, and restricting access to key grazing areas by pastoralists in the crater and in the forest 
reserves. The conservation policies and the natural population increase of the wildebeest 
population have led to changes on the traditional pastoralists land use, by limiting the 
livestock mobility, which in turn increase grazing intensities in highland areas thus inducing 
range degradation. 
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4.1.2.4 Trends in land – use in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area is a multiple land use system, which combines both human 
development and wildlife conservation. The area was gazetted in 1959 and has 47 years of 
experience of combining conservation and economic development. It is a unique 
conservation unit in Africa, and serves as a model of multiple land - use system in Tanzania. 
Principal land-uses, currently allowed within the Ngorongoro Conservation Area include 
conservation of natural resources, extensive livestock keeping, agro-pastoralism and 
tourism.  
 
Figure 27 and Appendix 9 presents main land use activities of respondents in the NCA. The 
results indicates that about one third (35.3%) of respondents practise pure pastoralism, 
while 64.7% of the respondents combine agriculture in their livelihood support systems. 
Among these, 39.2% of respondents are solely dependent on agriculture for subsistence and 
25.5% of respondents are practising agro-pastoralism. These results indicate that Maasai 
pastoralists in Ngorongoro area are increasingly dependent on agriculture for their 
subsistence. Increased dependence on agriculture is an indication of destitution among 
Ngorongoro Maasai, which is mainly due to loss of livestock and declining productivity of a 
pastoral herd. The study further reveals that there is a differential adoption of agriculture in 
the study villages.  
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Figure 27: Main land - use practises by respondents in Ngorongoro Conservation Area  
 
Extensive cultivation was observed in Naiyobi village where all respondents reported to 
carry out cultivation and only 46.7% respondents are engaged in agro-pastoralism. Where 
as, more than half of respondents (58.3%) in Enduleni village subsist on agriculture, and 
only 32.4% of respondents practise pure pastoralism. This can be explained by the fact that 
Enduleni village is located in a mid-slope zone with relatively high rainfall, where extensive 
cultivation is possible. This might have attracted some immigrants from other villages who 
tend to come to practice agriculture. As such this could be the reason for large proportion of 
respondents not owning cattle. Another plausible explanation derives from a fact that 
Enduleni is a growing shopping and an expanding local cattle market centre. These 
economic developments are providing reliable market for both livestock and agricultural 
products. The growing market could have provided incentives for some form of 
specialisation in agricultural production, whereby livestock owning households specialise 
on pastoralism, and others specialise in crop production. Hence, increasing specialisation 
might explain absence of households that practise agro-pastoralism in this village. All 
respondents in Kakesio village, which is located in more arid plains, reported to practise  
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pure pastoralism. Most probably the harsh arid climatic condition in this village restricts 
cultivation. Galvin et al. (2000) reported high out migration of pastoralits from a drought 
prone Kakesio village to other areas. This is most probably in search of suitable land for 
cultivation in midland and highland areas.  
 
The main land use practise reported in Irkeepus village, which is located in highland zone, 
is pure pastoralism. Despite of favourable climatic conditions for crop production no 
cultivation was reported in the village.  This may be due to village location in close 
proximity to NCA headquarters and areas accorded high conservation status including 
Ngorongoro Crater and Northern Highlands Reserve Forest (NHRF), thus high monitoring 
level by NCA wardens. Absence of cultivation could also be due to local restrictions 
imposed by local institutions. The highland areas have permanent water sources, therefore 
are utilised for permanent settlement and as dry season grazing reserves. However, the key 
informants as well as senior NCA Officials informed that illegal cultivation has been carried 
out in distant sloping areas, which are not easily accessible by NCA officials. Younger 
families, having limited number of cattle, and who are energetic, are said to undertake 
illegal cultivation.  
 
Livestock ownership by respondents in NCA is presented in Figure 28 and Appendix 10. 
The results show that 83.9% of respondents own livestock. Whereby, respondents in all 
study villages, with the exception of Enduleni, own cattle. In Enduleni, only 35 households 
(32.1%) own livestock. This indicates that most of the households in Enduleni were 
dependent on cultivation for subsistence. 
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Figure 28: Livestock ownership by respondents in Ngorongoro Conservation Area  
 
Figure 29 show a distribution of livestock holding categories among respondents in NCA. 
The majority of respondents (64.8%) own below 30 heads of cattle and 22.5% own between 
31 – 100 heads of cattle. Only a minority of respondents (8.6 percent) owns between 101 – 
200 cattle and 3.2 percent of respondents own between 201 to 250 cattle. The results on 
cattle ownership and distribution in Ngorongoro area, indicates that the household per 
capita number of cattle is very low. As such most of NCA Maasai pastoralists can no longer 
meet their food requirements from livestock. According to Pratt and Gywene (1977), a pure 
pastoral diet basing on milk and blood as the main staple, requires a per capita of 6 livestock 
units per household.  
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Figure 29: Livestock holdings categories in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
 Key: KK- Kakesio, END – Enduleni, IRK – Irkeepus, NYB - Naiyobi 
 
During Focused group discussion in Ngorongoro area, it was said that a household is 
considered poor if it owns 30 heads of cattle and below. Based on this information, 64.8% 
of respondents interviewed in NCA are poor. A decline in per capita livestock ownership is 
most probably attributed to restrictions imposed on access to key resources (dry season 
grazing areas and water) and high cattle mortality due to high disease incidences. As such 
the pastoralists food security has been threatened and they need to improve the security 
through cultivation. Similar conclusions on increased impoverishment of Ngorongoro 
Maasai have been drawn by a number of studies. For example, Homewood and Rogers 
(1991) had reported a substantial decline of per capita number of cattle in the NCA.   
 
The land-uses practised by local people are partly related to their culture and therefore their 
ethnic background. Figure 30 and Appendix 11 shows the ethnic composition of 
respondents in Ngorongoro Conservation Area.  
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Figure 30: Ethnic composition of respondents by study villages in Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area 
 
The results show that Maasai are the majority ethnic group accounting for 99% of 
respondents interviewed; another ethnic group is the Arusha who account for only 1 
percent. The Arusha are a Maasai sub-ethnic group residing in a neighbouring Monduli 
district, whose customary territory is contiguous with NCA in the eastern border. Most of 
the Ngorongoro Maasai belongs to a Kisongo clan, which is allied to the Arusha – they 
share same rituals and have traditional reciprocal relationship involving sharing of 
resources. This cultural alliance has significant implication on land use and demographic 
dynamics in NCA. The Kisongo-Maasai, tend to accommodate Arusha kinfolks who move 
into the NCA for the purpose of cultivation in Ngorongoro highlands. However, under NCA 
rules the Arusha are illegitimate residents in the area, but they are considered by local 
Maasai to have customary right in NCA. During in-depth interviews with ANC Officials 
they informed that a free movement of Arusha into Ngorongoro area was one of main 
reasons for expansion of agriculture, in particular in areas bordering Monduli district 
including Naiyobi village. Respondents’ opinions regarding land availability in Ngorongoro 
conservation Area are presented in Figure 31 and Appendix 12. Responding on land 
availability in the NCA, 75.5% of respondents considered land to be adequate and only  
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6.6% said that land is inadequate, while 17.9% of respondents had no opinion. These 
responses reflect a general pastoral perspective with regards to ownership of land, whereby 
the Maasai communities have devised institutions through which grazing land is used 
communally by a defined group of users, which are determined by traditions. Furthermore, 
traditionally the Maasai in Ngorongoro cultivate small farm plots only to meet their 
household subsistence requirements, where in most cases crops are grown on abandoned 
cattle “bomas”. For this reason under normal practices, Maasai pastoralists have no demand 
for large plots of land. 
 
In this study, land shortages were reported in Enduleni and Naiyobi villages (Figure, 31), 
where a high number of respondents depend on farming as a sole means for subsistence.  In 
these villages extensive cultivation was also observed. This may be probably due to loss of 
cattle by pastoralists who were in turn forced to cultivate. A small number of respondents 
(5.7%) reported land scarcity in Kakesio village.  
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Figure 31: Response distribution on land availability in study villages in Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area 
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This is most likely due to the fact the village is located in most arid lowland areas, therefore 
residents are facing serious shortages of land to cultivate supplementary cereal crops. In 
case of Naiyobi village, where extensive cultivation is practised, the reported land scarcity 
reflects the incentives of villagers to expand cultivation. It is believed that immigrant 
Arusha from Monduli district are the ones responsible for intensive cultivation. During the 
time of this study there was mounting tension between NCAA and villagers at Naiyobi due 
to expansion of cultivation. The NCA officials have initiated a concerted monitoring 
campaign aimed at limiting the expansion of cultivation. 
 
There is increasing concern over the scale and potential impact of cultivation carried out by 
both resident Maasai and the immigrants moving into the NCA. From the inception of NCA 
in 1959 cultivation was allowed throughout the entire area. In early 1970s when the area 
was under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, it was proposed to de-gazettement 
about 70 percent of the area in order to allow for agricultural expansion. This proposal was 
in line with the then government policies that aimed at attaining food sufficiency through 
agricultural intensification. A ban on cultivation was imposed as from 1975, when the 
mandate of the area was transferred to the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and 
Tourism. Studies by McCabe et al. (1992) and Galvin (1992) concluded that the ban on 
agriculture had severely impaired household food security in the area. It has also 
exacerbated tensions between local residents and the conservation authority. Resident 
Maasai, had in turn, resorted to illegal cultivation, which has led to serious conflicts with 
the conservation authority. The ban on agriculture was partially lifted in 1992 by the Prime 
Minister’s decree.  From then on, cultivation of small gardens - ranging from 0.5 to 1 ha per 
wife in the polygamous households using hand hoes was allowed. However, commercial 
cultivation using ploughs is prohibited. According to the NCA officials, cultivation is an 
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interim measure awaiting a permanent solution for the resident Maasai food security 
problems.  
 
A need for conserving wildlife seems to conflict with an urgency of sustaining the 
livelihoods of NCA Maasai. Conservation policies are believed to have undermined the 
pastoral economy. As a result the pastoralists are forced to cultivate in order to sustain 
household food security. Cultivation, therefore, seems to be a powerful force which, if not 
managed carefully, may jeopardize the traditional co-existence of pastoralism and wildlife 
conservation in Ngorongoro. This will be detriment to both wildlife conservation and 
pastoralism. 
 
Another development that is causing an alarm to wildlife conservation is increasing 
economic diversification of NCA Masaai. During in-depth interviews with NCAA officials, 
there was expressed concern over growing trading centres at Nainokanoka, Kimba and 
Enduleni settlements. Despite prohibitions under NCA regulations, growth of these 
settlements has been associated with an increase in building permanent houses, which are 
believed to alter landscapes and wildlife habitats. The authority has also served a demolition 
notice to traders operating small scale business at a number of trading centres, including 
Kimba settlement. Instead this has radicalised the tension between conservation authorities 
and local entrepreneurs. Such social and economic changes taking place among pastoral 
modes of production were never envisaged during the establishment of NCA in 1959. There 
are now needed institutional rearrangements that will accommodate the on going social and 
economic changes of pastoral population living in the Ngorongoro area.  
 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area has also been experiencing steady increase in land-use 
pressures due to increasing human, livestock and wildlife populations. It is now thought that 
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veterinary control of rinderpest, has led to a dramatic expansion of wildlife population 
(Runyoro et al, 1995; Campbell and Borner, 1995). The most noticeable change with 
serious environmental and social consequences in NCA is the increase in numbers of 
wildebeest, which rose from some 250,000 to a peak of some 1.7 million in the 1980s, 
returning to a figure of about 1 million animals in the early 1990s (Campbell and Borner, 
1995). The expansion of wildebeest population has effectively decreased the area available 
for grazing and placed increasing pastoral pressure on the highlands (particularly the 
Northern Highland Forest Reserve). This situation has arisen because wildebeest calves are 
asymptomatic carriers of “malignant catarrh fever”, a viral disease that is fatal to cattle. 
When the calving wildebeest herds occupy the short grass plains of the NCA during the 
rainy season, pastoralists are forced to abandon prime grazing areas and to retreat to safety 
at the highlands. This is a reversal of the traditional grazing pattern, which in the past 
revolved around the alternating rest and use of different pastures. The plains were used 
during the wet season, whilst the highlands, with their better rainfall and permanent water 
supplies, were used during the dry season. Portions of the highlands are now used 
throughout the year, and deprived of a resting cycle altogether (Machange, 1997). 
 
The restriction on available grazing lands for pastoralists in NCA has been compounded by 
increasing human population. Between 1966 and 1978, the pastoral population of the 
Ngorongoro area grew from an estimated 8,700 to nearly 18,000 people. The following 
decade witnessed a steady rise, and in 1994 the human population was estimated to be 
42,000 (Runyoro, 2001). This high rate of growth appears to have been the combined result 
of natural increase, estimated at 2.3% per annum (Homewood and Rodgers, 1991), and 
immigration. In particular, it appears that the Ngorongoro highlands became an important 
focal point of immigration during the drought years of the 1970s, when pastoralists from the 
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surrounding lowlands moved to the higher rainfall areas of the NCA in search of pasture 
and water.  
 
In addition to the simple numerical increase in the size of the pastoral population, it is 
evident that the change within Maasai society itself is leading to a new set of land-use 
pressures. In particular, an increased reliance on cultivation has necessitated a move from 
transhumance to a more sedentary way of life. Increasing sedentarisation concentrates 
human resource-use pressure onto small areas, whereas traditional transhumance patterns 
tended to spread such pressure over much wider areas, in line with the seasonal availability 
of fodder and water. Cultivation is occurring in the higher potential agricultural areas, 
which are also the most productive areas for livestock production. With the uptake of 
cultivation, large wild herbivores, which formerly co-existed with pastoralism, are 
increasingly becoming a pest to crops, and farmers are forced to take protective measure 
e.g. scaring away wild game, fencing cultivated plots or spearing them. On the other hand 
increasing of cultivated land also blocks wildlife migratory routes. 
 
All of these land use changes have implications on resource use conflicts. Although the 
Maasai were allowed to reside within the NCA area, they were subjected to a series of 
policy changes that had imposed restriction on their traditional land use systems, and this 
led to significant impact on their pastoral livelihoods. Some areas were closed to 
pastoralists, in others areas such as the Ngorongoro and Empakaai Craters, cattle could be 
grazed but no settlement was allowed.  
 
However the most important restriction is the prohibition of all cultivation within the area. 
Since the Maasai living within Ngorongoro area had traditionally depended upon local 
cultivators for getting grain this was perceived as a great set back with reference to 
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livelihood. The Prime Minister temporarily lifted the ban on cultivation in 1992. This was 
followed in 1998 by the Presidential decree allowing cultivation in the NCA. However, 
some conservationists have recently advocated that the World Heritage Designation for the 
NCA be rescinded because of the cultivation. 
 
The experimentation with a multiple land use system in Ngorongoro area, has led to 
impoverishment of the indigenous Maasai pastoralists. Contrary to the idealized pastoralists 
when the system was conceived, the Maasai pastoralists are now subject to both social and 
economic changes and they want to change the mode of production and life styles, through 
diversifying their economic activities, in response to more or less sedentary life styles. Thus 
conservation policies and regulations are causing high costs to the resident Maasai 
pastoralists. This is one of the main reasons underlying resource- use conflicts in the area. 
Moreover, socio-economic system of the pastoralists is changing; they have now been 
forced to lead a more sedentary life. This has also disrupted the traditional land use system, 
which was based on elaborate seasonal transhumant livestock mobility. The change in the 
land use patterns by pastoralists pose risks to the environment. In order to avert the potential 
conflicts, the development plans must therefore address these social changes.  
 
As a benefit sharing measure between the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority 
(NCAA) and the local communities, as from 1998 the authority has been disbursing TSh 
500 millions per year for the purpose of community economic development through the 
Ngorongoro Pastoral Council - a local organization which has been established under 
provisions of the NCAA rules. The money is used for education, veterinary services and 
food security. Under the food security protocol, the resident pastoralists are provided with 
grains at the market prices. Whereby, the NCAA pays for the transport costs. Thus, 
conservation policies and regulations are causing high costs to the local Maasai pastoralists. 
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This is one of main reasons underlying resource-use conflicts in NCA. Moreover, socio-
economic system of pastoralists is changing; they have now adopted a sedentary life style. 
This has also disrupted the traditional land use system, which was based on elaborate 
seasonal transhumant livestock mobility. The change in the land use patterns by pastoralists 
is posing risks to environment sustainability. In order to avert the potential conflicts, the 
development plans must therefore address these social changes. 
 
4.1.3 Resource Tenure Changes in the Study Areas 
4.1.3.1 Resource tenure changes in Mkata plains 
The key resources needed for supporting livelihoods in Mkata plains -  land for cultivating, 
water, grazing land, wetlands, woodlands and forests – are mainly used as common pool 
resources (CPR). Access to these resources is mostly determined through land tenure 
regime operating in specific villages or locations. Table 17 shows the tenure regimes 
existing in the study area. The main tenure systems are customary tenure system in 
traditional villages, individual land held under customary tenure system; village lands 
including lands falling under village jurisdiction and general lands which are state lands 
under the Commissioner of Lands. The village land encompasses all lands falling under 
village jurisdiction. These are claimed by individuals, families or owned communally 
without any formal title.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Land tenure regimes existing in Mkata plains 
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Title holder Tenure regime Access 
Private commercial estate 
farms 
Formal Leasehold Restricted and free access 
Private ranches Formal leasehold Restricted 
Pastoral villages Group title deeds Communal by pastoralists 
State ranch (NARCO) Formal leasehold Restricted 
Game reserve (TANAPA) Reserved land Restricted 
State  - General lands  State lands (Un allocated) Free access 
Individuals Customary rights, de facto 
individual ownership 
Restricted, family members 
Registered village council Deemed rights of occupancy Restricted, Free access, 
communal use. 
  
These land hold categories are now governed by Village land Act No. 5 of 1999 (URT, 
1999b). Under this Act the village government is issued with a group title to village land 
based on existing village boundaries. 
 
Then each village is authorised to issue land titles to individuals. These land hold titles are 
accorded similar standing in law as statutory title hold. However, conversion of title holds is 
yet to be accomplished. Most of landholders in the study area fall under village land 
categories. There is differential access and claim of land resources between the agro-
pastoral and pastoral villages. A multiplicity of land tenure regimes operating in the study 
area reflects the historical past of the study area as a centre of colonial plantation economy. 
It also reflects about evolutionary process of land tenure institutions in Tanzania. However, 
such multiplicity has created multiple claims and in some cases it has been an underlying 
cause of resource-use conflicts in the study area.  
 
Access to land in agro-pastoral villages is governed by a combination of customary 
institutions and administrative decisions through village government, or through the district 
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government. Individuals own farming plots privately, these could be obtained through 
inheritance or allocation by village government, while access to grazing land and water is 
communal. However, there are some variations on this general pattern. Kilosa district 
government determines settlements for pastoralists’, but the control of grazing lands is 
vested in respective villages. The area designated for settling pastoralists at Msowero 
village, was originally a state ranch, which had been devolved to village government. The 
area is therefore under a direct control of the village government, which has since set a limit 
to a number of cattle and pastoralists who can be settled there, and resisted the district 
government to settle more pastoralists in the village. In addition the village government has 
demarcated stock routes and specific areas along Msowero river where pastoralists can 
water their animals.  
 
In the case of Mbwade village, the pastoralists were recently settled on a neighbouring 
abandoned ranch (Madoto I ranch) which is bound by a along term leasehold. Where as, 
pastoralists are administratively answerable to the village government, but governance of 
their grazing lands does not fall under village government jurisdiction. Grazing land in the 
ranch is now governed through pastoralists’ customary system. Nonetheless, the pastoralists 
share water wells with farmers. As a result, there are complaints on part of farmers over 
increased demand of water by livestock.  
 
In 2004, the pastoralists’ customary leader – a former Baptist Church Minister – had been 
elected a village chairman at Mbwade village. The election was initially challenged by some 
farmers on allegations of corruption practices during elections, but it was upheld by the 
Kilosa District Government 
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In case of pastoral villages – Twatwatwa and Mabwegere - have formal group land-titles for 
livestock production. However, at local level access to grazing land and water is communal. 
All pastoral villages were excised from original farmer villages initially shared by both 
pastoralists and farmer. Nonetheless, after partitioning both farmers and pastoralists 
continued to share some resources including rivers and wetlands. Therefore, the pastoralists 
to some extent have secondary access right to crop residues in farmer villages after crop 
harvest.  
 
Land ownership by respondents in Mkata plains is shown in Figure 32 and Appendix 13. 
About tw two thirds of respondents (66.1%) said they own land.  
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Figure 32: Land ownership by respondents in study villages in Mkata plains 
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However, more that one third of respondents (33.9%) said that they do not own any land. At 
village levels there are variations on respondents’ perception with regards to land 
ownership. In Twatwatwa village, a pastoral village, 81.1% of respondents reported that 
they own land. Where as, in Mabwegere, a neighbouring pastoral village, only 23.3% 
reported to own land. The two villages hold group title deed, for their respective villages, 
but access to grazing land is communal. The varied responses could be attributed to high 
level of commoditization and market integration of the pastoralists at Twatwatwa village. 
 
During in-depth interviews with key informants at Twatwatwa village, it was revealed that 
there is a move being spearheaded by the local elites to partition the village land. This group 
was partly motivated by group ranch experience in Kenya as well as the economic gains 
implied in private land ownership. This is in line with the evolving land market in Tanzania. 
 
Table 18 show methods of land acquisition and tenure security in Mkata plains. The results 
indicate that the majority of respondents (37.1%) had acquired land through inheritance. 
Other important method for acquiring land is by buying which was reported by 26.1% of the 
respondents. Village governments are also playing a significant role in allocating lands 
reported by 10.2 respondents, this is particularly important in pastoral villages, which holds 
formal group titles vested in respective village governments. 
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Table 18: Methods of land acquisition by respondents in Mkata plains 
Number of respondents  
Method of acquisition   Twatwatwa 
(n =37) 
Mabwegere 
(n=30) 
Msowero 
(n=170) 
Mbwade 
(n=30) 
Total 
(n=267) 
Bought NA NA 50(29.4) 20(66.7) 70(26.1)
Rented  NA NA 21(12.4) 1(0.3) 22(8.2)
Inherited  NA NA 90 (52.9) 9(30.0) 99(37.1)
Allocated by village 
government 
6(16.2) 2(6.7) 9(5.3) NA 18(10.2)
• Data in some columns does not total up to 100 because of missing data 
• Numbers in brackets are percentages 
 Key: NA = Not applicable-  
 
The study indicates that the informal systems that are guaranteed by existing local 
institutions are the main methods for land acquisition in Mkata plains. The results also, 
suggests that local land market is well established, whereby land transactions are conducted 
through local institutions, which is formalised by local government officials who legitimize 
the agreements made locally by recording the transfer.  
 
Table 19 show sources of tenurial security in Mkata plains. The results indicate that the 
village government is a main guarantor of land tenure security, reported by 33.7% of 
respondents. Customary institutions were also identified by 31.5% of respondents as a 
source of land tenure security. This study results generally reveals that local institutions and 
a mixture of both local institutions and local government are the main institutions providing 
tenurial security of land resources at local level in Makata plains. 
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Table 19: Sources of land tenurial security of respondents in Mkata plains 
Number of respondents  
Land security Twatwatwa 
(n =37) 
Mabwegere 
(n=30) 
Msowero 
(n=170) 
Mbwade 
(n=30) 
Total
(n=267)
Title deed 1(2.7) NA NA NA 1(0.4)
Customary rights  NA 3(10.0) 72(42.4) 9(30.3) 84(31.5)
Village government  32(86.5) 1(3.3) 44(25.9) 13(13.3) 90(33.7)
No rights 4(10.8) 9(30.0) 20(11.8) NA 33(12.4)
Don’t known  NA 12(40.0) 1(0.6) 1(3.3) 14(5.2)
• Numbers in brackets are percentages 
• Data in some columns does not total up to 100 because of missing data 
 
The results reflect the historical past of the study area. During the pre-colonial period, 
access to land by smallholder cultivators was governed by customary system. Under 
customary system, access to land was through kinship and lineage rights. Historical 
information from scholars like Koponen (1994) posit that, internal relations within Africa 
societies are dominated by kinship in the sense of descent.  Land tenure was characterised 
by clan relationship, either matrilineal or patrilineal. Chiefs also controlled and distributed 
land over which people had the right to use. Land tenure studies in Tanzania indicate that 
land tenure mainly seemed to co-exist with land holding by lineage and individuals.  It is 
reported that land tenure underwent changes from collective and usufruct rights to a system 
that combined ownership by families with individual land holding.  
 
As such, pre-colonial land tenure generally was shaped by struggles between chiefs and 
subjects who wished to defend heritable land rights (Shivji, 1995). The often cited example 
of superiority of chiefs over control of land during pre-colonial period in Kilosa, is a treaty 
signed over a century ago - between Mangungo Chief of Msowero and Dr. Karl Peters from 
Germany. Nonetheless, the traditional customs over land have remained the same for many 
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generations. Therefore, the customary land tenure has remained the only legitimate system 
in the eyes of most of smallholder farmers at village level.  
 
The colonial land tenure policies, which aimed at establishing the settler colony (Germans, 
1885 – 1917), and plantation/small hold cash crop economy (British 1918 – 1962) brought 
about substantial changes on the customary land tenure systems in Mkata plains. Large 
tracts of land were expropriated from customary holders to none natives. The Germany 
colonialists first converted these into freehold sisal estates. The freehold titles were retained 
under the British regime, and were later on converted to government lease hold in 1963 by 
the post-colonial state government.  
 
The land policies followed by the post-colonial state government bear some similarities to 
colonial land policies, in that they tended to alienate lands to the state. In particular there are 
no comprehensive policies that aimed at redistribution of lands to customary holders. The 
most important post-independence policy interventions that brought about significant 
impacts on customary land tenure in the area include; the nationalization and establishment 
of agricultural parastatals, villagisation programme, structural adjustment, and economic 
liberalization. During nationalisation policies of mid 1960s, the leasehold sisal estates were 
nationalised, transferring the ownership and management of the estates to a parastatal 
organization, the Tanzania Sisal Authority (TSA) now the holding has been transferred to a 
private company KATANI Ltd.   
 
However, the transfer of private estates to a parastatal organization was effected without 
any formal repeal of the previous lease holds.  To day, this has proved to be a big huddle in 
attempts to distribute lands to smallholder producers in the villages. Since, under current 
liberalization policies, Tanzania is obliged to demonstrate her commitment to market 
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economy, otherwise the country may loose trust from would be external investors. Given 
this fact, large tracts of land in Mkata plain are tied up by long leasehold tenure. Parallel to 
nationalization, more customary lands, in the area, were alienated by the state to expand the 
state ranches, under the National Ranching Company. The state ranches in the study area 
include Mkata and Madoto II.  
 
During the village settlement schemes of mid 1960s, the nomadic pastoralists were 
allocated villages in Mkata plains. At that time these areas were unoccupied bush, but under 
customary landholding systems these were considered as land reserves to be allocated to 
new family members. These were however, legally considered as un-allocated public lands 
under the government. The measure to designate pastoral villages was prompted by, 
escalations of resource use conflicts in the villages shared by both pastoralists and farmers. 
When village titling was introduced under the Village and Ujamaa village (Registration, 
Designation and Titling) Act No. 21 of 1975, some of the pastoral villages carried out 
formal surveys and were issued with group title holds for the purpose of livestock 
production. The study villages with title deeds include Twatwatwa and Mabwegere. This 
land had in effect been removed from customary domains of farmers land use system. 
Different indigenous ethnic groups, as well as immigrant farming tribes resent this fact.  
 
Most of indigenous customary land users, challenges the legitimacy of pastoralists owning 
land within their tribal territories. The herders were, by custom, supposed to have a 
secondary user right, but not owning land. Moreover, the procedure used by the pastoralists 
to obtain leaseholds was not transparent. Apparently, the neighbouring cultivators did not 
fully participate in the entire process. Thus, initially the pastoral villages had no political 
autonomy, therefore registration and titling of these villages were supposed to be processed 
through the parent villages. This procedure was reported to be flawed. As a result at the 
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present there are intractable boundary disputes between the pastoral villages and 
neighbouring farmer villages, particularly in Mabwegere and Twatwatwa villages. 
 
Furthermore, during the time of this study there erupted another border dispute, involving 
Twatwatwa village and Mkata (NARCO) ranch. It was claimed that most village land, 
indicated on the title deed issued to the village was part of Mkata state ranch. The ranch 
then was sub-leasing to private investors parts of the ranch which were not of immediate 
use including the disputed area in Twatwatwa village. Privatized ranch areas include 
Ngaiti/Luhoza wetland, which in mid 1960s was also allocated by the district government to 
pastoral settlement schemes. The wetland has since been utilised as the dry season grazing 
areas for most of pastoralists’ herd in Mkata plains. The findings in this study demonstrate 
that land titling had not guaranteed the security of tenure to the pastoralists’ villages in the 
study area. 
 
During the Focused Group Discussions in pastoral villages, it was revealed that the main 
concern of the pastoralists was to obtain security to land that could enable them to lead a 
settled life. The pastoralists in the study area have now sedentarized. Only few members of 
the family move with a part or an entire herd to graze in distant grazing areas. The villages, 
through co-operative actions have built schools, dams, deep wells and piped water systems. 
The individual pastoralists have built permanent houses and invested in shops and milling 
machines. The main priority of most pastoralists, in particular at Twatwatwa village, is to 
educate their children as a way of preparing them to lead settled life. They have now 
established an “education trust fund”, which is managed through a traditional leadership, 
whereby each villager is obliged to make annual contributions in the form of cattle as 
school fees for his children.  Also each family is obliged to register all the school going age 
children. 
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4.1.3.2 Resource tenure changes in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
The entire land area falling under jurisdiction of Ngorongoro Conservation Area has a 
reserved area status, which overlaps with customary rights of resident Maasai pastoralists. 
Such dual claim of resource has been a source of contradictions and resource - use conflicts 
in the area. The recent attempt by NCAA to obtain a lease hold for the area was rejected by 
the government. This has in effect strengthened tenurial security of local Masaai pastoralists 
as well as reaffirming the government commitment to a multiple use approach to wildlife 
conservation. The land ownership and landholding distribution among respondents in 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area is presented in Figure 33 and Appendix 14. The majority of 
respondents (94.2%) interviewed in Ngorongoro area said that they do not own land. This 
response reflects a fact that the concept of individual land ownership is not comprehensible 
amongst the Maasai pastoralists. In their customary territories land resources are owned 
collectively through elaborate local institutions. 
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Figure 33: Response distribution on land ownership in the study villages in 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
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Furthermore, the responses reflect a general apprehension among the Ngorongoro 
pastoralists, that their land was appropriated by the government and that NCAA has only a 
managerial role. 
 
Table 20 presents distribution of land holdings by respondents in NCA. Only the 
respondents from Kakesio and Enduleni villages mentioned the size of land they own. The 
majority of respondents from the two villages said they own between 0.5 and 1.0 ha of land. 
This is a limit allowed by the NCAA for gardening purposes. The respondents in Irkeepus 
did not indicate their landholding size; this is probably due to the fact that the highlands are 
crucial dry season grazing areas, whereby cultivation is prohibited by custom. 
 
 
Table 20: Landholding by respondents from study villages in Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area 
Number of respondents  
Land holding  
Category 
Kakesio 
(n=35) 
Enduleni 
(n=84) 
Irkeepus 
(n= 81) 
Naiyobi 
(n=109) 
Total 
(n = 305) 
0.5 – 1.0 ha 34 (97.1) 59(77.1) NA NA 93 (32.1) 
1.1 – 2.0 ha 1(2.9) 25(22.9) NA NA 26 (14.4) 
2.1 – 5.0 ha NA NA NA NA NA 
• Numbers in brackets are percentages 
Key - NA = No answer provided 
 
The absence of answers on landholdings in Naiyobi village probably was due to mounting 
tensions between village residents and NCAA over expanding cultivation. For this reason, 
respondents were reluctant to disclose the size of their farm handholds.  
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Figure 34 and Appendix 15 show methods of land acquisition by respondents in NCA. Main 
methods for acquiring land in NCA include inheritance mentioned by 54.2% of the 
respondents and allocation by village government reported by 36.4% of the respondents. 
Maasai pastoralists consider encampment sites as private property, while the rest of the land 
is communally owned in accordance to customary institutions. Rights to land for the 
purpose of encampment or cultivation vary depending on residential status of an individual. 
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Figure 34: Methods of land acquisition in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
 
Original residents of a particular village have customary rights to land resources in their 
locality, while new immigrants are allocated land by traditional leaders or village 
government. The majority of respondents (91.4%) in Irkeepus and Kakesio (94.3%) 
reported to have acquired land through inheritance. This is probably due to a fact that, these 
villages have a relatively low number of immigrants and most residents have traditional 
claim to land resources. According to NCA regulations, all new immigrants are required to 
seek permission from the conservation authority before they settle in the village. However, 
in most cases this procedure is ignored and traditional leaders authorize settling.  
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Figure 35 show sources of land tenurial security by respondents in NCA. The results 
indicate that the majority of respondents (65.2%) believe to have customary rights to land 
resources in NCA, while 47 % of respondents said their tenurial security of land resources is 
vested in the village government. However, a small proportion of respondents (7.3 percent) 
reported that they do not possess any land rights in NCA.  
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Figure 35: Sources of land tenurial security by respondents in Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area 
 
This reflects a growing apprehension and discontent among Ngorongoro Maasai about 
expropriation of their lands by conservation authorities in collaboration with international 
conservation lobby groups. During Focused Group Discussions most participants were 
worried about eventual eviction. Such discontents have serious implication on sustainability 
of the NCA ecosystem, because the local people may resort to unsustainable use of 
resources (i.e. placing a high discount rate on resources) for the future. Such eventuality 
may lead to serious consequences to natural resources and viability of the multiple land-use 
system. Multiple land use policies in NCA have created a dualism of land tenure, whereby 
the area has a conserved land status but retaining customary claims of local pastoralists. 
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This is most probably due to acknowledgement, by policy designers, of compatibility of 
pastoralism and wildlife conservation. The dualism in tenure regimes has come to 
characterize modes of access to resources in NCA. Based on this background of land tenure 
regimes it can be concluded that these land regimes are complementary, therefore there is a 
need for institutional framework that enables increased collaboration between local actors 
and conservation authorities. 
 
The history of wildlife protection in the Serengeti-Ngorongoro ecosystem dates back to 
1929, when a Game Reserve was established in the central Serengeti. This reserve was 
subsequently expanded with the creation of the Serengeti National Park in 1951. At that 
time, both pastoralism and cultivation were allowed. In 1954, however, cultivation was 
prohibited in the whole of the park area. Both pastoralists and cultivators reacted strongly 
against these new restrictions, and a severe conflict arose. In an effort to resolve the 
conflict, the colonial Government in 1956 published a white paper, which recommended 
that the park be partitioned. The Western Serengeti, Ngorongoro Crater, the Northern 
Highlands Forest Reserve and Empakaai Crater were to be set aside exclusively for the 
conservation of wildlife and forests, while the rest of the park would be opened up for 
unrestricted cultivation and pastoralism. The proposal caused international concern and was 
contested by conservationists in North America and Europe. In 1956, a Committee of 
Enquiry was appointed by the government to propose a new solution. The recommendations 
of this committee formed the basis for the Ngorongoro Conservation Ordinance No. 14 of 
1959, which splinted the original Serengeti National Park into two separate units. 
 
In the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, pastoralists retained their rights of habitation, 
cultivation and socio-economic development. The administration commitment to safe guard 
interests of local Maasai were outlined by the then Governor of Tanganyika in a speech 
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before the Maasai Federal Council in 1959, in which he stated that “should there be any 
conflict between the interests of the game and the human inhabitants, those of the latter 
must take precedence” (Shivji and Kapinga, 1998). This commitment by the government 
has come to influence the legislature that established the Ngorongoro multiple land-use 
system. 
 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) was formally established in 1959 to provide for the 
dual goals of natural resource conservation and habitation and development of its resident 
Maasai people. By the terms of its establishing legislation - Ngorongoro Conservation 
Ordinance, 1959 - the NCA represents a land-use premised on European model of a 
protected landscape, in which human habitation has been permitted throughout an entire 
protected area. However, in practice the NCA has demonstrated two distinct approaches to 
multiple land-use management since its establishment in 1959. From 1959 to approximately 
1974, human habitation was combined with natural resource conservation throughout the 
area. However, the need for zonation of the NCA prohibiting human habitation in some 
areas of the NCA was identified in the area’s draft management plan in 1968. Management 
of the area has in practice followed a zanation since this time, in which the Ngorongoro 
Crater and Northern Highland Forest Reserve have been afforded a higher degree of 
conservation status. This zonation came in effect in 1974, when permanent habitation in the 
Ngorongoro Crater was prohibited. This coincided with restrictions on resource use in the 
wider NCA, with the total ban of cultivation in the Area in 1975 (under the Game Park 
Laws Act No. 14 of 1975). Since 1974, therefore, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area has 
effectively been managed as a core protected area (conforming to IUCN criteria) being 
managed as a buffer zone to both the Ngorongoro Crater and the adjacent Serengeti 
National Park (IUCN, 1994). 
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Since its inception, the Ngorongoro area has come under jurisdiction of different authorities 
and policies. It has also been contested between the conservationist and the social welfare 
lobbies. During the late 1960s, the Ministry of Agriculture proposed that the size of the 
Conservation Area be reduced by about 65%, and that the de-gazetted lands be used for 
intensive cultivation and ranching. By 1972, however, the pendulum had swung in the 
opposite direction, and international conservationists were seeking amendment of the 
Ngorongoro Conservation Ordinance to make the NCA an exclusive wildlife area. In 1975, 
a compromise was reached and the Ngorongoro Ordinance was revised (Game Parks Laws 
Act No. 14 of 1975) (URT, 1975b). Under the amended ordinance, the government 
commitment to the multiple-use philosophy was retained with the creation of the 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority which was given the mandate to conserve and 
develop the natural resources of the area and safeguard and promote the interests of the 
resident Maasai.  
 
The management and administration of the NCA is vested in the Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area Authority, a parastatal organization established under the Game Parks Laws 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 14 of 1975 (URT, 1975b). The main functions of the 
Authority include: 
• to conserve and develop the natural resources of the Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area; 
• to promote tourism within the Conservation area and to provide and encourage 
the provision of facilities necessary or expedient for the promotion of tourism; 
and  
• to safeguard and promote the interests of Maasai citizens of the United Republic 
of Tanzania engaged in cattle ranching and dairy industry within the 
Conservation Area. 
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The Authority has been encountering difficulties in formulating clear management 
objectives and development policies for the NCA; that could meet the conflicting demands. 
For over three decades the area does not have approved management plan. Three draft plans 
had so far been proposed for the area. The following are summaries of previous proposed 
management plan drafts. 
 
 
i) Ngorongoro Conservation Authority Management Plan (1960) (the Fosbrooke Plan) 
At the time of writing this plan, the Conservation Area was in its infancy, and there was 
considerable confusion and uncertainty over the structure and objectives of the Authority. 
As a result, the plan suffered from a lack of prescriptions. There were few guidelines on the 
ways in which different parts of the NCA were to be managed, and there was a lack of a 
clear policy on multiple land-uses. A more serious shortcoming was the plan paternalistic 
attitude to the local communities, and its emphasis on the use of compulsion to achieve 
management goals. It is evident that the Maasai neither contributed to the plan, nor where 
there any mechanisms envisioned for incorporating them into the management of the area. 
The plan viewed the NCA as one component of a larger ecosystem; therefore emphasized 
the need to establish liaison and cooperation between the NCA and Serengeti National Park, 
particularly in the light of the movements of migratory herds of wildebeest, zebra and 
gazelles across the wider Serengeti ecosystem (MLNRT, 1990). 
 
ii) Ngorongoro Conservation Authority, Revised Management Plan (1962) (Dirschl  
and Foosbroke Plan) 
The 1962 Plan suffered essentially the same weaknesses as the 1960 version. However, the 
plan included policy guidelines for the management of the NCA as a whole, as well as at the 
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sectoral level (for example, for water development). The plan emphasized the need for a 
stable environment in which the NCA’s human and animal could prosper, and stressed the 
importance of meeting the diverse requirements of the area as whole.  
 
Although these policy initiatives were a significant step forward, it is now evident that 
savannah ecosystems such as Ngorongoro are typically cyclical in nature, making it 
unrealistic to aim for a uniformly stable environment. Similarly, it is unrealistic to attempt 
to meet all management objectives fully in the whole area (MLNRT, 1990). 
 
iii) Ngorongoro Management Plan (1966) (Dirschl plan) 
The plan drew attention to the need for three levels of policy and objectives: a government 
level directive giving the overall goals and purpose of the area; a set of area wide 
objectives; and finally, management objectives specific to individual zones in the area. The 
plan recommended establishment of a permanent forum for routine meetings with the 
resident population of the area.  The plan proposed a comprehensive land-use zoning 
scheme, in which areas would be used for cultivation, wildlife conservation, forest 
protection and relatively intensive pastoral development. Unfortunately, the land-use zoning 
system proposed the establishment of 17 different land-use zones, each with its own 
objectives and land-use plan, and was too complex to be implemented. Although a number 
of individual recommendations were eventually put into effect, the plan as a whole was 
overtaken by the controversy surrounding the Ministry of Agriculture’s proposal to reduce 
the size of the area, and was never adopted as government policy (MLNRT, 1990). This was 
in line with the national policies of 1970s that emphasized on expanding agriculture 
production. 
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As part of the new measures, a ban was placed on cultivation throughout the NCA. No 
permanent residence or livestock grazing was allowed within the crater, although the 
Maasai were permitted to continue to bring livestock into the crater to access salt licks. The 
ban on cultivation in the Ngorongoro area remained in effect until 1992, when it was 
partially lifted by the Prime Minister. This step was taken to improve the food security 
situation in the area as a temporary measure during which time alternative ways of 
providing for the needs of the NCA residents would be established (NCAA, 1992). 
However, the Ngorongoro pastoralists successively lobbied at high political levels which 
led the President to issue a Presidential decree lifting a ban on cultivation in the area. This 
decision has sparked off some opposition from conservationists and an international lobby 
is organising to challenge the decision.  Restriction on cultivation remains one of the main 
sources of increasing sentiments between the pastoral community and conservation 
authorities in Ngorongoro area.  
 
(iv) Ad hoc Ministerial Commission Report - 1992 
The Minister for Natural Resources in 1988 appointed the ad hoc ministerial commission to 
evaluate and advise the government on formulation of a lasting conservation and 
development strategy for Ngorongoro area. The final report endorsed multiple-land use in 
the area. It also identified lack of an agreed plan to guide the NCAA as a main weakness. 
The main contributions of the reported include (a) a draft policy statement providing more 
details on multiple land-use management objectives (b) detailed technical recommendations 
for actions to implement the policy objectives, and it contains a draft policy statement. The 
report was endorsed and adopted as working document by NCAA board of directors in 
1992.  
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Some of the recommendations have been implemented including established the 
Ngorongoro Pastoral Council (PC) as a consultative body to discussing local community 
issues with the NCAA board, appointing the PC chairperson to the board of directors and 
initiated a benefit sharing program with local communities. However, the PC as well as 
representation of local Maasai in the board of directors is not provided for in the main NCA 
legislature. Therefore are not mandatory (Thompson, 1997). 
 
(v) Ngorongoro Conservation Area Draft Policy 1992 (Ngorongoro Chater) 
The NCA draft policy statement (the Ngorongoro Chater) principal elements include (a) 
commitment to multiple land-use management in the area (b) support to traditional 
community management systems. The draft policy has provided guidance for management 
of the NCA starting from 1992; it has also provided bases for developing the general 
management plan guiding conservation and management of the area. However, the policy 
has yet to be endorsed by the Minister, because it is not adequately addressing the issue of 
community participation. It is therefore vulnerable to ministerial level decisions or above.  
 
Moreover, the thorny issues recommended in the commission’s report were yet to be acted 
upon. These include a recommendation to survey and demarcate the village boundaries and 
providing secure land tenure to NCA residents as provided for in Ujamaa village Act of 
1975. Yet, this inertia has to change with enactment of the new village land Act, No. 5 of 
1999. The law transfer control of land to communities. This has been effected (in law) 
through conferring the customary land right a same status with granted rights of occupancy: 
The granted rights of occupancy are exempted in Ngorongoro ordinance (that is land hold 
under granted rights of occupancy is not subject to administrative powers and rules of the 
NCAA). For this reason, in law the local Maasai in Ngorongoro area now have a legal title 
to their land, therefore it is up to the NCAA to negotiate lease arrangements with the 
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villagers. Furthermore, the commission recommended adoption of controlled agriculture in 
the area, but this was rejected by board of directors on grounds that it is counter to the 
legislature establishing the NCA (Thompson, 1997). 
 
(vi) Ngorongoro Conservation Area New Management Plan 1996 
For the first in 30 years; the NCAA, the Ngorongoro area local community and other 
stakeholders came together to participate into formulation of the new management plan, 
supported by IUCN consultant. A draft management plan was presented for public comment 
in November 1995, and the text indicates “intensive participatory process” leading up to the 
plan.  The new management plan attempts to provide for community participation through 
the Pastoral Council (PC). However, the PC has only an advisory role to the NCCA board. 
Otherwise, the residents could statutorily relate to the NCAA through the Ward 
Development Committees, but these relates with community development projects and not 
the management of NCAA as the whole. Therefore, the management plan does not 
adequately provide for community involvement in decisions on natural resource 
management.  
 
4.2 Types, Roles and Strengths of Existing Local Institutions in Mkata Plains and 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
4.2.1 Types of local institutions 
Two main types of local institutions – formal and informal institutions - have been 
identified to regulate use of communal land resources and resolving resource - use conflicts 
in the study areas. According to Kajembe and Kessy (2000) the formal institutions are 
referred to as externally sponsored, originating outside the community and are established 
through written procedures. While informal institutions referred to as internally sponsored - 
these originates within the community. Depending on the functions and roles local 
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institutions can further be differentiated into: structural, organizational, constraints (e.g. 
taboos) and magico – religious institutions (e.g. rituals and curse). Whereby, the 
organisational institutions bear the structures, while the remaining institutions are imbedded 
within cognitive entity of community members and they manifest as norms, values or 
practices of certain communities. The structural institutions determine the authority system 
in a community, which in turn assign roles to different social actors as well as social 
obligations. 
 
4.2.2 Roles of externally sponsored local institutions  
Table 21 shows externally sponsored institutions identified by respondents in the study 
areas. The externally sponsored local institutions operating in the study areas were mainly 
administrative and legal instruments of the sovereign state. These institutions provide for 
administrative and organisational structures at local level including the village government, 
law and order enforcement agencies, service delivery agencies, and a variety of non-
governmental organisations. Externally sponsored local institutions identified in Mkata 
plains include the central government institutions associated with land allocation and access 
to natural resources. The majority of respondents (46.1%) interviewed in Makata plains 
mentioned the village government as an important institution. Another institution 
considered important was village water development committee mentioned by 30.5% of 
respondents. KATANI Ltd was mentioned by 19.1% of respondents as important externally 
sponsored institutions in the area.  
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Table 21: Externally sponsored local institutions existing in the study areas in Mkata 
plains and Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Number of respondents 
Mkata plains 
n = 267) 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
(n = 305) 
 
 
Institution 
Frequency % Frequency %
Village Government 101 46.1 138 46.7
Village Water Development 
Committee 
 
67 
 
30.5 
 
NA 
 
NA
Conflict Resolution 
Committees 
 
98 
 
44.7 
 
NA 
 
NA
District Council 21 9.5 NA NA
Police Force 53 24.2 95 32.2
Ward Council Tribunal 24 10.9 NA NA
National Ranching Company  
33 
 
15.0 
 
NA 
 
NA
Katani Limited 42 19.1 NA NA
Wildlife Department 12 5.4 NA NA
Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area Authority (NCAA) 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
116 
 
39.3
Ngorongoro Pastoral Council  
NA 
 
NA 
 
140 
 
47.5
WWF- Save the Rhino Fund  
NA 
 
NA 
 
55 
 
18.6
Frankfurt Wildlife 
Foundation 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
79 
 
26.7
NCAA Regulations  NA NA 110 37.2
IRETO (NGO) NA NA 87 29.4
CLIP 48 21.9  
• The percentages add to more than 100 because of multiple responses 
Key:  CLIP = Community Based Livestock Improvement Project, IRETO Maasai vernacular for Pastoral 
Livelihood Improvement Project, WWF  World Wildlife Foundation,  NA =Not applicabl 
 
Others were “Conflict Resolution Committees” mentioned by 44.7 % of respondents, the 
National Ranching Company mentioned by 15.0% of respondents. The Police Force was 
mentioned by 24.2% respondents, Ward Council Tribunal was mentioned by 10.9% of 
respondents and a Community–based Livestock Improvement Project (CLIP) - a Kenya 
based NGO involved in pastoral development - was identified by 21.9% of respondents. The 
majority of respondents in Mkata plains were belonging to farming ethnic groups, leading 
sedentary mode of life and usually well integrated into the central government structure. This 
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might explain a tendency of most of respondents from the study villages to mention the 
village government, as an important externally sponsored institution. Most respondents 
identified the KATANI LTD, because the company is, de jure, owner of most of the 
abandoned sisal estates. The presence of many abandoned leasehold estates, had contributed 
to land scarcities experienced in the study area. Kilosa District Council established the 
“conflict resolution committees” in 2000 by - law No. 1 of 2000, which aimed at resolving 
resource-use conflicts between herders and cultivators at the local level.  These committees 
had been particularly successful in resolving the conflicts in the Msowero and Mbwade 
villages, which are shared by farmers and pastoralists. 
 
The pastoralists mainly reported the National Ranching Company because most of herders 
in Mkata plains utilize wetland areas located in the ranch as important dry season grazing 
areas. Nevertheless, during the time of the study, Mkata state ranch had been sub-leased to 
private investors, denying about 80% of the district cattle herd access to the crucial dry 
season key resource. The state ranch was also, claiming parts of Twatwatwa pastoral village 
land. However, both Twatwatwa village and the national ranch holds formal title deeds for 
the contested area, suggesting a possibility of double allocation of the same piece of land to 
two title holders by the Commissioner of Lands.  
 
Most of the traditional pastoral territories in arid and semi-areas including Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area had, from the colonial times, been considered to be of least economic 
potential and were isolated from the main national economic infrastructures. Consequently 
only a minimum of central government structures was introduced. However, the realization 
of the tourism potentials in these areas, had spurred the introduction of new institutions that 
in many instances had dire impacts on the way of life of the indigenous people.  
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The externally sponsored local institutions identified in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
(Table 21) include the Ngorongoro Pastoral Council (NPC) identified by 47.5% of 
respondents as the most important externally sponsored institution. The pastoral council was 
established under the NCA regulations, as a consultative body through which Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area Authority (NCAA) can discuss issues pertaining to the welfare of the 
resident Maasai pastoral communities. The composition of the NPC includes the NCA 
Conservator and the six Directors heading the NCA administrative sections including: 
Community Development, Tourism, Natural Resource Management, Research and 
Planning, Administration, and Auditing and Finance. Others were elected chairperson, and 
the secretary, six representative village chairpersons, six representative village secretaries, 
all councillors from the area, six representative traditional leaders, six youth representatives 
and 6 women representatives. The term of office for the committee members is three years. 
The chairperson of the NPC is by virtue of his position a member of the NCAA Board of 
Directors. The main functions of the council include administration of the funds provided 
by NCAA for the purpose of community development. It is also used as a platform through 
which the NCAA consult the residents on resource management decisions that may have 
impact on their livelihood and welfare. 
 
However, the Conservator is not obliged by law to take on board the opinions of the 
pastoral council. During the interviews with the key informants from pastoral communities, 
they expressed appreciation to the NPC, and the decision by the NCAA to share the benefits 
accruing from conservation activities. The funds administered through the NPC were 
mainly used to support secondary education, water developing schemes and food security. 
As from year 2000, the NPC has been receiving about TSH 500,000,000 (500,000 USD) 
annually, from the NCAA (at exchange rate of 1000 TSh per USD). 
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Among other institutions identified by the respondents include NCAA which was 
mentioned by 39.3% of respondents, Police Force was mentioned by 32.2% of respondents, 
and IRETO (Maasai vernacular for a pastoral Livelihood Improvement Project) was 
mentioned by 29.4% of respondents (Table, 21). IRETO is a traditional Non - governmental 
Organisation, which was established by the NCAA and sponsored by the Danish 
Government, with the general objective of poverty eradication among the resident 
pastoralists in the NCA. The NGO operates a restocking program, to those households that 
had been forced into destitution after loosing all of their livestock. The redistribution of 
cattle is an age-old social institution of the Maasai pastoralists, known as “Olowowo”. This 
institution is no longer being practised by the pastoralists in Ngorongoro area mainly due to 
decline of per capita livestock ownership among the pastoralists. Although the village 
government was identified by a minority of respondents (6.7 %) (Table, 21), but it was 
observed to operates in parallel with traditional leadership. In most cases the traditional 
leadership was reported to be more powerful in decision-making. 
 
Regulations of the Ngorongoro Conservation Authority were mentioned by about one third 
(37.2%) of respondents. The regulations known to most respondents include a ban on 
agriculture and restrictions on grazing in the craters and Northern Highlands Forest 
Reserve. The NCAA regulation are associated with the game wardens who when enforcing 
the regulations are usually coming into direct conflicts with resident pastoralists. 
 
Frankfurt Zoological Society was identified by 26.7 % of respondents. The society has for a 
long-time been supporting conservation efforts in the area, and it is a very strong 
conservation lobby group at national and international levels. It has also, been very 
influential in the policies adopted or implemented by NCA. The society played a key role in 
the political process that in 1959 led to eviction of Maasai pastoralists from Serengeti 
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National Park. The society also supported the zonation program, which was implemented by 
the NCA starting from 1975. According to Shivji (1995) this program led to losing by the 
resident pastoralists the dry season grazing lands in Empakai and Ngorongoro craters and 
the “Northern Highland Forest Reserve” (NHFR). The residents had ever since been 
suspicious of the activities and the motives of Frankfurt Zoological Society, which 
represents the international conservationist lobby groups interested in the conservation of 
Ngorongoro area.  
 
It is notable that 32.2% and 17.9% of the respondents respectively mentioned the Police 
force -a law enforcement agent, and Ward Council Tribunal a formal judicial institution at 
village level -. The moderate and low mention of the central government institutions, 
particularly the ward tribunal, can be attributed to the isolation of the pastoral communities 
from the formal government system. Hence, the traditional institutions assume an increasing 
role in local governance particularly in conflict resolution and local defence, which 
otherwise should have been provided by the central government organs. 
 
4.2.3 Roles of internally sponsored local institutions in the study areas 
The villages under the study are located in traditional Maasailand in Ngorongoro area and 
Sagara tribe territory in Mkata plains, which is shared by different immigrant ethnic groups 
including Maasai pastoralists who settled in the area for about five decades. The Maasai are 
the main ethnic group in Ngorongoro area and they form a second largest ethnic group in 
the study villages in Mkata plains. For these reasons, the internally sponsored institutions 
examined were those drawing from Maasai as well as Sagara traditional institutions in the 
case of Mkata plains. 
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The internally sponsored institutions identified in the two study areas are shown in Table 
22. These could be differentiated into structural, organisational and constraining  
 
Table 22: Internally sponsored local institutions existing in Mkata plains and 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
  Number of respondents 
 
Institution type Institution 
category 
Mkata plains 
(n = 267) 
 
Ngorongoro 
Conservation 
Area 
(n = 305) 
  Frequency % Frequency %
Traditional diviner  
(Olo Laibon - Maasai) 
 
Structural 
 
78 
 
35.6 
 
98 
 
33.2
Traditional healers  
(Jenga-Kaguru) 
Structural  
50 
 
22.8 
 
NA 
 
NA
Curse Institutions Structural 87 39.7 230 77.9
Sacred forests Structural NA NA 69 23.4
Council of village 
elders 
 
Organisational 
 
78 
 
35.6 
 
210 
 
71.1
Ekingwana  62 28.3 270 91.5
Laigwanani (Maasai)) Organisational 90 41.1 284 96.3
Age- sets system Organisational 35 15.9 119 40.3
Warrior age-set 
(Morran) 
 
Organisational 
 
126 
 
57.5 
 
230 
 
77.9
Traditional guards Organisational 98 44.7 NA NA
Enkutoto Constraint NA NA 200 67.7
Ollalili Constraint 23 10.5 186 63.1
Enkopi Constraint 21 9.5 150 50.8
 
• The percentages are adding to more than 100 because of multiple responses 
 
Key:  NA = Not applicable 
 
institutions. The structural institutions are those, which determine the social fabric and 
serves as sources of authority for institutional supply. These are equivalent to Ostrom’s 
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(1990) constitutional-choice institutions. They are deeply embedded in the cognitive 
structures of individuals that determine the social values, norms and customs.  
The organizational institutions are those, which determine the social interactions and are 
associated with powers of decision-making structures. They play key roles in defining roles 
and obligations of individuals in a society and in community mobilisation. At local level 
these are in most cases embodied in the persona of implementing agents. Ostrom (1990) 
refers to this type of institutions as operational choice institutions. The constraining 
institutions reinforces the cognitive structure of individuals and shapes individual behaviour 
in relation to one’s physical and social - cultural environment. 
The traditional diviners/healers embody the magico-religious institutions and serves as 
spiritual leaders widely believed to possessing supernatural powers. The magico-religious 
institutions, like many other local institutions, are not codified into formal records and their 
operation remains a guarded secret by their custodians. 
 
Nonetheless, they are accorded high legitimacy by communities they were crafted to serve. 
The Sagara spiritual leader, a Jenga, was identified by 22.8% of respondents in Mkata 
plains (Table, 22). The Jenga is traditionally responsible with organising the Sagara and 
Kaguru fighters and providing them with magic believed to protect them against the Maasai 
warriors. These social narrations surrounding the Jenga are necessary in order to establish 
legitimacy and authority of the institution. In order to sustain its legitimacy, the institution 
designers have invoked magico – religious narratives as a source of incentives for its 
acceptance and powers. Similar strategies have been observed in a number of traditional 
institutions, especially those, which evolved in areas associated with high environmental 
risks and uncertainties like pastoral areas. Other functions of the Jenga include traditional 
healing and fortune telling. 
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The Jenga institution was revived in Mkata plains during the 2000 clashes between farmers 
and Maasai pastoralists. Interviews with key informants revealed that during the clashes, 
different farming ethnic groups organized as Ujaki under the Jenga to defend themselves 
against most powerful Maasai. This implies that the local institutions are deeply imbedded 
in beliefs of community members. The results also suggest that in case of failures of formal 
institutions to resolving social conflicts, local communities may opt to informal local 
institutions. A similar institution in Maasai tribe is embodied in the Olo Laibon, who serves 
as spiritual leader, medicine man, a visionary, fortuneteller, ritual leader and main advisor 
on cultural matters. . The Olo Laibon was identified by 35.6% and 33.2% of respondents in 
Mkata plains and Ngorongoro area respectively. The Olo Laibon officiate all rituals that 
provide an identity to an individual in the “Maasai” culture.  
 
There are similarities between the roles of Jenga and Olo Laibon institutions with regards to 
resolution of resource - use conflicts. This is based on the fact that traditionally the Kaguru / 
Sagara territory borders with Maasai. Thus, long time interactions between the two ethnic 
groups resulted into institutional learning as a means of co-existing and interaction in 
resource use. This implies that these local institutions have a potential role to play in 
conflict management process in the new orbit of interactions like is the case of Mkata 
plains.  
 
The Olo Laibon main role during pre-colonial times was to authorise Maasai warriors 
raiding parties, as well as providing charms believed to protect warriors during raiding. 
However, there are conflicting views on the role played by Olo Laibon in regards to inter-
tribal fights, in modern state. In the case of pastoralists’ – farmers’ conflicts in Mkata plain, 
some informants said that the Olo Laibon could have authorised warriors to attack farmers. 
Yet, the Olo Laibon was reported by district officials to have played a key role in 
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preventing escalation of the December, 2000 conflicts in Mkata plains, by ordering the 
Maasai warriors to stop the fight.  In addition to this, he was also reported to collaborate 
with local government officials in Kilosa district to mediate in numerous farmers - herders’ 
conflicts. This implies that the Olo Laibon institution has high legitimacy among Maasai, 
thus the institution has authority to mediate in conflicts involving Maasai pastoralists in 
Mkata plains. 
 
During interviews with district officials it was revealed that there exist traditional rivalry 
between the Jenga and Olo Laibon competing for superiority and power. The official 
claimed that this rivalry contributed in exacerbating resource - use conflicts among the 
Maasai and farmers, as each spiritual leader incited his followers to fight. These beliefs 
demonstrate ignorance on part of government officials on the roles of local institutions in 
community mobilisation. Moreover, most of government officials originate from farming 
ethnic groups, which had lost most of the customary practices through schooling and 
religion. In this pretext most of customary institutions are considered to be backward and 
earthly. This led to imposing an official ban on Ujaki and Jenga. By arriving to this decision 
the government officials were unknowingly being manipulated by the Maasai. A ban on 
farmers’ local institutions was in effect weakening their bargaining power to the advantage 
of pastoralists. As a result, the local institutions of pastoralists have been incorporated into 
the district conflict resolution mechanism. Most probably it was assumed that formal 
government institutions might cater for the farmers. 
 
Ritual institutions were reported by 38.3% respondents in Mkata plains and 65.6% 
respondents in Ngorongoro area. The rituals represent deeply embedded social practices that 
provide a cultural background of the society. The Maasai traditional rituals also define other 
social institutions like marriage, inter-ethnic relationship, leadership as well as access to 
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family cattle wealth. For instance, the key informants in Mkata plains informed that each 
wife married to a Maasai is supposed at marriage time to be given cattle to start her own 
herd that will in future be inherited by her sons. This pre-requisite apparently limit inter- 
marriages between Maasai women and men from farmers ethnic groups. Furthermore, the 
identity of Maasai tribesmen and their access rights to resources is associated with the age-
set rituals. Members belonging to particular age-set tend to mature together and get 
promoted together to the next stage of seniority during “olonotu” ritual. At this stage the 
senior warriors get promoted to elder hood and allowed to own cattle and marry, but are 
prohibited to carry fatal weapons. The ritual invigorates junior elders to develop wisdom 
and they start to participate in the council of elders. The ritual determines the roles and 
rights of individuals to access clan cattle wealth, therefore ensuring institutionalised 
redistribution of family cattle herd. 
 
Most of social institutions in the study areas are reinforced by a curse institution, whereby 
powers to cast a curse are vested in the Olo Laibon as well as the Ole Laigwanani. A 
particular age-age can also cast a curse to a junior age-grade. The curse was mentioned as 
important institution by 39.9% of respondents in Mkata plains and 94.9% of respondents in 
Ngorongoro (Table, 22). A curse spells upon an individual implies exclusion from 
community social networks that involves sharing of resources and other reciprocal 
arrangements. Cleansing of a curse involve fines in a form of cattle, goats or sheep which 
are contributed by the family or all clan members, depending on the offence. Moreover, a 
curse cast upon an individual is believed pass from one generation to another until the entire 
fine is paid. This ensures a high level of conformances to social sanctions and collective 
monitoring. In addition, the institution provides a mechanism for enhancing conformance to 
social norms; it is also minimises the transaction costs for supply and functioning of local 
  
221
institutions. The effectiveness of curse institution in community- forest management has 
been reported among the barbaig communities by Kajembe and Monela (2000). 
 
The important structural institutions mentioned in the study areas include the council of 
elders (ekingwana), Ole Laigwanani (Maasai traditional leadership), enkutoto (home 
territory), age-set system, warrior age set, traditional guards (Ujaki in Sagara tribe),. The 
structural institutions are involved in the actual operation of the institutions; therefore most 
of them are embodied in their implementing agencies or the locality where they operates 
(Table 22). 
 
The council of elders was mentioned as an important institution in both study areas. 
Important decisions in Maasai society are taken collectively on the open village meeting the 
Ekingwana. The results in Table 22 show that Ekingwana institution was mentioned as 
important institution by 28.3% of respondents in Mkata plains and 96.9% of respondents in 
Ngorongoro. The Ekingwana institution allows every body a right to speak and be herd. The 
Ekingwana system is widely practised in Ngorongoro area. During this study it was 
observed that even the formal administrative structures, both the local government and the 
conservation authority make use of the traditional system when communicating with the 
local communities. This implies the local institutions are the more effective in mobilising 
local communities. 
 
This differential rating of the importance of the council of elders in the two study areas 
could be explained by differences in ethnic composition and cultural values held by 
communities in the two study areas. In the case of Mkata plains the council of elders was 
identified as important local institutions in villages dominated by Maasai pastoralists. Key 
informants from the pastoral villages in Mkata plains said that the council of elders handles 
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most important decisions in their villages. However, the importance of this institution has 
been eroded in those villages dominated by farming ethnic groups. A plausible explanation 
for this is that farmers in Mkata plains are multi-ethnic in their composition and most of 
them are immigrants. Removed from their areas of origin the legitimacy of their institutions 
were weakened, they also lack a coherent critical mass to practice their culture.  
 
Moreover, the immigrant farmers are more integrated into formal market system, for this 
reason a need for developing elaborate local institutions and social networks is to some 
extent weakened. Furthermore, the farmers lead more sedentary life and had been fully 
integrated into the state administrative structures, where most of administrative decisions 
are by village government. For instance, most of the respected elders are members to the 
village government. In this case the roles that would have been assumed by a council of 
elders are integrated into a formal government system. On the other hand in the case of 
Ngorongoro area, which is a typical pastoral area and remotely located with minimal central 
government infrastructures; people have a high reliance on the council of elders as a local 
institution for making important decisions. These results suggest that the level of 
articulation into central government structures by communities in the two areas, influence 
on role of local institution in decision-making. Nonetheless, a high recourse to central 
government structures was reported in villages shared by both pastoralists and cultivators in 
Mkata plains. Whereas, in the villages occupied by pastoralists the local institutions appear 
to dominate in decision-making.  
 
The day to day administration in Maasai society is undertaken by the age-set tribal leader 
the Ole Laigwanani. The Ole Laigwanani is an age-set spokesman, who is nominated when 
the age-set is established. Each age-set has it own spokesman. The Ole Laigwanani 
institution was reported by 41.0% of respondents in Mkata plains and 96.2% of in 
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Ngorongoro area. The results indicate that a relatively low proportion of respondents in 
Mkata plains identified the Ole Lwaigwanani but was mentioned by a high proportion of 
respondents in Ngorongoro area. The discrepancy could be attributed to the fact that in 
Maasai traditional areas, the tribal territories are contiguous and intricately integrated with 
the local institutions for governing local resources. The Ole Laigwanani in this case is 
associated with the local territory resources the enkutoto. For this reason the roles of the 
traditional leaders are well known by all resource users. In case of Mkata plains the pastoral 
villages were relatively recently designated by the district authority. Most of these villages 
get registered as “Ujamaa” pastoral villages or were issued with formal title deeds. Control 
of the village land resources in this case rests on local elites, who had spearheaded the 
registration or obtaining the title deeds to the respective villages. Moreover, the villages 
occupied by pastoralists are widely dispersed and the current overall traditional leaders are 
residing in Morogoro district outside the Mkata plains and Kilosa district. In this case the 
overall traditional leaders are not responsible with day to day management of village land 
resources.  
 
In a traditional setting particular clan resides in particular territorial section referred to as 
the Enkutoto and have a council of elders.  Each clan member has a primary access to 
resources in the home territory. The enkutoto was mentioned by 91.5% of respondents in 
Ngorongoro area, but there was no any mention in Mkata plains. The differential results are 
attributable to the fact that the respondents in Ngorongoro area were in their traditional 
home territory, where the social institutions for governing resource use had the opportunity 
to evolve. In case of Mkata plains the pastoralists are immigrants in the area, and they were 
allocated the land resources through formal titling system, which is unfamiliar tenure 
system to Maasai. As such, social institutions for governing communal resources are 
adapting to new political and economic settings existing in Mkata plains. 
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Yet, despite the fact that they do not have direct control over matters pertaining to 
management of local resources in Mkata plains, the traditional leaders continue to play a 
key function in the collective decision making process. Key informants revealed that the 
Ole Laigwanan in Mkata plain chairs important council of elders meetings the ekingwana. 
The proceedings of the “council of elders” meetings are relatively democratic. The role of 
the Ole Lwaigwanani among others is to convene the council, meetings, moderate the 
proceedings, clarify issues and announce the final decision arrived at by the council 
members. The Ole Lwaigwanani verdict is final and binding to all community members.  
Furthermore, the traditional leader decisions are sanctioned by a curse institution, if 
contravened the offender or his kinsfolk are liable to a fine. During this study it was 
revealed by the key informants that the traditional leader in Mkata plains play a key role in 
election of village government leaders. The researcher was also informed about the 
existence of inter-generational competition for the village government leadership in 
Twatwatwa village. These competitions indicate the institutional changes which are taking 
place within the Maasai community in Mkata plains. In case of Ngorongoro a traditional 
pastoral leader, the Ole Lwagwanani plays a key role in the management of local resources. 
The traditional leaders were also reported to making decisions on day to day administrative 
issues in their communities.  
 
The Maasai tribe is hierarchically organized in the age-set system. The age - set comprise 
cohorts spanning for 15 years. This system defines roles to different age categories. The 
age-set institution was reported by 57.5% and 77.9% of respondents in Mkata plains and 
Ngorongoro area respectively (Table, 22). The age-set system has been reported in most of 
the pastoral societies in East Africa (Spear, 1993). Traditionally members of the age-set are 
supposed to share resources, help each other and cooperate in defence of their territory or in 
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cattle raids in neighbouring territories. The age-set ensures peer monitoring, and promotes 
the culture of reciprocity that is prevalent amongst the pastoral societies. The predominant 
age-set is the warrior (morrans), which comprise of bachelor youth at their prime age 
between 20-30 years. The warriors (morrans) are supposed to perform public services to the 
society and defend the territory. Their main duty is to drive herds of cattle to distant grazing 
areas during dry seasons. The in-built social network within the fabric of the Maasai, allow 
tribal members to share strategic resources (dry season grazing lands and water), which are 
usually widely dispersed over space and time in different territories. 
 
Furthermore, each age-set has a collective curse power over the junior age-set. In this way 
the curse institution ensures peer pressure, collective enforcement and high level of 
conformance to norms and social conventions. However, this curse institution is regulated 
by both complementary and rivalry relationships between alternating and successive age-
sets. Whereby, members of each senior age - set are nominal fathers to alternate junior age – 
set, with which they share reciprocal relationship. The reciprocity among alternate age sets 
is prescribed by the olpiron institution. The nominal fathers are supportive to the junior age-
set and serve as their guardians, and the two age sets tend to collaborate when decisions on 
social issues are made. At the same time adjacent age-sets are characterised by rivalry, 
competition and at some stage bullying. This relationship is prescribed by the watani 
institution. The institution is also prevalent among other ethnic groups of Tanzania. The 
watani relationship among different ethnic groups provide for reciprocal support among 
ethnic group members. It also provides a platform for dialogue and in resolving social 
tensions amicably. In effect, this is an institutionalised low cost arena for conflict resolution 
and expanding the social nets. Such institutional framework is particularly important in 
Maasai society through maintaining harmony among the rival warrior age-sets who are 
prone to violent clashes.  
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The controlled institutionalised violence embodied within Maasai social institutions, can 
explain the violence and wary behaviour of the “warriors” to other ethnic groups. The most 
prestigious event in the aging process is when the junior “warriors” assume a senior 
“warrior” status. Yet, the juniors have to demonstrate their worthiness for promotion. The 
transition stage has in most cases been associated with cattle raiding in neighbouring tribes 
or violent fights with farming tribes. Such institutionalised traditions have an implication in 
inter.-tribal conflicts involving the Maasai and the farmers’ ethnic groups, like is the case in 
Mkata plains. Thus, it is important to understand the dynamics of age-set organisation when 
recommending an intervention in the Maasai society. During a decision making process a 
consensus of all age-sets must be sought before any binding agreement is made. This 
implies that any intervention must be agreeable upon by all social groups. 
 
A traditional guards’ institution Ujaki was mentioned as an important institution by 44.7% 
of respondents in Mkata plains (Table, 22). The institution is a traditional defence group 
practised by Sagara and Kaguru tribes, which are indigenous tribes in Mkata plains. Ujaki 
institution evolved during the pre-colonial times, aimed at repulsing tribal raiding by the 
neighbouring Maasai. In its original form the institution was employed in mobilising and 
providing command structures of the defence groups against invading Maasai warriors. In 
its present form Ujaki is a revival of the indigenous institution, and it was employed to 
unifying all farming ethnic groups to defend their land and other natural resources against 
much powerful Maasai. Traditionally Ujaki organises around a spiritual leader a Jenga.   
 
A number of social constraints moderate the social behaviour of individuals. These are in 
the form of taboos and conventions were reported to shape the social order of the Maasai. 
The important social constraints mentioned by respondents include the ollalili, enkopi and 
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ndobito institutions. The Ollalili institution was identified by 8.6% of respondents in Mkata 
plains and 63% of respondents in Ngorongoro. The Ollalili is a “pasture reserved” for an 
individual or a community. The reserved pastures are used for grazing calves or sick cows 
during the dry season. The Ollalili is regarded as a private property belonging to an 
individual or common property belonging to a specific group, and any trespass is punished 
by a fine of a bull. The bull is supposed to be slaughtered and be feasted by all community 
members including a person who has paid the fine. In Maasai culture, private property is 
sacrosanct enforced by curse institutions. Encampment sites as well as the cultivated plots 
are considered as private properties and sanctioned by Ollalili. During the study it was 
observed that the Ollallili institution is widely practised in Ngorongoro area for setting 
aside pasture reserves. However, the existence of the institution in Mkata plains was only 
acknowledged, but the key informants said that it was never practised. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the Maasai are immigrants in Mkata plains and they hold formal 
group titles to their villages. In this situation an individual lacks the legitimacy of declaring 
exclusive rights to any part of the village land, with exception of the premises of his house. 
Moreover, the Kilosa Maasai have about a century long isolation from their traditional 
Maasailand, while they have retained the general Maasai culture, a number of institutions 
have been evolving and adapting to their new social settings.  
 
Homicide cases involving Maasai tribesman is sanctioned by Enkopi institution. The Enkopi 
institution involves repayment of “blood money”, to the bereaved, by the clan members of 
the killer. The male victim is repaid for by 49 cattle, while the woman victim is repaid 48 
cattle. The fine is believed to cleanse the clan out of the curse, and it has to be paid even if 
there is a formal prosecution by the court of law. The enkopi was identified as important 
institution by 9.5% and 50.8 % respondents in Mkata plains and Ngorongoro area 
respectively (Table, 22).  
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During the Focused Group Discussions in Mkata plains participants reported that the 
institution is not practised in the area. It is generally felt that every body must be 
responsible to his acts, and they prefer homicide cases to be tried by court of law. 
Moreover, the enkopi institution does not apply to none Maasai. Neither does it apply to all 
Maasai - tribal sclans, which are allied to different ritual leaders the Olo Laibon. The Key 
informants in Ngorongro area informed that Kisongo Maasai do not share enkopi institution 
with Parakuyo Maasai of Kilosa. This was one of the main reasons for resource - use 
conflicts between the two Maasai sections during the last century, which led to 
displacement of Parakuyo from main Maasailand.  
 
Fatal wounding of a clansman is sanctioned by the ndobito institution. The institution 
obliges offender’s family to pay a sheep for cleansing the blood curse. The offender is also 
supposed to meet the medication costs of the wounded man. The ndobito was identified as 
important institution by 22.8% of respondents in Mkata plains and 49.8% of respondents in 
Ngorongoro area (Table, 22). 
 
The interplay of the different social institutions have an implication on the management of 
communal grazing lands and the preponderance of resource-use conflicts and tribal wars 
characterising pastoral areas. The structural social institutions prescribe roles for monitoring 
and enforcement of rules governing use of common grazing lands, to warrior age group. 
The institutions also provides for peer control of behaviour amongst community members. 
The organisational social institutions ensure collective decision making in the community. 
On the other hand the Maasai culture promotes self assertiveness of the morrans while 
constraining the behaviour of the adults. The culture also tolerates morrans stealing cattle 
from other tribes. This is partly attributed to implicity economic rationale as the youth may 
  
229
use stolen cattle to build their own cattle herd. In this way they reduce the necessity of 
redistributing the family herd. 
 
Such institutionalised behaviour has implications on resource-use conflicts in particular 
where the Maasai co-exist with farming tribes. For example, during this study it was 
informed by key informants from Mkata plains that most progressive farmers were 
discouraged to keep grade cows due to risk of being stolen by the Maasai warriors. One key 
informant from Msowero lamented that the Maasai have stolen from him two improved 
dairy cows. There is a general feeling that the Maasai had conspired to discourage the 
farmers from keeping cattle as a measure to prevent competition for grazing lands. Key 
informants at Twatwatwa village reported some instances of warriors deliberately graze on 
crops, such fermenting conflicts with farmers. Baidleman (1960) reported instances in 
Mkata plains where Masaai warriors disdain the farmers to the extent of forcibly grazing 
cattle on crops even in the presence of farm owners. During this study a case of forcibly 
grazing on crops was reported at Twatwatwa- Rudewa village boundary.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the importance of local institutions in governing the use of 
common pool resources, including the communal grazing lands, has come to the attention of 
a number of scholars. Since 1970s writers like Ciriary-wantrup and Bishop (1975) have 
emphasized about the importance of considering institutional aspect in resource 
management. The role of institutions in natural resource management have also, been made 
a subject by Pretty (1995) and an important feature in Ostrom’s work (1996, 1992,). All 
these writers emphasize on the importance of understanding the local environment and in 
particular the relevant institutions for proper design of natural resource management. 
Institutions are critical at all levels of human interaction. This owes to their role in guiding 
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political decision-making along just and fair procedures, and for re-assuring people on 
predictions of future decisions. 
 
4.2.4 Strengths of local institutions governing the use of communal grazing lands in 
Mkata plains and Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Both pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the study areas have settled in permanent villages, 
where they practise extensive livestock production system. The system involves seasonal 
movement of entire or part of household herd between dry and wet season grazing areas. 
This being an adaptation to variability in supply of pastures and water which is 
characteristic to arid environments. In the course of seasonal mobility, herders have to 
access various resources, which might be under jurisdiction of different groups of users or 
authorities.  
 
Therefore a strategy practised by a particular group of pastoralists or individuals may differ 
depending on the type or resources needed, characteristics of resource users and 
institutional arrangement governing access to the resources. In order to minimize resource-
use conflicts among resource users, there is a need of devising elaborate institutional 
frameworks to co-ordinate livestock mobility among different resource niches and the 
multiple users.   
 
Tables 23 and 24 present livestock mobility practises and terms of access to various grazing 
areas in Mkata plains and Ngorongoro area, respectively. Results in Table 23 shows that a 
majority of respondents (94.8%) in Mkata plains said that they usually move their livestock 
to dry season grazing areas. A grazing cycle starts at the beginning of short rains towards 
the end of January when animals return to permanent villages and continue to graze on 
  
231
village land throughout the rain season. As dry season sets - in mid May animals are moved 
progressively towards pasture reserves on river banks. 
 
Table 23: Response distribution on livestock mobility in study villages in Mkata plains 
  
• Percentages in some columns are not totalling to 100 because of missing data 
• Data in parentheses are percentages 
Key - NA = Not applicable 
 
 
As dry season progress, towards the end of June, most herders cross into farmer villages to 
feed on crop residues or graze on wetland patches found on river valleys within these 
Herd mobility Twatwatwa 
(n= 37) 
Mabwegere 
(n= 30) 
Msowero 
(n= 170) 
Mbwade 
(n= 30) 
Total 
(N= 267) 
Yes  23(76.7) 30 (100.0) 60(35.3) 21(70.0) 253(94.8 ) 
No  6(20.0) NA NA 8(26.7) 14(5.2) 
      
Time herd moved      
Dry period  13(43.3) 30 (100.0) 90(52.9) 21(70.0) 154(57.7) 
Rain period 2(6.7) NA NA NA 3(1.1) 
Beginning of rains  NA NA 12(7.1) NA NA 
Droughts  11(36.7) NA  NA 23(8.6) 
      
Terms of access to other areas    
Free communal 
grazing 
3(10.0) 30(100.0) 13(7.6) 6(20.0) 52(19.5) 
Open access on state 
ranch  
5(16.7) 15 (50.0) 15(8.8) 6(20.0) 41(15.4) 
Negotiate access 
with local leaders 
15(40.5) NA 6(3.5) 1(3.3) 22(8.2) 
Permission by 
village government 
leaders  
18(60.0) NA 5 (3.0) 27(15.9) 41(15.4) 
Reside with relatives 
and kinfolks  
21(56.8) 16(53.3) NA 28(16.5) 65(25.0) 
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villages. Different institutional arrangements are employed by herders to access resources 
outside their residential villages. Most of respondents depend on long established social nets 
by moving to kinfolks and/ or friends’ residing in other villages with ample supply of 
pasture, this strategy was mentioned by 25.0% of respondents. Other methods used include 
negotiating access with local leaders mentioned by 8.2% of respondents; seeking permission 
from village government leaders mentioned by 15.4% of respondents. Traditionally most 
tribes in Tanzania recognise secondary rights to grazing livestock in most of uncultivated 
village lands. Most Maasai pastoralists base on this general norm to graze their cattle on 
communal lands in farmer villages, as free access resources. 19.5% of respondents in 
Makata plains said they use communal grazing areas in other villages as free access 
resource. While 15.4% graze in state ranch area without searching for any formal 
permission, therefore they use the public land as an open access resource. 
 
Table 24 presents livestock mobility in Ngorongoro area. Herd mobility has for centuries 
been an important feature of extensive pastoral system practised by Ngorongoro Maasai. 
More than two thirds of respondents (73.5%) said they practise seasonal mobility. An 
elaborate transhumant movement, involving alternating between highland and lowland areas 
had been practised by the pastoralists in the area for centuries. The highland areas endowed 
with permanent water supply are used for permanent settlements and dry season pasture 
reserves grazed during the dry seasons. While the low lands, which lack permanent water 
sources are utilised during rain season. Timing and extent of mobility differs depending on 
location of permanent settlement in the landscape. Most of the respondents (90.2%) said 
that they move their livestock at beginning of rain season. Such high responses is because 
the majority of pastoralists move their animals to feed on highly nutritious green rush grass 
growing on short grass plains in low land at on set of rain season. The results in this study 
also indicate a growing deviation from the long established transhumant movement,  
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Table 24: Response distribution on livestock mobility in Ngorongoro conservation 
Area 
•  Numbers in parentheses are percentages 
• Percentages in some columns are totalling to over100 because of multiple responses 
 
Key  :NA = Not applicable 
 
whereby some pastoralists from Irkeepus (14.1%) reported to move their animals during the 
dry season. This can be attributed to the fact that Irkeepus, like other villages located in 
highland land areas, is experiencing increasing scarcity of dry season pastures, and the 
pastoralists are compelled to move towards reserved crater areas and forest reserves. The 
increasing shortages of dry season pastures have been attributed to increasing invasion of 
Number of respondents  
Herd mobility Kakesio 
(n=35) 
Enduleni 
(n=84) 
Irkeepus 
(n=81) 
Naiyobi 
(n=105) 
Total 
(n=305) 
Moving herd to other areas   
Yes  33(94.3) 86(98.2) 81(100.0) 71(67.6) 255(73.8)
No  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  
Time herd moved  
Dry period  NA NA 43 (53.1) NA 43(14.1)
Rain period NA NA NA NA NA
Beginning of rains  33(94.3) 35(41.7) 81(100.0) 91(86.7) 275(90.2)
Droughts  35(100.0) 0.0 38(46.9) 0.0 73(24.1)
  
Terms of access to other areas  
Co-ordinated access in lowland 
areas 
25(71.4) 35(41.7) 81(100.0) 76(72.4) 175(57.4)
Negotiate access with local 
leaders 
4(11.4) 4(4.7) 79(97.5) 15(14.3) 102(33.4)
Reside with relatives  30(85.7) NA 56(69.2) 91(86.7) 177(58.0)
Permission from NCA NA NA 75(92.6) 21(20.0) 96(31.5)
Permission by village government 
leaders  
NA NA NA NA NA
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highlands by an evasive grass Eleusine jaggeria, which has relatively low nutritive value to 
grazing cattle.  
 
Other movements were in response to drought, which was reported by all respondents 
(100%) in Kakesio and 46.9% of respondents in Irkeepus village. The elaborate pastoral 
transhumant movements in Ngorongoro area has for centuries been mediated through a 
constellation of enduring local institutions. These include user group institutions governing 
co-ordinated access of grazing areas in lowland plains. Institutions for co-ordinated access 
were mentioned by 57.4% of respondents. The institution ensures equitable access to rush 
pastures and water which are limiting resources at the beginning of rain season. This is 
attained through imposing of institutionalised closing season to access resources, prescribed 
camping sites, and grazing zone. The institution prohibits any pastoralist to camp on 
permanent water sources.  
 
Furthermore, moving of animals to other villages in Ngorongoro area can be achieved 
through negotiation with a local traditional leader, who grants access right to resources and 
assign camping sites. Negotiated access was reported by 33.4% of respondents (Table, 24). 
Another enduring institutionalised system for accessing resources is through reciprocity, 
whereby pastoralists may move their animals to their relatives or friends residing in other 
villages. Sharing arrangements are highly institutionalised in pastoral systems, and has been 
mentioned by 58.0% of respondents in Ngorongoro area. This study further establishes that, 
the local government plays no role in governing livestock movements or management of 
communal grazing lands. Most of respondents (97.5%) in Irkeepus and 20.0% from 
Naiyobi, located in highland areas, informed to seek permission from the NCAA to access 
restricted grazing areas. 
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However, these restricted areas have been traditional grazing lands of communities from the 
two villages, and most of community members question the legitimacy of the restrictions. 
As results violent clashes have been erupting between NCA wardens and pastoralists over 
illegal grazing into restricted areas. Key informants revealed that, the local leaders had been 
instrumental in mediating these conflicts. Study findings in Ngorongoro area is a testimony 
to a contention that local institutions governing communal grazing lands in the area are 
effective in co-ordinating access to resources and they have endured a number of political, 
policies and economic changes. 
 
Figure 36 and Appendix 16 show respondents’ awareness, on regulations governing access 
to communal grazing lands. The majority of respondents (83.2%) in Ngorongoro area and 
about a third of respondents (33.0%) in Mkata plains, said that they were aware of 
regulations governing use of communal grazing lands.  
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Figure 36: Respondents awareness of regulations governing use of communal 
grazinglands in Mkata plains and Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
 Key: TWT= Twatwatwa, MBG= Mabwegere, MSW= Msowero, MBD= Mbwade TMKP= Total Mkata 
plains, KK= Kakesio, EDN= Enduleni, IRK= Irkeepus,  TNCA=Total Ngorongoro Conservation area 
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When examined by villages in Mkata plains, high level of awareness on regulations was 
recorded in agro-pastoral villages. Whereby, 78.9% and 45.6% of respondents in Mbwade 
and Msowero village respectively reported to be aware of the regulations.  
 
This is probably due to the fact that, the two villages that are shared by both pastoralists and 
farmers had formed full functional “Conflict Resolution committees” (CRC). These are the 
institutions sponsored by the Kilosa district council, aimed at resolving herder - farmer 
resource-use conflicts. The Focused Group Discussion in Msowero village indicated that the 
village CRC has set rules designating the livestock watering sites and stock routes to 
watering points along Msowero river.  The pastoralists were reported to abide to the rules. 
The Focused Group Discussion in Mbwade also showed active participation of pastoralists 
in village conflict resolution committee, which has reduced incidences of resource-use 
conflicts.  
 
Figure 37 present sources of regulations for the management of communal grazing lands in 
Mkata plains and Ngorongoro area. A number of local organisations and agencies were 
identified as sources of regulations governing the use communal grazing lands. Most of 
respondents (84.0%) in Mkata plains identified the conflict resolution committee, and 
36.5% of respondents identified the village government as main sources of regulations. 
Furthermore, a substantial proportion of respondents (41.1%) considered the informal 
neighbourhood discussions as the most effective means of regulating the use of communal 
grazing lands, possibly through negotiated access. Where as, only 4.5 percent of 
respondents considered customary rules as important sources of regulations governing use 
of grazing lands. These results indicate that both informal and formal local institutions are 
the major source of regulations governing common grazing lands in Mkata plains 
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Figure 37: Response distribution on sources of regulations governing use of communal 
rangelands in Mkata plains and NCA  
Key:  TWT= Twatwatwa, MBG= Mabwegere, MSW= Msowero, MBD= Mbwade TMKP= Total Mkata 
plains,  KK= Kakesio, EDN= Enduleni, IRK= Upkeeps,  NCA=Total Ngorongoro Conservation Area, 
CR= Customary rules, VG= Village government, CL = Customary ruler, CRC= Conflict resolution 
committees, MI= Mixed institutions and NG = Neighour hood groups. 
 
The study established that whereas the government holds, de jure, claims over Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area, still most of the communal rangelands used by local communities in the 
area are actually under, de fecto, ownership of local communities. The majority of 
respondents (82.8%) interviewed in Ngorongoro area reported that customary rules are the 
main institutions governing use of communal grazing lands in the area. Other respondents 
(36.3%) reported collaborations of local leadership and conservation authorities in making 
decisions regarding access to grazing resources and supervising controlled burning of 
rangelands, which has recently been adopted by NCAA as one of rangelands management 
tool.  
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Similar to other areas in Maasailand, the traditional system for management of common 
pool resources had persisted in Ngorongoro area. During Focused Group discussions in the 
study villages, it was established that the traditional administration system operates in 
parallel to village government.  In some villages it was observed that the traditional 
leadership is the most powerful in mobilising people and in decision making. Access to 
water and grazing lands is secured through an elaborate institutional arrangement based on 
geographical territories, socio-political age -set system and kinship. Such institutional 
framework forms a hierarchy of resource management organization, which determines both 
primary and secondary rights holders to specific resources. According to Spencer (1993), 
the Maasai society constitutes a large ideological unit, with shared language and culture 
with a limited access to non-Maasai except through trade.  
 
However, the society never had a unified political authority; instead the political authority is 
devolved to the smaller sections of decision making the Oloshoni. These are more or less 
self-contained ecological units. The “Oloshoni” comprises the largest units of grazing 
management. Each unit has its own political, social and cultural identity. Members of a unit 
have a ‘de jure’ access to grazing resources in the entire “Oloshoni”. Within each 
“Oloshoni” there is a secondary tier of organization based on the localities the “enkutoto”. 
Each “enkutoto” has its own council of elders (ekingwana) and forms a socio-political 
organization that serves as the most important tier of local governance. The enkutoto also 
represents a distinct ecological and economic unit encompassing permanent water sources 
and defined areas of wet and dry-season grazing areas. Historically, individual families 
secure rights to the communal resources through common residence within the same 
locality over long periods of time and by regular participation, involving specific 
obligations in local age-set activities as well as rituals (Jacobs, 1975). At a more local scale, 
natural resource management is organized on a residential basis. The Maasai reside in 
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encampments, the enkang, or “boma” (in Kiswahili), the elders in each encampment make 
decisions on where to graze and water the livestock. Resource-use decisions vary depending 
on seasons and availability of most limiting resources - pasture and water. Thus movement 
of livestock, which is a necessary survival strategy in extensive livestock production 
systems practised in the study areas, necessitates an elaborate institutional framework to co-
ordinate access to resources and resolving resource-use conflicts.  
 
Table 25 shows strength of local institutions governing the use of common grazing lands in 
Mkata plains and Ngorongoro Conservation Area; computed as co-operative index.  The 
results show that the mean co-operative index in Ngorongoro area is 3.52 (+0.52) while in 
Mkata plains the index is 1.95 (+0.85). The institutional strength measures the performance 
of local institution to influence human-environment interactions. The institution 
performance presented here encompasses the attributes of institutional effectiveness, 
efficiency and sustainability. Institutional efficiency is a capacity of local communities to 
mobilise and set rules for governing common pool resources: while efficiency is measured 
in terms of resources needed for institutional operation. 
 
Table 25: Co-operative index in Mkata plains and Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Parameter Mkata plains Ngorongoro conservation Area
Mean cooperative index 1.95 (0.85) 3.52 (0.52)
Minimum 0 1
Maximum 3.0 5
 
• Numbers in brackets are standard errors 
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Institutional sustainability refers to the “robustness” or continuity of rules governing use of 
common pool resources. The results suggesting that local institutions in Ngorongoro area 
are more robust compared to those in Mkata plains. This can be attributed to the 
heterogeneity of respondents in the two study areas. Whereby, the sampled population in 
Mkata plains was multiple ethnic and operating different land-use systems. As a result they 
might be ascribing different use values to common rangelands. Furthermore, Mkata plains 
are highly integrated in market as well as formal structures of central government. 
 
Therefore functioning of local institutions has to adjust to formal institutions as well as the 
local institutions of other ethnic groups. This is apposition to Ngorongoro area where the 
sampled population was more or less homogeneous, isolated from market forces and 
operating similar land-use system. For these reasons the local institutions in Ngorongoro 
area are free of external perturbations, thus apparently might be adapting to new land-use 
settings. Agrawal (2001) argues that sustainable resource management can never be 
independent of sustainability of social institutions that provides framework for governance 
of common pool resource.  
 
4.2.4.1 Factors determining strength of local institutions in the management of 
communal grazing lands in the study areas 
(i) Mkata Plains 
A logistic model was used to determine factors influencing the likelihood of cooperation in 
the management of communal grazing lands in the study areas. Table 26 summarises results 
of logistic regression analysis, for Mkata plains. The model predicted correctly the 
relationship at 88.4% and significantly at p < 0.05.  The model– 2 Log Likelihood = 
118.331 indicating that there is a high fit between the model and the data. The Nagelkerke R 
squared = 0.743, suggests that about 74.0 % variation in cooperative management of 
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grazing land is due to independent variables in the model. Factors with likely positive 
effects on cooperative management of grazing lands are integration in market economy, 
perceived degradation of rangeland, family size, migration level, livestock ownership and 
strong local leadership. The results show that increasing household integration in market 
economy significantly (P<0.05) increase the likelihood of cooperation in management of 
common grazing land in Mkata plains by a factor of 4.157. This is best demonstrated in 
those villages designated for Maasai pastoralists, they had organised themselves to obtained 
formal group land leasehold.  
 
Table 26: Factors influencing strength of local institutions for management of 
communal grazing lands in Mkata plains 
Estimates 
Variables in the Equation 
β S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(β)
Integration in market +1.425 .499 8.162 1 0.004* 4.157
Perceived degradation of rangelands  +2.398 1.154 4.314 1 0.038* 10.999
Strength of local leadership +3.343 .832 16.121 1 0.000* 28.292
Family size +0.510 .710 .517 1   0.472 1.666
Migration level +1.091 .820 1.769 1   0.183 2.976
Livestock ownership +0.013 .009 2.413 1   0.120 1.014
Wealth differentiation -1.222 .394 9.631 1   0.002* .295
Constant -9.078 3.585 6.412 1   0.011 .000
 
Model summary 
– Overall percentage                =  86. 95 % 
– Model Chi-square                 =  104. 324,    at  (p< 0. 05) 
– 2 Log Likelihood                  =  118.331  
–  Nagelkerke R squared          =  0.743 
* = Indicates significancy at P < 0.05 
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Formal titling was aimed at attaining security of tenure to their villages. This is particularly 
crucial with recently introduced market economy in the country, which has led to increasing 
grabbing of village lands by elites. In their new villages, pastoralists practise communal 
monitoring of their village land against outsiders and they have a local system for making 
decisions on the uses of that land. However, at present they have yet to introduce 
regulations to govern internal uses of village communal grazing land. In particular, setting a 
limit to a number of livestock that could be grazed in the land. Cousin (1996) when 
discussing on the issue observed that most pastoralists tend to set rules limiting external 
users, but they refrain from setting rules limiting internal uses. This is related to attempts to 
balance conflicting demands of sustaining resource stock, while ensuring equitable access to 
resources by community members. 
 
Nevertheless, obtaining title deeds to the village land has developed a sense of ownership 
among the pastoralists, creating incentives for monitoring against outsiders. For example, 
pastoralists from other areas can only graze in a village grazing land upon negotiation with 
village leadership and they are required to contribute to village development projects (like 
school and water development projects). 
 
Strong local leadership also significantly (p< 0.05) increases the likelihood of cooperation 
in management of village grazing land by a factor of 28.292. Local leadership among the 
pastoralists in Mkata plains tend to combine both formal village government structures and 
customary systems of governance. Local leaders belong to local elites, who are also large 
herd owners. They make most of the decisions in the village based on Maasai traditional 
system. The local elite have close link with customary leaders and are well connected to 
district council. In a addition to this, they occupies positions in the formal village 
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government structure like being village chairmen, or members of important committees like 
water development projects, school committees or land allocation committees.  
 
Similarly, in agro-pastoral villages the local elites, who belong to land owning indigenous 
ethnic group, are influential in decision making process in their villages. Most of the elites 
are much wealthier, and some of them had previous employment experiences in formal 
sectors. For example the local elites at Msowero village have been influential in 
implementation of zonation of village land resources. This led to allocating a site along 
Msowero river where pastoralists could water their livestock and assigning a specific 
corridor through which livestock can access watering point. In addition to that they have 
registered resident pastoralists in a village register. These measures have led to increased 
co-operation between farmers and pastoralists and ending competition for wetland along the 
river. The role of local leadership in self-governance resource regimes has been reported by 
a number of institutional analysts including Ostrom et al., (2002) and McKean, (2000). 
 
Perceived deterioration of grazing land, significantly (p<0.05) increase the likelihood of 
cooperation in management of village communal grazing land by a factor of 10.999. The 
perceived deterioration of rangelands was used as proxy to expected economic flow from 
rangelands. Most of pastoralists consider the village communal grazing lands to be in good 
condition, and are committed to sustaining productivity of their land. This could be one of 
the reasons for the  pastoralists in Mkata plains to engage into seasonal movement of their 
herds to alternative grazing lands in neighbouring farmers’ villages and to open access state 
lands, in order to easy grazing pressure in their villages. Some pastoralists are proposing to 
limit a number of livestock per household that can be grazed on village communal grazing 
land, while most of large herd owners are diversifying their cattle wealth to permanent 
assets and other business. Ostrom (1999) advocated conditions for emergency of self-
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organisations among users to include feasible improvement of the resources and 
predictability of benefit flow from the resources. Livestock ownership in Mkata plains has a 
positive influence on cooperative management of communal range lands with a positive 
regression coefficient (β = 0.013) and a Wald ratio of 2.413. This suggests that although the 
relationship is not significant at (p<0.05) but the increase in number of households owning 
livestock is likely to increase the likelihood of cooperation in the management of village 
communal grazing lands. The explanation for this is that, since most pastoralists in Mkata 
plains depend on livestock for their livelihood, therefore they have incentives to sustaining 
the productivity of village grazing lands. This incentive is likely to increase among the 
community members as more of them start raising livestock. On the other hand, livestock 
owners form the social - nets aimed at mitigating risks of loosing their livestock due to 
draughts or diseases. Once one joins into the social nets he has duties to provisioning to 
management of communal grazing lands, short of that he/she is likely to loose access to the 
social net work. The majority of small herd owners lacking alternative sources of livelihood 
are most likely to cooperate in group management of resources in order to grantee access to 
social net and the reciprocal sharing arrangements. 
 
Migration level also have a strong positive relationship (β = 1.091) with cooperation in the 
management of communal grazing lands with a Wald ratio of 1.769. The results suggest that 
as migration increase there are improvements in self-governance of communal grazing 
lands. These results reflect on practises of pastoralists to move their livestock to other areas 
as a measure of minimizing overgrazing and environmental degradation in their villages. 
The large herd owners were reported to engage in long range migration extending to other 
districts or regions. It is well documented in the literature that the wealthier individuals in a 
community are likely to extracting a large share of resources from communal resource base 
leading to undermining of local institutions governing use of resources (Agrawal, 2002).  
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Thus by practising seasonal movements the large herd owners averts the likelihood of 
escalation of resource – use conflicts within their villages. 
 
Furthermore, immigration into pastoral villages in Mkata pains is moderated through 
customary institutions, whereby the immigrant pastoralists have to negotiate with local 
leaders. Usually immigrations involve reciprocal movements based on kinship relationship 
or stock friendship located in different villages. In this way, immigration by other 
pastoralists is part of established social nets. For that matter the immigrant pastoralists are 
more likely to participate in existing communal management of rangelands. However, 
similar institutional arrangements do not exist between pastoralists and farmer villages, 
whereby pastoralists consider grazing resources in farmers’ villages as open access 
resources. Thus, there is no negotiated arrangement between farmers and pastoralists with 
regard to coordinated access to grazing resources in farmers’ villages. The exception is at 
Msowero village, where the local elites have identified and registered resident pastoralists 
who are allowed to use the village communal grazing lands. 
 
Family size in Mkata plains is also positively related to co-operation in management of 
communal grazing lands (β = 0.510) with a Wald ratio of 0.517. A plausible explanation is 
that pastoralists in Mkata plains particularly the youth do not engage in urban area 
migration. This owe to the fact that because Mkata plains are well connected to market 
system, this offers opportunities to generating incomes through  trading cattle in nearby 
urban centres. Therefore the youth have incentives to remain in the area were they engage in 
herding and transhumant livestock movements. In this case the youth who play a key role in 
the monitoring and enforcement of rules for management of communal grazing lands are 
available to contribute in local governance of village lands. Increase in family size in this 
study was used as a proxy to population increase.  
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Different scholars hold different views on the role of population increase on management of 
natural resources. For example Boserup (1981) asserts that population growth can stimulate 
innovative uses of resources. This view relates to the management practices of village 
communal grazing land in the area. The sustainability of communal grazing land in Mkata 
is highly dependent on ability to monitor the resource uses and capacity to engage in 
frequent and long range livestock mobility in order to easy pressure on resources. These 
activities have high demand for the work force at household level. Therefore, a demand for 
a large family size. 
 
The study results also show that increase in wealth differentiation significantly (P<0.05) 
decrease the likelihood of cooperation in management of common grazing lands by a factor 
of 0.295. With increasing wealth differentiation, there is increased likelihood of forming 
different sub-groups with different interests. Key informants at Twatwatwa village; 
informed on suggestions by local elites to partition the village grazing land, which is now 
used communally. A motive behind this suggestion has led to suspicions on part of young 
generation, who fear loosing out if partitioning is implemented. In the literature, similar 
cases of benefits being captured by local elites have been reported by McKean (2000). It 
was further demonstrated by attempts of wealthy pastoralists to purchasing areas of Mkata 
national ranch offered for sale by National Ranching Company (NARCO). The pastoralists 
biding as individuals lost, but those who organised into a pastoral association, succeeded to 
buy a ranching block. 
 
At present the pastoral system in Mkata plains is highly commercialized, whereby 
individual pastoralists have ultimate objective of accumulating cattle for sale in cattle 
markets in nearby urban centres. This study established that most pastoral youths are 
engaged in cattle marketing. Whereas, some of the wealthier pastoralists have diversified to 
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other urban based economic activities, but they are still attached to their communal 
rangelands where they are accumulating large herds of cattle for commercial purposes. 
Shem (2004) referred to this class of pastoralists as absentee large herd owners. This group 
is well connected in governmental circles and has been able to influence governmental 
decisions on their favour, raising discontents among fellow pastoralists. Agrawal (2002) 
asserts that by specializing in different occupations individuals form alternative arenas for 
exchange and generation of prestige thus undermining the importance of local institutions. 
 
(ii) Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Table 27 show factors influencing strength of the local institutions governing use of 
communal grazing lands in Ngorongoro area. The model predicted correctly at 90.4% and 
significantly at (p<0.05). The -2 Log Likelihood = 115.10, suggest that there is high fit 
between the model and data.  The Negelkerke R squared = 0.754 implying that 75.0% of 
observed variation in the institutional strength is explained by independent variables in the 
model.  
 
Results in Table 27 show that five out of eight factors examined  have significant influence 
on likelihood of local institutions to bring about collective management of rangelands in 
NCA. Furthermore, out of eight factors four have positive effects. While other four factors 
has negative influence on the likelihood of cooperating in management of common grazing 
land. 
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Table 27: Factors influencing strength of local institutions for management of 
communal grazing lands in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Estimates 
Variables in the equation 
β S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(β )
Distance to market +3.044 .498 37.359 1 .000* 20.992
Family size -1.123 .627 3.207 1 .073 .325
Wealth differentiation -1.055 .267 15.578 1 .000* .348
Migration level -0.999 .718 1.939 1 .164 .368
Livestock ownership +1.111 .451 6.063 1 .014* 3.036
Autonomy in decision making +1.718 .667 6.644 1 .010 5.575
Perceived degradation of  
grazingland 
+3.083 .761 16.430 1 .000* 21.826
Restrictive policies -0.268 .865 .096 1 .757 .765
Constant -18.229 4.193 18.905 1 .000 .000
     
Model summary 
      -Overall percentage                   = 90.4% 
       -Model Chi. Square                  = 190. 392,  p (0< 0.05) 
      - -2 Log Likelihood                  = 115.10 
      - Negelkerke R squared            = 0. 754 
 
* = Significant at p< 0.05 
 
Factors with positive influence include perceived degradation of rangelands, livestock 
ownership, autonomy in decision making and distance to market; while factors with 
negative influence are household wealth heterogeneity, migration level, family size and 
restrictive policies. The highly significant positive relationship (P<0.05) between perceived 
rangeland degradation and cooperation in the management of common grazing lands can be 
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explained by the fact that supply of key pastoral resources in arid areas (water and pastures) 
is unpredictable in space and time. 
 
In order to survive under such conditions the pastoralists in dry areas develop institutions 
that govern sharing of resources and co-ordinate mobility between different resource niches. 
A number of studies have reported emergence of local institutions developed by pastoralists 
for cooperative management of common rangelands, for example Scoones (1996) and 
McCarthy et al. (1999). In this study an increase in perceived environment risk expressed as 
perceived range degradation was estimated to increase the likelihood of co-operation in the 
management of common rangelands in Ngorongoro area by a factor of 21.8 times. 
Suggesting that the pastoralists in Ngorongoro area are subjected to high environmental 
risks. 
 
Increase in number of people owning cattle can significantly (P<0.05) increase the 
likelihood of cooperation in management commons rangelands by a factor of times 3.036. 
The explanation for these results is the fact that the pastoral system in Ngorongoro area is 
under stress, where most of pastoralists have run into destitution through loss of livestock. 
In the context of Ngorongoro area the increase in number of people owning cattle for most 
pastoralists means restocking and shift from destitution to returning to pastoral economy. 
This also, has implication on enhanced livelihoods and increase in household food security. 
On the other hand, as the household restock, it is able to regain lost social nets, which in 
most cases are based on cattle exchange systems. An increase in household herd size will 
therefore motivate more livestock owners to cooperate in sustainable management of 
communal grazing land. For example rejoining the social networks system will provide 
incentives to individual pastoralists to adhere to local institutions for the management of 
communal grazing lands. On the other hand because pastoralists in Ngorongoro are living in 
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an ecologically fragile area with high environmental variability and limited opportunities to 
exit from the area, they have high incentives to cooperate for sustainable management of 
their ephemeral resource stock.  Dietz et al, (2002) reported on the importance of incentives 
in realization of cooperative action and overcoming free-rider syndrome.  
 
The autonomy of local community setting own rules significantly (P<0.05) increase the 
strength of local institutions for management of communal grazing land in NCA by a factor 
of times 5.575. This implies that sustainability of local institutions in Ngorongoro area is 
contingent to its isolation, firstly by its remote location and secondly by conservation 
policies which to some extent limits the freedom of association. In this way the local 
communities have been left on their own to craft their own local institutions. This 
observation is very pertinent in the context of institutional structures operating in 
Ngorongoro, for example Shivji and Kapinga (1998) observed an overlap of responsibilities 
between Ngorongoro Conservation Area and Ngorongoro District Council, the two agencies 
have jurisdictions over Ngorongoro area but their mandates are not clearly defined. In 
particular, the mandate of these agencies at local community level is not well understood. 
Whereas NCAA has been vested with overarching powers on administrative matters and 
resource management in the area, but has no political mandates in the area. Under such 
institutional clash local communities have resorted to local institutions for political 
mobilization and management of local resources.  
 
There is a general agreement among researchers and practitioners for local communities to 
craft their own institutions for the management of natural resources for example McKean 
(2000) and Ascher (2001). According to Ostrom (1993) this is likely to provide incentives 
for sustainable management of resources, because local institutions are better at providing 
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rules relating to access, harvest and management forum. Similarly she asserts that local 
institutions can respond quickly and cheaply to change on resource condition. 
 
The results in Ngorongoro suggests that when left on their own local communities are able 
to set collective rules that govern the use of  local resources, in this case common grazing 
lands. This is because whenever resources are scarce under increasing demand, resources 
users will organize for collective management. In Ngorongoro area Maasai pastoralists face 
high seasonality in availability of pasture; on the other hand they are subjected to restrictive 
policies imposed by the conservation authority. In isolation, local communities in NCA 
were able to craft strong local institutions for governing the use of communal grazing lands. 
In the literature a number of workers has reported the ability of local communities when left 
on their own, to craft institutions to govern local commons for example Ostrom (1990, 
1992), McKean (1995). 
 
Increasing distance to the market significantly (p < 0.05) increase the strength of local 
institutions for management of communal grazing land by a factor of 20.99. In this case 
distance to market is used as a proxy of local community articulation on market NCA in 
general is remotely located from market infrastructures. A plausible explanation for this 
result is the fact that Ngorongoro area is a typical pastoral area lacking most of economic 
infrastructures with very poor roads. For this reason the local communities are isolated from 
main economic systems. Therefore the only viable economic activity for local communities 
is the livestock based pastoral economy, which aims at attaining household subsistence 
level food requirements. The local population has no any readily available alternative for 
provisioning to their livelihoods. This situation has created the incentives to device the 
institutions for sustainable management of their resources including communal grazing 
lands. The observation in Ngorongoro is supported by Young (1999), who assert that 
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integrating with markets may lead to adverse impact on the management of common-pool 
resources. 
 
Increase in family size has a strong negative effect (β= -1.123) on the strength of local 
institutions governing use of communal grazing land in Ngorongoro area. This is probably 
due to the fact that as family members increase, some members particularly the youth 
migrate to urban areas.  This in turn leads to weakening of local institutions for the 
management of common grazing lands, because the youth plays a key role in monitoring 
and enforcing rules for using grazing lands. In the literature, it is enounced that excessively 
high populations exert high pressure on definite resource stocks, shared among users. This 
may ultimately lead to breakdown of local institutions (McKean, 1995).  
 
The rationale of this finding is that as family size in Ngorongoro area increase, may lead to 
a reduction of per capital livestock units available to family members, and forcing the 
household to start cultivation. In this way local institutions, which manage grazing land 
have to be re-arranged to allow community members to engage in agro-pastoralism. On the 
other hand some immigrants in Ngorongoro area get assimilated in pastoral families. These 
immigrants contribute substantially on increase in family size as well as population growth. 
These factors leads to transforming the pastoral to agro-pastoral land use systems. 
 
The heterogeneity in household wealth levels has a significant negative influence (P<0.05) 
on strength of institutions for management of common grazing lands. This suggests that as 
the household income level increases, the households are able to diversify to other income 
generating activities. In this way the richer households have alternative sources of income 
other than the commons to obtaining their livelihoods. Furthermore, some wealthier 
households in Ngorongoro area are engaged in commercial cattle marketing. As a result 
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they have high demand for resources from common grazing lands. In the process the 
wealthier pastoralists are likely to undermine the local institutions for the management of 
communal grazing lands, and leading to weakening of these institutions. A number of 
researchers reported similar results, for example Varughese and Ostrom (1998) who 
reported mixed influence of household wealth heterogeneities on local institutions. Dietz et 
al. (2002) reported the importance of homogeneity in goals in overcoming free-riding 
effects. In this study increase in household wealth differentiation in Ngorongoro area 
increase the likelihood of weakening the local institution for management of common 
grazing lands by a factor of 0.348. 
 
Restrictive conservation policies also have a strong negative effect (β = - 0.268) on the 
strength of local institutions governing the use of communal grazing lands with a Wald 
value = 0.096. The restrictions are statutory provisions enforced through NCAA regulations, 
which prohibit cultivation all over the NCA area and restrict grazing in some areas. These 
restrictions were imposed without sufficient scientific basis and in total disregards of local 
practices and indigenous knowledge. A number of researchers have since proved that the 
restrictions were detrimental to the pastoral production system for example, Runyoro 
(1994); Runyoro and Velded (1996), Perkin (1995); Homewood and Rodgers (1993). A 
case in point is restriction on burning as range management tool and restrictions on 
traditional grazing system. These have led to the decline in rangeland health and 
productivity, thus a loss in sustainability of rangeland for livestock and wildlife grazing. 
Increasing number of scientists are of the view that restrictive policies in Ngorongoro area 
have led to decline in pastoral economy weakening the local institutions for the 
management of communal grazing lands, thus threatening future sustainability of the 
ecosystem, for example in MacCarthy et al. (1999) and  Perkin (1993).  
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The regression model results for the two study areas show high significance of some factors 
and high correlation coefficients for all factors tested. This indicates that hypothesis 1 is 
supported by the empirical data. 
 
4.3 Resources - use Conflicts in Mkata plains and  Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
4.3.1 Resource-use conflicts in Mkata plains 
Resource - use conflicts in Mkata plains are centred on interactions between immigrant 
pastoralists and other land users, in particular the interactions between pastoralists and 
smallholder farmers. Table 28 presents occurrence of resource-use conflicts in the study 
villages in Mkata plains.  
 
The results indicate that resource-use conflicts are highly prevalent in all the study villages, 
whereby 72.3% of respondents acknowledged presence of resource-use conflicts. When 
examined at local level all study villages, with exception of Msowero, reported presence of 
resource-use conflicts. Whereas in Msowero village only 56.5% of respondents said that 
there is resource-use conflicts and 43.5% respondents reported no resource-use conflicts. 
Mixed results in Msowero village could be attributable to the fact that the village 
government had recently formed a conflict resolution committee to mediate resource-use 
conflicts between the farmers and the pastoralists. The committee has provided a forum for 
farmers to negotiate with herders; leading to negotiated agreements on how to utilize 
multiple-use resources in the village .In particular, the joint committee – comprising of 
herders and farmers, has allocated areas to be used by pastoralists and farmers along 
Msowero river, which in the past has been an underlying cause for intractable conflicts in 
the village.  
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Table 28: Responses distribution on occurrence of resource-use conflicts by study 
villages in Mkata plains 
Frequency of respondents  
Presence of 
resource –use 
conflicts                      
Twatwatwa
(n= 37) 
Mabwegere
(n= 30) 
Msowero 
(n= 170) 
Mbwade 
(n = 30) 
Total
(n = 267)
Yes 37 (100.0) 30 (100.0) 96(56.5) 30 (100.0) 193 (72.3)
No NA NA 74(43.5) NA NA
 
• Number in brackets are percentages 
             Key:- NA = No answer 
 
All respondents (100%) in Mbwade village reported occurrence of resource-use conflicts.  
This is probably due to the high herd mobility practised by pastoralists, which sometimes 
leads to livestock trespassing into crop farms leading to conflicts with farmers. All pastoral 
villages - Twatwatwa and Mabwegere - reported existence of resource-use conflicts with 
farmers. This is mostly due to boundary disputes that arose following titling of pastoralists’ 
villages, where farmers challenge the established formal village boundaries. Another reason 
for conflicts might be frequent trespass of livestock into crop farms.  
 
Table 29 show Focused Discussion Groups’ results on types and magnitude of resource-use 
conflicts existing in the study villages in Mkata plains.  
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Table 29: Types and magnitudes of resource-use conflicts by study villages in Mkata 
plains 
Score and ranking of conflict intensity  
Conflict 
types 
Twatwatwa 
 
Mabwegere 
 
Msowero 
 
Mbwade 
 
Score Rank
Inter-ethnic 
conflicts 
 
√√√ 
 
√√√√ 
 
NA 
 
√ 
 
8 
 
1
Village vs 
Village 
conflicts 
 
 
√√√ 
 
 
√√√√ 
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA 
 
 
7 
 
 
2
Village vs 
state agents 
conflicts 
 
 
√√√ 
 
 
√√ 
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA 
 
 
5 
 
 
3
Intra-ethnic 
group 
conflict 
  
 
√ 
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA 
 
 
1 
 
 
4
 
Key:     - Scores, √√√√ - very high, √√√- high, √√- moderate, √- low  
                 -NA = Not applicable 
 
The results indicate that resource-use conflicts occurring in the study area can be delineated 
into four main types including inter-ethnic conflicts, village versus village conflicts, village 
versus state agency conflicts and intra-ethnic conflicts. When ordered in terms of their 
importance; inter-ethnic resource use conflicts ranked highest, followed by village to village 
conflicts, then village versus state agency and lastly the intra-ethnic conflicts.  High inter-
ethnic conflicts were reported from the pastoral villages. This is because residents in 
pastoral villages are mainly Maasai pastoralists who are collectively blamed for incidences 
of crop damages by cattle in neighbouring farmers’ villages, leading to conflicts between 
farmers and herders. The situation periodically flared up into violent clashes, and the most 
serious clashes occurred in December, 2000. This involved pastoralists from Twatwatwa 
village and neighbouring Rudewa, Peapea and Mbuyuni farming villages (Figure, 38). 
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Conflicts arising from crop damages by livestock, eventually assumes ethnic dimensions. 
This is partly due to competing land use systems, i.e. pastoralism and subsistence farming, 
whereby Maasai have largely specialized on pastoralism. In this way competitions for 
shrinking resource base get polarized to ethnic competitions, pitting Maasai pastoralists 
against other ethnic groups.  
 
A relatively low magnitude and absence of resource-use conflicts were reported in Mbwade 
and Msowero villages, which are shared, by both pastoralists and farmers (Table, 29). The 
fact that in agro-pastoral villages both farmers and pastoralists are able to communicate; and 
device institutions to resolve their conflicts; could be a reason for low conflict level at 
Mbwade. Furthermore, in agro-pastoral villages the pastoralists are integrated in village’s 
government administration, and they become more accountable to formal structures of 
governance, which are dominated by farmers.  
 
The results further shows that no inter-ethnic conflicts reported in Msowero village, an 
agro-pastoral village which is multi-ethnic including Barabaig, Maasai pastoralists, Sukuma 
agro-pastoralists, and a number of farming ethnic groups. The Barbaig were reported to 
have first settled in the village in early 1950s. The key informants reported that the Barbaig 
pastoralists have cordial relationship with farmers and they tend to compensate crop 
damages caused by their cattle. This is opposite to aggressive behaviour expressed by 
Maasai herders who come to graze and water their cattle in Msowero from neighbouring 
pastoral villages.  The reported differential behaviour among Maasai and Barbaig 
pastoralists is attributable to a number of factors. Firstly herding duties among the Maasai is 
carried out by youth (warrior age-set) who are not immediate owners of cattle they are 
herding.  
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Secondly, there is a general contempt of Maasai towards cultivators and worrisome 
behaviour among Maasai warriors. On the other hand adults, both women and men, carry 
out herding duties among the Barbaigs. Being the immediate owners of livestock, the adults 
bear the responsibility of crop damages inflicted by their livestock. A study by Mbwiro 
(2002) in Usangu valley argued that Maasai pastoralists who were holding more secure 
tenurial rights to resources were reportedly more co-operative and peaceful, in opposition to 
recently arrived Sukuma agro - pastoralists. While a study by Brehony et al. (2001) reported 
that the Barbaig were least cooperative with farmers in Kilombero district.  
 
Thirdly, low conflict levels in Msowero may be due to the fact that a full functional conflict 
resolution committee has been formed in the village, providing a forum for both pastoralists 
and crop cultivators to resolving resource-use conflicts. The key informants in the village 
reported that the conflict resolution committee comprise of elders from pastoral ethnic 
groups, women representatives and village government leaders. It was further revealed that 
the most influential local elites had endorsed formation of conflict resolution committee. 
 
Low conflict intensities and a full functional conflict resolution committee were also 
reported in Mbwade village, which also comprise of a multi-ethnic community. These 
findings conflict with the received narratives that tend to associate conflicts with ethnic 
heterogeneity. Implying that resource - use conflicts are mostly related to resource scarcity 
and access rights hold by a respective group, rather than the ethnicity of groups involved in 
the conflicts. This implies that the conflict process and its outcomes are contextual, and 
depends on institutional constellation operating in a particular area. This fact suggests that 
successful resolution of resource-use conflicts can be best achieved through institutional 
innovations that combine both local and formal institutions. 
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Figure 38: Part of farmers’ village burnt down during 2000 farmers-herders’ clashes 
at Rudewa- Mbuyuni village in Mkata plains 
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Inter-village conflicts were reported in two pastoral villages (Twatwatwa and Mabwegere), 
which involve boundary disputes between the pastoral villages and the neighbouring 
farmers’ villages (Table, 29). The pastoralists have formal group titles to their village lands, 
while farmers have customary claim on their communal village lands which appear to 
overlap with lands allocated to the pastoralists. The farmers are challenging the pastoral 
village formal boundaries indicated on the title deeds issued by the Commissioner of Lands. 
Furthermore, a process that led to titling of pastoral villages was claimed to be not 
transparent, which led farmers to challenge the legitimacy of the land title deeds issued to 
the pastoralists. The disputed border areas in most cases are the river valleys and wetlands, 
which are key resources to both pastoralists and farmers during dry seasons. These areas are 
utilised by farmers to produce irrigated crops during the dry season, while the pastoralists 
also depend on these valleys as dry season grazing areas. 
 
Village versus state agencies resource-use conflicts were reported in Mabwegere and 
Twatwatwa villages (Table, 29). A land dispute was reported between Mkata state ranch 
(under the National Ranching Corporation - NARCO) which was claiming about 4000 ha 
which are legally occupied by Twatwatwa village, which holds a formal title deed for the 
disputed land. During the time of the study, NARCO announced to sub-leasing to private 
investors part of the ranch areas, including the disputed land in Twatwatwa village. This 
decision has raised a lot of questions, because it was not clear if NARCO is legally allowed 
to sub-lease land to private investors. Furthermore, the part of ranch offered for 
privatization included a wetland located in Tindiga/Luhoza area which has been utilized as 
an important dry season grazing area by more that 80% of the pastoral herd in Kilosa 
district. Moreover, when the wetland was annexed into a state ranch during early 1970s, it 
was already occupied by the pastoralists who continued to utilize these areas until when 
they were privatised. A decision to privatize them was made at NARCO head quarters, 
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without any participation of regional and district governments. As such local demands for 
land in the area were never taken into consideration.  
 
Moreover, the main motive behind sub-leasing the portion of the ranch area was to enable 
bureaucratic elite’ to access land, mainly for speculative purposes. It is important to note 
that during annexation by the government and the subsequent privatization of these areas no 
regard was accorded to the pastoralists residing there. At the time of the study, the pastoral 
community resident on the wetland area was on its second generation. These results 
demonstrate ignorance of pastoral production systems by state officials, who consider 
pastoralism to be wasteful and need to be transformed by sedentarisation. Privatisation of 
wetland areas in Mkata ranch has in effect removed an important dry season grazing areas 
for the entire pastoral communities residing in Mkata plain. This has an implication for 
escalation of resource-use conflicts between the pastoralists and farmers in the area. 
 
Another conflict reported in Mabwegere village, involves the village and the District Land 
Planning Department. The latter does not have any records of the title deed issued to the 
village by the Land Commissioner. This discrepancy probably arouse from the policy flaws 
that laden land administration and allocation in Tanzania during the 1980s. In the 1980s, the 
districts as well as regional development committees had mandates to allocate village lands. 
Hence, land titling in Mabwegere and Twatwatwa villages were processed through the 
regional development committees. Furthermore, the pastoral schemes in Kilosa district 
introduced during early 1960s through the District Livestock Development Department, 
which designated the present day pastoral villages. This program was implemented without 
considering other land uses in the area. Moreover, when the pastoral villages were first 
designated during 1960s, then grazing lands were abundant, human and livestock 
population was relatively low. Therefore the demand for land was not so intense. Ever since 
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there has been no comprehensive resource inventories that had been undertaken in pastoral 
villages in Mkata plains to ascertain the rangeland carrying capacities. Until the time of this 
study Kilosa district authorities were demanding all pastoralists to move to villages 
designated for pastoralists. 
 
Similarly intra-ethnic group resource - use conflict was reported at Twatwatwa village. 
Discussions with key informants revealed that as a measure to arrest range degradation in 
the village, there is a general drive to partition the village lands into individual 
landholdings. The village elites, who are also large herd owners, advocate the idea. 
However, the proposal is being challenged by the young generation who are worried to 
loose if village grazing land is partitioned, the interests of village elites will most probably 
prevail. Then the land will be partitioned according livestock holdings in favour of large 
herd owners. Most apparently, the motives of those advocating partitioning of village 
common grazing land is for land speculation purposes and attaining immovable asset that 
can be used as collateral for bank transactions in line with the emerging land market in 
Tanzania.  
 
This covert intra-ethnic group conflict has assumed more or less inter-generational 
dimensions. The worries of the younger generation in Mkata plains cannot be dismissed as 
baseless. Mwinihoke and Kajembe (2001) reported similar inter-generational resource-use 
conflicts in Handeni district, Tanga region. Ostrom et al. (2002) reported benefit capture by 
local elite’s following changes in institutions governing use of common pool resources. 
Similar losses had been reported in Kenya following partitioning of communal grazing 
lands into group ranches (Galaty, 1993, 1994; Ruttan, 1995).  
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4.3.2 Causes of resource - use conflicts in Mkata plains 
The causes of resource - use conflicts involving Maasai pastoralists and farmers identified 
by respondents in Mkata plains are presented in Table 30. The main cause of farmer-herder 
conflicts identified by a majority of respondents (70.4%) was crop damages by livestock. 
Crop damages occur when livestock trespass into crop fields in villages occupied by 
farmers. Trespassing in most cases occur accidentally owing to difficulties of controlling 
large herds of cattle, but in some instances the Maasai youth were reported to deliberately 
drive cattle in crop farms in contempt of farmers. This was associated to warring behaviour 
among Maasai youth which was reported by 34.5% of respondents.  
 
Trespassing was also attributed to a general tendency of Maasai pastoralists to disregard 
village boundaries which was reported by 33.7% of respondents. This can partly be due to 
ignorance on the actual location of village boundaries, or due to patchyness of grazing 
resources whereby certain key resource such as water or dry season grazing areas may be 
located in farmer villages. Another important cause of conflicts mentioned by 67.0% 
respondents was reluctance of government officials to take action on time to diffuse 
tensions between farmers and herders. Ineptness of government officials could be attributed 
to lack of conflict resolution skills among government officials, but could also be associated 
with corrupt practices. Allegations of pastoralists corrupting government officials were 
mentioned by 44.9% of respondents. The study revealed that both farmers and herders hold 
different views on causes of conflicts and their escalations. 
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Table 30: Causes of resource-use conflicts in study villages in Mkata plains 
Number of respondents 
(n= 267) 
 
Cause for resource-use conflict 
Number % Rank
Crop damages by livestock 187 70.4 1
Government officials reluctant to take action on time 
to diffuse the tensions 
 
179
 
67.0 2
Excessively large herds of cattle 160 59.9 3
Pastoralist corrupting government officials 120 44.9 4
Farmers forcibly confiscating cattle 108 40.4 5
Warring behaviour of herding warriors 92 34.5 6
Herders violating boundaries 90 33.7 7
Farmers disregarding village boundaries 49 24.7 9
Hatred between pastoralists and farmers 64 23.9 10
Heavy penalties demanded by farmers for crop 
damage 
51 19.1 11
Government officials favouring farmers 70 26.2 8
 
• The percentage total up to more than 100 because of multiple responses 
 
It is argued that pastoralists owning large herds of cattle frequently trespass in farmer’s 
villages in search of pastures, crop residues and water. In the process they increase chances 
of crop damages and conflicts with farmers. On part of pastoralists they claimed that a 
tendency of farmers to confiscate cattle suspected to cause crop damages flare up resource - 
use conflicts. A fairly high number (40.4%) of respondents reported confiscation of cattle 
by farmers as main source of conflicts. This response indicates that the practice was 
accorded high importance by most pastoralists in Mkata plains. Confiscation of cattle was 
reported to trigger off violent clashes between farmers and herders in December, 2000. The 
Kilosa district administration has since banned confiscation of cattle, in the event of crop 
damages only cattle brands have to be recorded then reported to government authorities. 
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Furthermore, pastoralists claim that farmers tend to over charge when there are crop 
damages inflicted by livestock, compared to the real value of crop losses. Over charging 
was reported by 19.1% of respondents. While 26.2% respondents mentioned that 
government officials tend to favour farmers in delivering adjudicationa  on farmer-
herder conflicts.  
 
During Focused Group Discussions in pastoral villages it was claimed that some farmers 
deliberately grow crops in the cattle routes and grazing areas in order to leap compensation 
money from the herders. In some instances cultivators charge fees to allow the herders to 
graze on crop residues, but there is no elaborate institutional mechanism to enforce these 
agreements. Kilosa district administration has since banned grazing on crop residues. Some 
pastoralists were of the opinion that crop damage is not, in most cases a deliberate action, 
but in practice when herding large herds of livestock some animals can accidentally stray 
into crop fields. 
 
Again, herding activity especially near the settlements is carried out by young boys, who 
might not be attentive in controlling animals, which end up trespassing into the farms. 
Discussions with key informants at Twatwatwa village disclosed that some Maasai youth 
are deliberately grazing on crop fields in order to gain social prestige among their peers. 
Preponderance for delinquent behaviour embedded in the Maasai culture, condones youth 
aggression towards other ethnic groups. Such behaviour among youth directly or indirectly 
contributed to protracted conflicts in the area. Nonetheless, schooling which promotes 
cultural integration and changes in social values among Maasai, apparently will contribute 
to change such warring behaviour. During this study it was observed that young Maasai 
boys, who are attending school, have many age - met friends from farming ethnic  
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groups, with whom they share very cordial relationship. Such relationship was not apparent 
amongst young men, who had never attended school.  
 
Furthermore, Maasai young men who have had opportunity to attend training seminars and 
other courses were more co-operative towards outsiders. This observation suggests that 
improved contacts and communications between Maasai and neighbouring farming 
communities will improve social integration among the two communities, thus providing 
avenues for peaceful resolution of resource-use conflicts. On the other hand farmers argue 
that arrogance of Maasai pastoralists and reluctance to compensate crop damage as a one of 
main cause of resource-use conflicts. Furthermore, they argued that government agents, 
particularly the police and the judiciary do not seem to take actions whenever cases of crop 
damages are reported to them. This tendency points a finger to corruption. The courts of law 
seem to take long time to settle cases, while fines and or compensations ruled are too low to 
deter the offenders. The events which led to December 2000 killings, have led to a general 
feeling that government agencies have failed on their duties to discharge justice. Thus the 
government bodies lost legitimacy on the eyes of the community who in turn decided to 
take self-action as a means of seeking justice. This was a triggering factor, which invoked 
the old sentiments between Maasai and Sagara/Kaguru. Ethnic identities and symbolism 
were used to draw the battle lines. Informants from police force blamed the politicians for 
politicizing the issue and exploiting the situation for political gains. 
 
The causes of resource-use conflicts identified by respondents in this study have differential 
impacts on outcomes of conflict process. As such any measures taken to resolve these 
conflicts must also address the underlying causes to these conflicts. Whereby some causes 
have a causal effect relationship with conflict outcomes, these are referred to as proximate 
causes or determinant factors. While others factors have indirect effects.  
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4.3.2.1 Determinants of resource-use conflicts in Mkata plains 
Table 31 shows key factors contributing to resource-use conflicts in the study area in Mkata 
plains. Contribution of different variables to likelihood of resource-use conflict was 
analysed using a logistic model. The model parameters predicted correctly at 92 2% and 
significantly at p < 0.05. The -2 Log Likelihood = 26.405 indicating a high fit between the 
model data. Whereas the Nagelkerke R square = 0.846 suggesting that the variables in the 
model accounts to about 84.6 % of the observed variation in the variables under study.  
 
The results show that the increasing herd size of individual pastoralists contributed 
significantly (P<0.05) on the likelihood of conflicts with farmers by a factor of 7.197. A 
plausible explanation of this is that when a household increase the number of livestock, 
demand for grazing land also increases. 
 
Table 31: Determinant factors of resources- use conflicts in Mkata plains 
 Variables in equation β S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(β) 
 Herd size 4.276 1.201 12.673 1 .000* 7.197
 Market integration .958 .541 3.133 1 .017* 2.607
 State intervention 1.465 1.187 1.522 1 .217 4.326
 Wealth differentiation .812 .532 2.330 1 .127    2.253
Local leadership strength -1.401 .762 3.379 1 .046* .246
Education level -1.215 .619 3.852 1 .050 .297
Migration -1.734 1.261 1.891 1  .169   .176
 
Constant 14.469 4.153 12.140 1 .000 .000
Model summary 
      - Overall percentage                   = 92.20% 
      - Model Chi – Square                  = 61.098 
      - 2 log likelihood                         = 26.405 
      -  Nagelkerke R squared              =   0.846 
     * = Significant at p < 0.05 level 
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In turn this necessitate high herd mobility which increase the likelihood to trespass into 
farmers villages and causing crop damages which leads to conflicts with farmers. On the 
other hand increase in the herd size is associated with decrease in herding efficiency, where 
herders fail to control sufficiently the animals. This has an implication on institutionalised 
Maasai culture, which prescribes herding duties to young boys and youth who might not be 
careful in controlling livestock grazing in farmers’ villages leading to crop damages. 
Moreover, trespass of livestock into a cultivated plot belonging to a fellow Maasai is 
prohibited by curse institution Olallili. But there is no similar institutional mechanism 
which applies to none Maasai. Baidelman (1960) reported disdainment of farmers’ by 
Maasai youth who in some instances were reported to deliberately graze on crops. Similar 
incidences were reported during this study. 
 
Increase in market integration can significantly (P<0.05) increase the likelihood of resource 
–use conflicts by a factor of 2.607. This can be explained by the observation that in 
responding to settled life and high land value the pastoralists in Mkata plains had mobilised 
to obtain formal lease holds to their village land as a measure of attaining tenure security. 
However, this measure has led into protracted boundary disputes with neighbouring farmers 
villages, who have customary claims to disputed areas. Furthermore, recent economic 
liberalisation policies implemented in the area have made possible for rich local Maasai to 
buy previously state owned sisal estates and ranches. This has triggered of resentments from 
farmers who were previous workers of these farms, now facing increasing land shortages. 
Furthermore, covert resentments were expressed by fellow pastoralists who used to graze on 
the recently privatized grazing areas. Furthermore, an increasing market for horticultural 
crops has led to a closure of wetland areas located in farmers’ villages, which were 
previously utilized as open access dry season grazing areas by the pastoralists. This has in 
turn led to increased competition for shrinking wetland areas and escalation in resource-use 
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conflicts. Furthermore, pastoralists in Mkata plains previously had free access to crop 
residues in farms after harvest. However, increasing commoditization in the area has led to 
commercialization of crop residues. Pastoralists are required to pay for grazing rights in 
order to graze on crop residues. However, there is no elaborated institutional mechanism to 
control access to crop farms by pastoralists. The lack of controlling institutions resulted into 
cheating on grazing-right agreements, which in most cases have led to crop damages and 
violent clashes between farmers’ and pastoralists. The Kilosa district local government has 
since imposed a ban on grazing rights transactions involving crop residues. 
 
Intervention by state government is positively related to resource- use conflicts, with a 
positive regression coefficient (β = 1.465) and a Wald ratio of 1.522. A plausible 
explanation for this is that government policies aimed at solving certain problems may 
generate other unintended negative externalities. A case in point in Mkata plains is that 
formal titling of pastoral villages, which was intended to providing security of tenure to 
pastoral villages, had led to protracted boundary disputes with neighbouring farmers’ 
villages and Mkata state ranch. On the other hand when the pastoral settlements in Mkata 
plains were designated no mechanism put in place to limit the number of animals that could 
be grazed in these villages. This has led to varying levels of overgrazing and changes in 
species composition forcing pastoralists to graze in farmers’ villages leading to conflicts 
with farmers. Bush and Opp (2000) assert that most interventions by state governments 
which lead to change in access to resources may lead to escalations in resource-use conflicts 
because in most cases the interventions are not community focused. This is best 
demonstrated by recent privatisation of state owned sisal estates and ranches in Mkata 
plains that did not take into consideration the serious land scarcity faced by both herders 
and smallholder farmers in the area. Increase in household wealth differentiation although is 
not significant (at p < 0.05) has a strong relationship to resource-use conflicts with a 
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positive regression coefficient (β = 0.8129) and a Wald ratio of 2.33. This implies that 
increasing household wealth differentiation is likely to increase resource-use conflicts in 
Mkata plains. This can be explained by recent appropriation by rich pastoralists, part of 
lands which have previously been shared by both pastoralists and farmers as common pool 
resources. Wealthier pastoralists at Twatwatwa village are also attempting to partition the 
village communal grazing, in an anticipation of obtaining a large share of land if this 
proposal gets community blessing. This measure has led to intra-ethnic discontents and is 
opposed by younger generation who fear to loose out to large herd owners if partitioning is 
carried out. Furthermore, most rich pastoralists own large herds of cattle that are more likely 
to trespassing into farms, but the blame of crop damage is shared collectively by all Maasai 
pastoralists. This is generating some resentments to rich herd owners by fellow pastoralists. 
 
Table 31 shows that strong local leadership contributes significantly (P<0.05) on the 
likelihood of reducing resource-use conflicts by a factor of 0.246. Attributes of strong local 
leadership include making binding decisions at a local level and minimum recourse to 
higher authorities. It has long been realized that local resource users have the ability to 
make decisions on how to govern local resources and mitigate resource-use conflicts 
(McKean and Ostrom 1995). It was observed in this study that effective conflict resolution 
committees were formed in agro-pastoral villages - Msowero and Mbwade – this was partly 
attributed to strong leadership. At Msowero village the village chairperson belong to a 
group of influential highly respected elders who are indigenous to the area with customary 
claim to the land, who has customary mandates to conduct traditional rituals in the area. 
Whereas in Mbwade village, which is dominated by immigrant ethnic groups and former 
plantations and ranch workers they have formed an effective conflict resolution committee. 
This comprises of respected farmers and traditional leaders from Maasai community. The 
committee is making decisions that are respected by both farmers and herders. 
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Increase in education level is strongly related to reduction in resource-use conflicts with a 
regression coefficient of β = - 1.215, and a Wald ratio of 3.852. This is attributable to a fact 
that by attending school, pastoral children get an opportunity to share culture with children 
from farmers’ ethnic groups and change the value systems. The pastoralists in Mkata plains 
to some extent operate an isolated economic system; therefore children raised under this 
system who miss an opportunity to attend school will tend to be ignorant about social values 
of other ethnic groups. As such the cognitive as well as normative structures of such 
children will be framed along the traditional system which does not accommodate other 
cultures, and inculcate a sense of ethnic superiority. They may also fail to develop a civic 
culture expected in a modern state, and respect to formal structures of governance. This may 
exacerbate tendencies of conflicts based on symbolism and cultural identities. Maiese 
(2003) observes that conflicts over identity arises wherever group members feel that their 
sense of self esteem have been denied legitimacy and respect. The author further asserts that 
identity conflicts tend to be aggressive and tend to persist. This observation is particularly 
pertinent to East African pastoral groups including Maasai who have institutionalized 
violence behaviour and armed warrior age-grades. It was observed during this study that 
pastoral children who are attending schools develop cordial relationship with children from 
other ethnic groups.  
 
Migration has a negative relationship to resource-use conflicts in Mkata plains, with a 
regression coefficient of β = - 1.734 and a Wald ration of 1.891. This suggests that 
increasing migration is likely to reduce resource use conflicts. This is based on the 
observation than large herd owners engage in long range out migration from the area. This 
practise tends to easy pressure on shrinking resources, as such minimising intra ethnic 
conflicts within pastoral communities. The practise is also likely to reduce the rates of crop 
damages by livestock in farmers’ villages, which in most cases involve large herd owners. 
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Furthermore, large herd owners tend to split their cattle herd and keep their livestock at 
different localities. According to Herlocker (1999), the pastoralists have for generations 
practised herd mobility and herd splitting as a measure against environmental risks as well 
as resource-use conflicts. The regression model results for two study sites show high 
significance level of some factors and high correlation coefficient levels for all factors, this 
suggests that the empirical data supports hypothesis 2 of this study. 
 
4.3.2.2 Management of resource-use conflict in Mkata plains 
The Kilosa district local government had enacted Kilosa by-law No. 1 of 2002, which 
provides for the establishment of conflict resolution committees (CRC) at village level. The 
committees are intended to provide fora through which the pastoralists and farmers can 
meet and resolve resource-use conflicts. The committees were formed in all study villages 
with exception of Mabwegere village, which had failed to form the committee with the 
neighbouring villages, which are involved in border disputes. 
 
During the Focused group discussions, pastoralists at Twatwatwa village rated the 
performance of the CRC high, and they informed that the committee has minimized the 
farmer-pastoralists resource-use conflicts. The pastoralists reported strained communication 
with the farmers, and they emphasised a need to amend the strained relationships. However, 
on part of farmers from Rudewa – Buyuni village (a site of December 2000 Killings), the 
conflict resolution committee was reported to progressively becoming defunct. The reason 
given was that the counterparts from the pastoral community were not attending the 
committee sittings. The farmers were of the opinion that the committee members from the 
pastoral community were reluctant to take action against the offenders from their pastoral 
community. The shortcomings can be attributed to difficulty of communication between 
committee members. This arises from the fact that  Twatwatwa is a very large village 
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spanning over 16 km with four sub villages dispersed all over the area, with no access 
roads. The village offices for the two villages are 30 km apart. For this reason it is difficulty 
for pastoralists to effectively contact their members. The efficiency of conflict resolution 
committee will be improved in the village if each sub-village form a committee with 
neighbouring framers’ village. 
 
In Msowero village a full functional committee was reported which comprises of both 
farmers and resident pastoralists. The committee has achieved the following: registration of 
the resident pastoralists in a village register, assigned Msowero - Godess area as a village 
communal grazing area, and advised the district authorities to stop re-locating more 
pastoralists to the village. In addition to the registration of the pastoralists, both Barbaig and 
Maasai were allocated farming plots and asked to select their representatives to the village 
“Conflict Resolution Committee”.  
 
The committee reviewed the sanctions contained in the “Kilosa District by-law No 1 of 
2002,” providing for the formation and functions of village conflict resolution committees. 
The conflict resolution committee at Msowero village has minimized resource use conflict 
by setting rules providing for the following: specific stock routes to access drinking water 
along Msowero river, specific areas where livestock can drink water, designate areas for dry 
season cultivation along Msowero river banks. These measures taken at local level have 
reduced resource - use conflicts, where the livestock in the past used to cause damages on 
dry - season crops grown along the river banks. Both livestock and crop production now 
peacefully co-exist on Msowero riverbanks (Figures, 39 and 40). The longstanding conflicts 
between pastoralists and farmers over crop damage in the village have since been resolved. 
Another full functioning conflict resolution committee has been formed in Mbwade, which 
is also an agro-pastoral village. A number of workers on social conflicts, for example 
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Figure 39: Irrigated dry season crops along Msowero river bank after resolving access 
conflicts between farmers and herders 
 
 
 
Figure 40: A pastoral herd at Msowero village using a stock route designated by 
village conflict resolution committee to access Msowero river   
  
275
Kumar (1998) asserts that resource-use conflicts occur when different categories of resource 
users have competing demands for shrinking resources, and may attach different values to 
the resource base. According to Kumar (1998) resource-use conflicts occur in settings that 
involve an array of culture, economic, and political arrangements that may influence 
outcomes of the conflict process. Therefore, resource-use conflicts tend to vary in 
dimension, level and intensity, and may. take place at different levels, from within the 
household to local, regional, societal scale (Anyling and Kelly, 1997). According to Hirsch 
et al., (1999) ethnicity may also influence the use of natural resources, bringing to the fore 
cultural and social dimensions of conflicts. Some observers arguest that conflicts are not 
always necessarily destructive or disruptive, and that they are inherent within any human 
relations, so that cannot be removed all together, but can only be managed (Weeks, 1992).  
 
Nevertheless, sustainable management of natural resources as well as sustainable 
livelihoods of communities who are dependent on natural resources could only be attained 
after resolving the inherent resource-use conflicts. In this context, the presence or absence 
of conflict mediating mechanisms or the social institutions for conflict resolution are the 
main determinant factors of the outcome of conflict process.  
 
4.3.3 Resource-use conflicts in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
4.3.3.1 Overview 
The Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) was established in 1959 as a multiple land use 
unit to provide for dual goals of natural resource conservation and development of its 
resident Maasai people. Establishment of the multiple land-use system was a compromise of 
prevailing conflicts between international conservationists lobby groups which favoured 
separating human from conservation area and social welfare activists who were in favour of 
social economic development of pastoralists. From its inception the relationship between 
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Maasai residents and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority has often been 
contentious. The Maasai pastoralists have since been subjected to policy changes that 
proven detrimental to their livelihoods as well as ecosystem sustainability. The 
unfavourable policy environment has invariably predisposed to intensification of conflicts 
between local Maasai and the conservation authority. 
 
4.3.3.2 Types of resource-use conflicts in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
The resource-use conflicts in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area are presented in Table 32. 
The main conflict involves cultivators and Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority which 
was mentioned by 62.6% of respondents.  
 
Table 32: Types of resource-use conflicts in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Number of respondents  
Conflict type Kakesio
(n=35)
Enduleni
(n= 84)
Irkeepus
(n= 81)
Naiyobi 
(n= 105) 
Total
(n= 305)
Cultivators vs 
conservation authority 
 
NA
 
78(92.9)
 
NA
 
103 (98.1) 
 
191(62.6)
Pastoralist vs 
conservation authority 
 
3(8.5)
 
NA
 
79(97.5)
 
NA 
 
82(26.9)
Pastoralists vs predator 
animals 
 
21(60.0)
 
20(23.8)
 
50(61.7)
 
NA 
 
91(29.8)
Cultivators vs wild game NA 17(20.2) NA 30(28.6) 47(15.4)
Entrepreneurs vs 
conservation authority 
 
NA
 
50(59.5)
 
NA
 
78(75.7) 
 
128(42.0)
Immigrants vs 
Conservation authority 
 
NA
 
23(27.3)
 
NA
 
54(5.1) 
 
77(25.2)
• The percentage in some columns exceeds 100 because of multiple answers 
Key:  - Numbers in parentheses are percentages 
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Most of these respondents were from midland villages - in Enduleni and Naiyobi – where 
extensive cultivation is being practised.  Another important resource-use conflict involves 
local entrepreneurs and the conservation authority; mentioned by 42.0% respondents mainly 
from Naiyobi and Enduleni villages. The two locations are local shopping centres, which 
have recently been undergoing rapid expansion. The conflict involves increasing 
construction of permanent houses. Construction of permanent structures by local Maasai is 
prohibited under NCAA regulations, as it is considered detrimental to landscape and likely 
to interfere with animal behaviour. Yet, it seems the regulations have not stopped the 
expansion of permanent structures. Moreover, this regulation appears controversial, because 
the regulation does not appear to apply to external investors who are expanding permanent 
structures around areas of high wildlife concentrations, for example tourist facilities 
established around the Ngorongoro crater rim.  
 
Other conflicts involve pastoralists and conservation authority which were mentioned by 
26.9% of respondents from Kakesio and Irkeepus. This type of conflict arises from different 
underlying causes, whereby conflict in Irkeepus is mainly due to loss of village grazing land 
in the neighbouring crater area and NHFR. The NCAA restricts access to dry season 
grazing in these areas. Complaints in Kakesio were based on a lack of reliable water sources 
in dry lowland plains. A colonial government when it evicted the pastoralists from Serengeti 
area, promised as a compensation reliable supply water source in the area. The promise had 
never fully met by both colonial and independent governments. Another conflict is between 
the pastoralists and predator animals which was mentioned by 29.8% respondents from 
three villages – Kakesio, Enduleni and Irkeepus.  These villages are located in areas with a 
high concentration of wild life, therefore facing a high risk of livestock predation by wild 
game. Cases of predation of cattle are in most cases followed by reprisal killings of 
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predators by morrans, compelling intervention by conservation authority to stop 
indiscriminate killings of wild game.  
 
A few respondents (15.4%) from Enduleni and Naiyobi villages – where extensive farming 
is undertaken - reported a growing conflict involving farmers and wild game over crop 
damages. As a measure to prevent crop damages farmers are reported to fence off their 
crops, scaring away wild game or spearing animals damaging their crops. The wildlife in 
this case is increasingly becoming pests, as cultivation intensifies. This development has 
serious implication on conservation of wildlife in Ngorongoro area, thus threatening co-
existence of agro-pastoralism and wild game. This is a challenge to a recently adopted 
approach to multiple land-use principle, whereby controlled cultivation has been allowed in 
NCA in order to improve the food security of Maasai pastoralists and minimizing resource – 
use conflicts in the area.  According to McCabe (2002) and Kijazi (1997) this measure have 
improved substantially the welfare of NCA Maasai and reduced resource - use conflicts. 
Where as studies by Galvin et al. (2002) and Runyoro et al. (2002) concludes that 
controlled agriculture has not so far negatively impacted wildlife in NCA. 
 
Another conflict involves immigrants and conservation authority, mentioned by 25.2% of 
respondents mainly from Enduleni and Naiyobi villages. The Conservation authority blames 
the immigrants for agriculture intensification in the area. Under NCAA regulations people 
entitled to reside in the area are those who were living in the area or moved into the area in 
1959 or before, people born in the area after 1959, or people who moved to “Ujamaa 
villages” established in the area during “Ujamaa village” operation of mid 1970s. However, 
this definition fails to acknowledge the mobile nature of pastoral production system and the 
social network of pastoral community residing in Ngorongoro area with neighbouring 
communities. Thus, the legal definition of a legitimate resident of NCA is misleading and it 
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may underestimate the actual population of Maasai with a customary claim to the area. 
Furthermore, the linking of immigrants on expanding agriculture is based on flawed 
assumption, which stereotype Maasai pastoralists as dependent on animal products (blood 
and milk) as their main staples. The Ngorongoro Maasai had been, for generations, 
combining farming in their household livelihoods. As such, expanding of agriculture in 
NCA is most likely related to increasing household food insecurity experienced by resident 
Maasai.  
 
From the study results, it is apparent that the main conflicts in the Ngorongoro area involve 
resource-users (local pastoralists) and regulators (NCAA). Conflicts among resource users 
are very rare, this being an indication of the effectiveness of local institutions in 
management of the local resources in the area. 
 
4.3.3.3 Causes of resource-use conflicts in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
The causes of resource-use conflicts in the NCA are presented in Table 33. During the 
Focused Group Discussions in Ngorongoro area causes of resource-use conflicts were 
identified as (1) transmission of animal disease by wildlife to livestock, (2) restriction on 
access to dry season grazing area, (3) restrictions on cultivation, (4) livestock predation and 
(5) crop damage by wildlife Livestock diseases transmission from wildlife was identified as 
major constraints on livestock production in all study villages in Ngorongoro area. 
Pastoralists consider a disease to be important if it causes considerable livestock loses or if 
there is no reliable cure for the disease, as well as diseases with potential for major 
outbreaks involving both livestock and wildlife. According to Machange (1997) the most 
important livestock diseases in NCA are tick borne diseases, Foot and Mouth Disease, 
rinderpest and Malignant Catarrh Fever. Different wildlife species serves as reservoirs for 
most of these diseases. 
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Table 33: Causes of resource-use conflicts in Ngorongoro Conservation Area  
Magnitude  of  resource-use conflict  
Cause of conflicts Kakesio 
 
Enduleni
 
Irkeepus
 
Naiyobi 
 
Total 
score 
Rank
Livestock disease 
transmission 
 
√√√√ 
 
√√√√ 
 
√√√ 
 
√√√ 
 
14 
 
1 
Restriction on agriculture √√ √√√ √√ √√√√ 11 2 
Restrictions to key 
resources 
 
√ 
 
√√√ 
 
√√√√ 
 
√√ 
 
10 
 
3 
Livestock predation √√√ √√ √√√ √ 9 4 
Crop damage by wild life NA √ NA NA 1 5 
Loss of human life NA NA NA NA 0 6 
Human injury NA NA NA NA 0 6 
 
Key: Scores, √√√√ - very high, √√√- high, √√- moderate, √- low  
 
Serious disease transmission occurs on the short grass plains, where increasing wildebeest 
population has increased the risks of malignant catarrh fever (a fatal disease in cattle), 
which is transmitted by wildebeest calves. In response to this problem pastoralits abandon 
the prime grazing lands for 3 to 6 months in order to avoid contact with calving wildebeests. 
In some areas the pastoralists have reacted by chasing wildebeest away from settlements, or 
constructing a thorny fence to prevent wildebeest from accessing areas for grazing 
livestock. All these measures are likely to lead to conflicts with NCAA. 
 
A second cause of conflicts in NCA, which was mentioned in all villages during Focused 
Group Discussion, is restrictions on agriculture. Traditionally, the Maasai of Ngorongoro 
area subsisted on animal products that were supplemented with grain and other vegetable 
products. As livestock numbers have declined the Maasai dependence on cultivation 
increased. Cultivation was prohibited between 1975 and 1991, but despite a ban illegal 
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cultivation persisted throughout the ban period (Perkin, 1993: Runyoro, 1994). This 
exacerbated land-use conflicts between local communities and NCAA. The ban was 
temporarily lifted in 1992 in order to improve the food security situation in the area. The 
current conservation policies limit the amount of area that can be cultivated. Thus, as the 
human population expands land-uses and resource-use conflicts intensify, the local Maasai 
sensing that their welfare and economic status were declining. The long-term studies, for 
example Galvin et al (1994), have established that a large proportion of NCA Maasai have 
been impoverished. 
 
Another cause of resource use conflicts mentioned in all study villages is the restrictions to 
key grazing resources. The rules that banned cultivation in NCA also contained restrictions 
on use of key resources (dry season grazing areas, water and salt lick) in the crater 
highlands and Northern Highland Forest Reserve. This period also was accompanied by 
eviction of some Maasai pastoralists from crater areas (Fosbrooke, 1990 in Neumann, 
1998). These land-use constraints had significant impact on livestock productivity and 
pastoralists livelihoods leading to impoverishment, yet there where limited options for them 
to cope. Galvin et al., (2002) arrived at a conclusion that the costs of conservation in NCA 
are partially borne by residents of the conservation area, and that there are needed some 
compensation for these costs. 
 
Maasai pastoralists have historically been in a peaceful co-existence with a diverse of 
wildlife. Only minimum human-wildlife conflict involving predator animals are known to 
exist, whereby attacks of cattle by predators elicits reprisal killing of trouble animals by 
warriors, thus leading into conflicts with conservation authority. Livestock predation was 
identified as a serious problem in Irkeepus and Kakesio villages. This is most probably due 
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to a fact that the two villages are located in close proximity to areas with a high 
concentration of predators in crater area and short plain grasslands respectively. 
 
The recent increase in cultivation in NCA has also generated potential sources for human-
wildlife conflicts over crop damages. The herbivores that in the past co-existed peacefully 
with grazing livestock are now increasingly becoming pests to cultivating Maasai. Crop 
damages by wildlife were reported as cause of conflict in Enduleni village. As a control 
measure the Maasai were reported to scaring away animals from their farms, fencing of 
cultivated areas or in extreme cases they were reported to spearing problem animals. All 
this measures are likely to increase conflicts with NCAA. 
 
The study results indicate that respondents do not consider human injuries and human life 
losses as important. An explanation for this is that the pastoralists had co-existed for 
millennia with wildlife. In turn they have evolved indigenous knowledge which enables 
them to sustainably share resource with wildlife. Furthermore, the Maasai generally have no 
significant consumptive use to wildlife. Discussions with Maasai youth reaffirmed this 
supposition; they argued that generally they do not take bush meat. This suggests 
persistence of local institutions that govern co-existence of Maasai pastoralists and wildlife. 
However, key informants reported occasional incidences of young warriors eating 
antelopes, and NCA Official informed a case of slaughtered giraffe at Irekeepus village. 
This has a significant implication to NCA policies, in that long term initiatives are needed 
that will ensure a thriving pastoral economy basing on a sustain human: livestock ratio. 
 
4.3.3.4 Determinant factors of resource-use conflicts in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
A logistic model was used to determine the relationship between resource – use conflicts 
and the socio – economic, demographic factors and perceived degradation of rangelands. 
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The logistic model results are shown in Table 34. The socio – economic and demographic 
factors analysed in this study include family size, wealth heterogeneity, diversification to 
cultivation, livestock ownership, market integration, conservation policies and strength of 
traditional leadership. The perceived range degradation was used as a proxy to 
environmental factors. Results in Table 34 show that the model has predicted correctly the 
cases at 91.8% and statistically significant at p <0.05. The Nagelkerke R square is 0.803, 
indicating that 80.3 % of the observed variation in resource-use conflicts is explained by 
independent variables in the model. The high -2 Log Likelihood (= 27.11) indicates that 
there is a high fit between the model and the data. Out of seven factors that have been 
analysed three factors have positive relationship to resource - use conflicts relationship and 
remain four factors have negative effect. The factors contributing significantly to 
intensification of resource-use conflicts include increase in household wealth differentiation 
and conservation policies.  Whereas, factors that are likely to minimize conflicts. are 
increase in number of households owning livestock, increase in perceived degradation of 
rangelands, presence of strong local leadership and increase in family size..  
 
The results show that increase in household wealth heterogeneity significantly (P<0.05) 
increase the likelihood of resource use conflicts by a factor of 5.87.  This can be explained 
by a fact that much wealthier households are likely to diversify into others economic 
activities.  This is likely to lead into conflicts with the conservation authority, which 
restricts expansion of economic activities by Maasai pastoralists. Conservationists assume 
that by diversifying the economic activities, Maasai pastoralists are likely to cause habitat 
destruction and subsequent loss of wildlife. The wealthier households in Ngorongoro area 
are diversifying their economic activities to shopping activities, restaurant business and 
cattle trading. 
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Table 34: Determinant factors of source-use conflicts in Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area 
 Variable β S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(β)
 Conservation 
policies 
3.631 1.254 8.382 1 .004* 37.749
  Wealth 
heterogeneity 
1.770 .546 10.495 1 .001* 5.870
  Diversification to 
farming 
1.384 .890 2.416 1 .120 3.990
  Livestock 
ownership 
-1.448 .611 5.612 1 .018* .235
   Perceived range 
degradation 
-3.682 1.424 6.683 1 .010* .025
  Strength of local 
leadership 
-3.145 .934 11.342 1 .001* .043
  Family size -1.463 1.038 1.988 1 .159 .232
  Constant -8.748 5.719 2.340 1 .126 .000
      
       Model Summary 
- Overall percentage                     = 91.8 
- Model Chi- Square                     = 76. 581 
- - 2 Log Likelihood                     = 27.111 
- Nagelkerke R square                  =  0.803 
 
 * = Significant at p< 0. 05 level 
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These economic activities have led to expansion of local marketing centres and increase of 
permanent houses built by local Maasai (Runyoro, 2000, Runyoro et al., 2002). Increase in 
permanent structures by local community members is believed to be detrimental to 
landscape as well as wildlife habitats, and is prohibited by NCAA rules. This has in turn led 
to escalation of conflicts between local entrepreneurs and conservation authorities. For 
example, Lissu (2000) reported an attempt by the conservation authority to evict traders 
from Kimba settlement.  
 
However, Runyoro (personal communication.) commented on legal complications of 
carrying out evictions in Ngorongoro area, arising from astronomical compensation costs 
demanded by would be evacuees. Furthermore, the wealthier local entrepreneurs engaging 
in cattle trading were reported to keeping large herds of cattle on communal grazing lands 
causing competition for resources and resentments by small herd owners. This increases the 
likelihood of resource-use conflicts among local pastoral communities. 
 
The NCA conservation policies significantly (P<0.05) increases the likelihood of resource-
use conflicts by a factor of 37.749.  This is related to restrictive NCAA policies and 
regulations introduced as from 1975, which banned cultivation and restricted access to 
grazing in crater area and forest reserves. Implementation of these policies severely affected 
livelihood of the pastoralists. As a coping strategy they engaged in illegal cultivation as well 
as illegal grazing in restricted areas. These practices in turn led to clashes with NCA 
wardens as well as growing tensions and mistrust between local communities and the 
conservation authorities. At times, there are threats for full scale clashes between NCA 
wardens and Maasai warriors. 
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Adaptation of farming by pastoralists has a strong positive relationship with resource-use 
conflicts with a regression coefficient of β = 1.384 and Wald ratio of 2.416. This explains a 
protracted conflict between Maasai pastoralist and NCAA over cultivation, banned by a 
legislature in the entire area of NCA starting from 1975 to 1992. During this period 
pastoralists, also experienced a progressive decline in herd productivity, range productivity 
as well as a decline on per capita herd ownership. For these reasons they resorted to illegal 
cultivation leading to escalation of conflicts with conservation authority.  
 
The root cause of conflicts could be traced to flawed assumption when formulating the 
multiple land use system, which idealised a pastoral economic system in the area that was 
hinged on cattle economy, and with animal products forming the main staple. The reality is 
that the pastoralists of Ngorongoro, similar to other pastoral groups in East Africa, are 
experiencing socio-economic changes. These changes are manifesting as changing life 
styles, feeding habits and increasing demand of consumptive goods. Therefore, there are 
needed appropriate management models that could sustain co-existence of pastoralism and 
conservation activities. The government had lifted the ban on agriculture as from 1992. 
However, the ban was emphasised by the board of directors of the Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area, against the advise of a technical advisory committee (Perkin, 1995), 
demonstrating a conflict of interests between conservationist orientation and the reality on 
the ground. 
 
The results further shows that increase in number of households owning cattle significantly 
(P<0.05) reduces the likelihood of resource use conflicts by a factors of 0.235. A plausible 
explanation for this is that as numbers of households owning cattle increase it also raise the 
livestock: human ratio. This has an implication on improved household food security, in 
particular improved supply of animal products that constitute the main staple food for 
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pastoralists. On the other hand increase in animal products, reduces a need to expand 
agricultural production as a means for supplementing household food requirements. 
Reduced agricultural expansion contributes to minimizing the likelihood of conflicts with 
conservation authorities. Increased perception of deterioration condition of grazing land, 
also significantly (P< 0.05) reduces the likelihood of resource use conflicts by a factor of 
0.025. This can be explained by a fact that NCAA has put in place a mechanism of benefit 
sharing; which includes issuing grazing permits into restricted areas during the dry season.   
 
During this study the conservation authorities reported a high conformance to permit 
requirements.  This has in turn improved the relationship between NCAA and local Maasai 
population.  It has also been observed that the administration is more positive to local 
Maasai.  For example during this study it was observed that, while officially the permanent 
habitation in the crater area was banned in 1975, yet permanent; encampment has been 
allowed just on a nearby crater rim.  Pastoralists from these encampments have easy access 
to water and salt lick in crater areas. Moreover, a high concentration of livestock was 
observed on encampments located on the crater rim, suggesting that pastoralists residing in 
distant villages could have moved part of their livestock to the crater rim where they have 
easy access to water. This indicates increasing insights and tolerance of traditional pastoral 
production system by conservation officials. Furthermore, it was revealed by senior NCCA 
officials that in case of severe draughts the pastoralists shall receive a first priority in 
accessing the resources. 
 
The results further show that strong traditional leadership can significantly (P<0.05) reduce 
the likelihood of resource – use conflicts by a factor of 0.043.  The traditional leaders in 
Maasai society play a role in resource management and resolving resource-use conflicts.  In 
this study, traditional leaders were reported to play a key role in resolving conflicts between 
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local communities and the NCA authorities. A strong traditional leader is defined as the one 
who adhere to a tradition, non-corruptible and impartial.  These qualities enhance the 
legitimacy of a leadership before the eyes of the community, hence high level of conformity 
to rulings made by the leaders. 
 
Family size has a strong negative relationship with resource - use conflicts, with a negative 
regression coefficient (β = - 1.463) and a Wald ratio of 1.988. Although the relationship is 
not significant (at p < 0.05), the results suggest that an increase in family size lead to 
reduction of resource - use conflicts in Ngorongoro area. A possible explanation for this is 
that because the pastoral economy in Ngorongoro area is under stress, therefore the main 
production strategy adopted by individual households aims at meeting household 
subsistence requirements. There is an institutionalised mechanism, which ensure a delicate 
balance between shrinking resources and increasing human population. This involves some 
family members migrating out when the family size increase. At present this is effected 
through urban migration by youth, where they engage in wage labour. In this way 
competition for resources is minimised.  
 
Some families in NCA are reportedly being supported through remittances by members 
with paid job in urban areas. Furthermore, the Ngorongoro Division Executive Officer 
reported a drop in inter-ethnic cattle rustling around Kakesio area, because most of the 
youths who have migrated to urban areas were able to buy cattle and start their own herds. 
The regression model results show that socio-economic factors, policies and perceived 
rangeland degradation significantly affect resource-use conflicts. This suggests that the 
empirical data support hypothesis 2 in this study. 
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4.3.3.5  Mechanisms for resolving resource-use conflicts in Ngorongoro conservation 
Area 
The NCA administration is increasingly promoting co-operation with local communities. 
This is mainly effected through informal contacts, and by conferring increasing recognition 
to traditional leaders. There is an unofficial commitment that under severe resource scarcity 
then, local pastoralists and their livestock shall be given a priority to access to limiting 
resources (water and pastures). Such a state of affairs has improved relationship.  In 
addition, to a controlled access to resources, the NCAA operates a food security program, 
under which during drought periods the pastoralists are supplied with grain at subsidized 
price. The NCAA administration has long recognized the traditional leadership. There is 
now extensive informal co-operation and cordial relationship between the traditional 
leadership and the NCA Chief Conservator. The relationship is marked by designating the 
“Chief Conservator” a rank of Maasai traditional leader Ole Laigwanani and it was reported 
that the Chief Conservator attend some council of elders meetings ekingwana.  
 
During this study it was learnt that, when introducing the NCAA leadership to visiting 
dignitaries the “Maasai” traditional leader is accorded a status next to the District 
Commissioner (the representative of central government in the district). Notwithstanding, 
such cordial relationship, there is no sufficient legal instruments linking the local 
communities to decision making process in the Ngorongoro Conservation area. Yet, the new 
found grounds may serve in future, as basis for aligning the local level institutions, the 
NCAA, national level as well as international conservation institutions. 
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4.4 Institutional Innovations in Mkata plains and Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
4.4.1 Mkata plains 
A number of institutional innovations have been identified in Mkata plains, whereby the 
main trend has been to scale up local institutions. Scaling up is defined as sustaining 
institutions both in time and space. This was achieved through extending institutional 
jurisdiction in space to cover more areas as well as increasing the number of participants in 
shared management of common grazing lands. This is particularly important under pastoral 
production system, characterised by high variability in distribution of key resources both in 
space and time. Olson (1965) when discussing on the effects of group size in collective 
action, referred to such tendency as creating critical mass for collective action. Another 
approach for the institutional scaling up was linking local level institutions to high level 
institutions at regional, national and international levels. The institutional innovations were 
both endogenous and exogenous and occurred in both pastoral as well as agro-pastoral 
villages.  
 
The pastoralists have now settled in their designated villages where they are leading more or 
less sedentary life (Figure 41). The institutional innovations observed among the Maasai 
community in Mkata plains include (1) scaling up of the Olo Laibon and Ole Laigwanani 
institutions, (2) integration of both formal and informal local institutions, (3) forming 
formal organisations (4) incursion of foreign religions and  (5) enhancement of gender 
equality. These innovations aims at enabling the pastoralists to cope with settled life in the 
pre-dominantly agricultural areas with high market pressure (Figures 42). At the same time 
they strive to maintain their Maasai cultural identity, by retaining the overall Maasai 
hierachical tribal organization, which is hinged on spiritual leaders Olo Laibon and age-set 
spokesmen Ole Laigwanani.  
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An important institutional innovation in Mkata plains is expanding the influence of magico 
– religious institution. Whereby, the Olo Laibon residing at Kiduhi village in Mkata plains, 
is increasingly assuming the role of overall spokesperson for all Maasai under his 
jurisdiction extending in Morogoro, Iringa, and Mbeya regions. He is particular playing a 
key role in negotiations at different levels of the central government. Furthermore, the Olo 
Laibon is involved in administrative functions, particularly in conflict resolution. This is 
different to roles played by the Olo Laibon under traditional Maasai settings in NCA, where 
his roles are basically ritual leader and private practitioner of traditional medicine.  
 
Furthermore, under traditional settings the tribal leaders are attached to their ancestral lands 
the oloshon. Whereby, each locality forms a distinct administrative unit, with a council of 
elders and a tribal spokesman. In case of pastoral villages in Mkata plains, the social 
organization involves a combination of both formal village government and traditional 
leadership. All pastoral villages have full functional village governments, which more or 
less are subordinated to traditional leadership. This was achieved through electing to post of 
village chairman one of the influential local elite. The village executive officer post is in 
most cases taken by non-Maasai or younger literate Maasai, whose main duties are limited 
to handling directives from local government. The local elites make important decisions 
based on traditional Maasai system.  
 
However, there are checks and balances, to the seemingly local elite’s hegemony. This is 
through a council of elders, which is chaired by the overall tribal age-sets spokesman. 
Village members my seek recourse on decisions made by local leaders at this council. 
Another institutional innovation occurring in Mkata plains is the tendency to centralise the 
authority in the institution of overall tribal Ole Laigwanani. This is in apposition to 
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idealised Maasai society where the tendency has been to decentralise the authority to local 
level units as accounted for in Spencer (1993).  
 
 
Figure 41: Masaai permanent settlement at Twatwatwa village in Mkata plains 
 
 
Figure 42: A bi-monthly market at Twatwatwa village in Mkata plains 
 
  
293
The Ole Laigwanani in Mkata plains is not based on traditional locality, as is the case in 
Maasai land, instead there is an overall spokesman who represents all Maasai community in 
all districts of Morogoro region. This is an institutional innovation aimed at scaling-up the 
local institutions to much larger geographical area. The authority of the overall spokesman 
is also recognised in other regions including Coast region, Arusha, Dodoma, Mbeya and 
Iringa. The current Maasai overall spokesman, in Morogoro Ole Laigwanani “Isirika 
Kiprotu” resides at Mikese, Morogoro Urban District. The decisions of the tribal spokesman 
are binding to all Maasai in Tanzania.  
 
Among other things, the Ole Laigwanani has been instrumental in mobilizing the local 
communities for self-help projects: schools and water development projects in Mkata plains 
in particular and other areas in Morogoro region where Maasai are settled. Although the 
overall Ole Laigwanani is not directly responsible with the management of local resources 
in Mkata plains, but he provides a framework for community mobilisation as well as 
decision making in the community. This is attained through chairing important council of 
elders meetings, where community members may seek recourse to actions of local elites. It 
was reported at Twatwatwa village that the Ole Laigwanani played a key role that led to 
change of formal village government. This, ascertain a contention on the superiority of 
traditional governance system over formal village government.  
 
The recent exogenous institutional innovations occurring in Mkata include forming formal 
community-based organisations (CBOs) as well as registered associations. Pastoralists at 
Mbwade village have formed and registered an association “Madoto Pastoralists Primary 
Association”, which’s main objective is to improve pastoral production in the village. While 
at Twatwatwa the pastoralists were finalising procedures to register a CBO “Parakuyo 
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Pastoral Community-Based Organisation”, which’s main aims, are economic development 
and environmental protection.  
 
Formation of these legal entities arose from high interaction of Mkata Maasai with external 
agencies as well as government officials. The formal organisations are intended at providing 
a mechanism for obtaining donor money as well as benefiting from local government 
creding schemes. For instance Twatwatwa village has recently commissioned a TSh100 
millions water supply project through a grant from the World Bank. Other institutional 
innovations in Mkata plains are increased incursion of foreign religion and schooling. 
 
Table 35 present respondents religious faith in Mkata plains. The data on religious 
afflictions in Mkata indicates that the Moslems are the majority (37.5%), followed by 
Traditionalists (28.5 %) and the Roman Catholics (19.1%) and the Lutherans (10.5 %). 
These results combine religious affiliations of both the Maasai and other ethnic groups 
settled in Mkata plains. Despite of the fact that traditional religion is predominant in the 
Maasai community, the study results indicate that religious faith is increasingly penetrating 
in the pastoral communities, which is attracting mostly the youth (Figures 43 and 44 ).  
 
Table 35: Respondents religious affiliation in Mkata plains 
Number of respondents Religion 
Frequency Percentage
Roman Catholic 51 19.2
Moslem 100 37.7
Lutheran 28 10.5
Traditional Religion 76 28.7
Assemblies of God 10 3.7
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Nonetheless, the introduction of other religious faiths does not appear to have eroded most 
of the cultural codes of conduct. At most the new faiths appear to co-exist with traditional 
practices.  
 
To support this contention is an observation made during this study, whereby a council of 
elders meeting “ekingwana” convened at Tindiga/ Luhoza in Mkata ranch area, was 
preceded by a prayer led by a young catechist of a Lutheran Church. The meeting was 
convened on Olo Laibon directives; to discussing a fait of pastoralists Maasai residing in the 
ranch area which was offered for sub-leasing.  
 
The outcomes from the meeting were a decision by local pastoralists to organise themselves 
to buy the ranch block on offer. They formed a formal pastoral association, mobilised funds 
for the purpose of paying for leasehold fee and lobbied successfully through Kilosa District 
Commissioner, Morogoro Regional Commissioner and Minister of Water and Livestock 
Development- who facilitated them to obtain a lease hold for a 4 000 ha grazing block. This 
demonstrates how local institutions could link with formal institutions in organising for 
collective management of common pool resources. Another, landmark of penetration of 
foreign religion in Maasai community was the inauguration of a new Anglican church at 
Twatwatwa village which took place during the study period, and officiated by Anglican 
church representative from the United States of America. 
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Figure 43: A Maasai temporary Baptist church at Madoto ranch in Mwade village 
 
 
 
Figure 44: A new Anglican church at Twatwatwa village in Mkata Plains donated by 
the World Confederation for Anglican Church 
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4.4.2 Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Scaling up of the local leadership institutions has been observed in the Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area. The trend in social organisation among the Ngorongoro Maasai is 
centralizing the traditional authority in an overall tribal spokesman, for the entire Kisongo 
section. The unified traditional leadership has served to improve the bargaining power as 
well as political force of Ngorongoro Maasai, in competition for resources with a more 
powerful NCAA.  
 
The current tribal spokesman for Kisongo Maasai section “Ole Laigwanani Ile Lunguna” 
resides at Irkepuus village in Ngorongoro Conservation Area. His jurisdiction extends 
beyond NCA boundaries to Kisongo Maasai residing in Loliondo Game Controlled Area. 
Such scaling up of the local authority has proved to be effective in advocating for the 
Ngorongoro Maasai rights. Through their local structures, the NCA Maasai had lobbied 
successfully at higher political leadership leading to lifting up of the ban on cultivation by 
the President of United Republic of Tanzania. This demonstrated the organisational capacity 
of local institutions, whenever local formal institutions are weakened by central government 
policies, as is the case in Ngorongoro Conservation Area. 
 
Another institutional innovation in Ngorongoro area is increasing number of local NGOs 
advocating for social development and human rights. However, most of the NGOs are 
meeting with resistance from NCAA. Only two NGOs until now are operating in the area. 
These are NGOPADEO (Ngorongoro Pastoralist Development Organisation), which is 
centred at Enduleni area and PINGO (Pastoral Indigenous Non - governmental 
Organisations) an umbrella NGO which has wider coverage in Maasai pastoral areas. The 
incentives to forming these NGOs are basically a condition of obtaining donor money as 
well as advocating for rights of indigenous Maasai of Ngorongoro. Initially the local 
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communities were reluctant to be represented by these alien structures in stead they prefer 
to be represented by their traditional leaders. However, the two systems are now building 
bridges, for instance in a workshop organised by an NGO (PINGO) - in March, 2006 at 
Loliondo - the Maasai elders from Ngorongoro area denounced the NCAA Board of 
Directors calling for its resolution. It is important to note that the newly established NGOs 
can only win legitimacy before the communities if they work through traditional 
management systems. Furthermore, the NGOs are attracting followers from young 
generations. Therefore it can be asserted that should anticipate mounting advocacies for 
indigenous people rights in Ngorongoro area. 
 
Table 36 show religious affliations in Ngorongoro area. The main dominion in NCA is the 
Roman Catholic accounting for 52.9 % of respondents, followed by traditional religion 
comprising 38.0 % and the Moslems accounting for 6.1 percent of respondents. During the 
in-depth interviews it was learnt that some religious faith contradicts with the traditional-
religious practises, on which most of the local institutions are based. Nonetheless, the new 
faith has not led into erosion of cultural code of conduct amongst the Maasai communities. 
Yet the new faiths are bringing about some changes on the traditional value system. 
 
Table 36: Respondents religious affiliation in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Number of respondents Religion 
Frequency Percentage
Roman Catholic 156 58.1
Moslem 18 6.1
Lutheran 5 1.7
Traditional Religion 112 38.1
Assemblies of God 3 1.0
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For instance discussions with youth who have attended some schooling disclosed that, 
whereas they are adherent to traditional practices but they consider the Olo Laibon as a 
private practitioner without any important role to play in community administration. This 
tendence is counterbalanced by the social institutions vesting more administrative and 
decision making powers in the overall age-set spokesman the Ole Laigwanani. During the 
in-depth interviews it was learnt that some religious faith contradicts with the traditional-
religious practises, on which most the local institutions are based. Nonetheless, the new 
faith has not led into erosion of cultural code of conduct amongst the Maasai communities 
in which the traditional practises seem to coexist with modern practises. 
 
4.5  Proposed institutional framework for the management of communal pastoral 
resources and resolving resource-use conflicts 
Today the pastoralists in Tanzania are subject to economic, policy and social changes. 
These reforms are envisioned in the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (URT, 1995) and 
the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (URT, 1997c). The two guiding 
vision aims at accelerated economic growth, reducing poverty and improving living 
standards. In order to realize the long term objectives, it has necessitated policy reforms in 
all sectors of the economy including the pastoral sector.  
 
Policies changes that directly impact on pastoral systems were initiated in the Agriculture 
and Livestock Policy of 1997 (MAC, 1997), which redefined roles of public sector in 
particular the divestiture of the state and promotion of private sector in delivery of public 
services in agriculture and livestock sector. Yet, further reforms in the economy had 
necessitated reformulation of a new policy - the National Livestock Policy of 2006 (draft) 
(MLD, 2006). The draft livestock policy aims at commercializing the livestock industry in 
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order to increase income, improve food security to all stakeholders including pastoralists 
and environment conservation.  
 
The Implications of these policy reforms on pastoral production system entails fundamental 
changes on pastoral strategies so that the system will match with current development in 
trade liberalization, privatization and divestiture of state enterprise as well as enhancement 
of the private sectors (MLD, 2006). As a measure to implement the policy a process to enact 
a law for control usage and management of rangeland has been initiated. During the time of 
this study the proposed Range Control and Management Act was at a draft stage. In order to 
ensure secure tenure security of rangeland the draft Act proposes establishment, registration 
and gazettement of range development areas.  
 
An apex body – the National Rangelands Management Council (NRMC) –has been 
proposed to enforce the proposed Act.  The council will draw members from all sectoral-
ministries involved with the management of land resources as well as associations 
representing main users of rangelands. Such arrangement will allow for coordination of 
activities with other sectors which my have overlapping mandates in the rangelands. The 
main functions of the council shall be advisory on policy issues, regulatory, co-ordination, 
registration of rangeland development areas and registering associations utilizing the 
rangelands.   
 
The NRMC will function through proposed District Range Management Coordinating 
Committees (DRMCC) comprising of district functional officers of departments involved 
with development of land resources and representatives from associations of main 
rangeland users in respective districts.  The proposed activities DRMCC are: registration of 
range development areas, monitoring and regulation use of rangelands as well as conflict 
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resolution.  The DRMCC will be guided by local authority by-laws and regulations for 
management of rangelands to be enabled by the proposed rangeland Act.  
 
A post of an Authorized Officer is proposed, who will serve as a secretary to DRMCC and a 
principal agency for enforcing the Act at district level.  Duties of Authorized Officer 
include: monitoring of range condition, enforcing range management regulations, enforcing 
the carrying capacity in rangeland management areas, issuing permits to grazing in reserve 
rangeland management areas. Other function is to serve as agency in registration of range 
development areas, private ranches, group ranches, cooperative ranches and pastoral 
associations. Two categories of range development areas are being proposed: Village Range 
Development Areas and Reserve Range Management Areas.  Whereby, the village range 
development areas will be established on village land and the reserve range management 
areas to be established on general lands. 
 
A Village Range Management Committee (VRMC) is proposed for day to day management 
of Village Rangeland Development Area, under the directives of DRMCC. Procedure for 
establishment of village range development area will be initiated by an Authorized Officer 
who will contact the village council to designate a village rangeland development area. The 
village council upon approval by village assembly shall declare the proposed area and a 
Village Range Management Committee shall be formed to manage the VRDA. The Chief 
Executive Officer of Local Authority having jurisdiction in the area shall be notified of 
proposed VRMA, and will record it in the Register of Village Range Development Areas. 
Management rules for VRDMA will be established by village by-laws provided by the 
Local Government (District Authorities) Act, of 1982. 
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The proposed Reserve Range Management Areas will be established in general lands by 
district Range Management Coordinating Committees, and shall be designated by order 
established in the Gazette, stipulated on the Land Act No.4, of 1999. Grazing in the 
Reserved Range Management Areas will be by a permit and shall involve payment of 
grazing fee charged for not more than 6 months grazing period.   
 
The proposed Rangelands Management Act will provide a mechanism to establishing 
secure tenureship to rangeland, particularly in pastoral areas.  However, the proposed 
mechanism is a top-down approach and concentrates a lot of powers in central government 
bureaucrats at a district level. Thus, there are minimum roles devolved to local communities 
and no any provision for integrating pastoralists’ indigenous technical knowledge. This is 
contrary to the livestock policy statement emphasizing community participation and 
indigenous knowledge.   
 
Moreover, implementation of proposed Act is likely to generate conflicts, especially in 
villages shared by indigenous farmers and immigrant pastoralists. In this case village 
communal lands are considered as land reserves by farmers, and have statutory status under 
village land Act No. 5 of 1999. Moreover, given the vast areas of rangelands, effective 
enforcement range management regulations could best be achieved by integrating existing 
local institutions in the management of range resources as well as integrating existing local 
mechanisms for conflict resolutions. 
 
Furthermore, the propose Act does not provide any mechanism for enhancing 
entrepreneurial livestock management skills amongst pastoralists, through encouraging 
large herd owners to establish individual medium scale ranches. There is a mention of 
  
303
registration of group ranches, cooperative ranches and pastoral association but the proposed 
act is silent on how these apparently large livestock holdings will acquire land. 
 
In order to address some of these shortcomings an institutional framework for sustainable 
management of communal rangeland and improved livelihoods is proposed (Annex, 17).  
The proposed alternative institutional framework is based on a livestock policy (draft) 
(MLD, 2006) and proposed Range Control and Management Act, and integrates a 
mechanism for involving local communities and existing local institutions in management 
and decision making process. The main emphasis is on local participation and cross-
linkages with other stakeholders who are involved in the management of rangelands at 
local, district, regional and national levels. Such arrangement will contribute in obtaining 
the political support and scaling-up local level concern for the management of village 
communal rangelands. This will lead to empowering of local communities for sustainable 
management of rangeland resources.  
 
The implication of proposed framework on pastoralist production systems is that by 
attaining security of tenure to specific areas, the nomadic pastoral movements shall be 
curtailed and pastoralists will have a duty for management their designated areas. Therefore, 
both short and long-term interventions will be needed in order to sustain the environment 
health in these areas.  
 
The interventions should include appropriate technological packages for increasing 
productivity of both rangelands and livestock. There also needed to establish efficient 
markets, sufficient infrastructures and building schools in pastoral areas. Schooling shall 
play a crucial role in changing attitudes and value system which are key factors in 
  
304
transformation of pastoral production systems. The main outcomes of the alternative 
institutional framework are sustainable rangeland resources and pastoral livelihoods. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusions  
5.1.1 Land cover  changes 
The study indicates that high grazing intensities in the study areas have caused loss of 
grasslands. In Mkata plains the changes involve conversion of grassland into woodland 
cover type. Where as, palatable grass species such as Themeda spp in Ngorongoro 
highlands are being replaced by a least palatable grass species like Eleusine jaegaris, while 
the midland areas are being invaded by bush dominated by Accacia spp. 
 
5.1.2 Land - use changes 
Pastoralists in the study areas have settled in permanent villages and some of them have 
started cultivating, thus shifting the pastoral system towards agro-pastoralism. However, 
expansion of agriculture production in Mkata plains has reduced common grazing lands 
previously available to pastoralists and limiting livestock mobility.  
 
Whereas the restrictive conservation policies in NCA and increasing risks of disease 
transmission from wildlife has disrupted the traditional pastoral herd mobility: causing high 
grazing intensities in highland areas. This has led to range degradation, and a decline of per 
capita livestock number, thus threatening household food security. In order to cope the 
pastoralists have started to cultivate in order to improve household food security. A shift to 
agro-pastoralism is threatening a breakdown of compatibility between pastoralism and 
wildlife conservation, leading to escalation in resource-use conflicts in the study area. 
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5.1.3 Resource tenure changes 
Both Mkata plains and Ngorongoro area are characterized by a multiplicity of land tenure 
systems, which is a legacy of their historical integration into international market. Mkata 
plains were centre of colonial plantation economy, which led to expropriation of customary 
lands and conversion to private freehold property. The sub-sequent post-independence land 
policies led to increased expropriation of more customary lands. Nationalization policies of 
1970s transferred ownership of private sisal estates to a parastatal organization (Tanzania 
Sisal Authority). More customary lands were expropriated following establishment of 
Mkata state ranch and pastoralists’ settlements in the area. The liberalisation policies of 
1980s transferred the nationalised sisal estates to a private company (KATANI Ltd) and 
private investors. Thus, land tenure changes in the area did not take into consideration the 
redistribution of lands to customary owners.  
 
Ngorongoro area has been a centre of tourism. The establishment of NCA in 1959 as a 
multiple land -use system has created dualism and some times conflicting land tenure 
systems in the area. Between 1959 and 1974 the area was managed as a multiple land-use 
system, whereby local Maasai had access to resources all over the area. However, as from 
1975 the area has been managed as a buffer zone to core protected areas with access 
restrictions imposed on core protected areas and a ban on cultivation. Enforcement of these 
restrictions had led to escalation of resource-use conflicts. Controlled cultivation was 
allowed in some areas as from 1992 as a measure to improve food security. 
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5.1.4 Roles and strength of local institutions in the management of common grazing 
lands 
The evidence from this study indicates that the informal local institutions have persisted in 
the two study areas, whereby on their own or in combination with formal institutions are 
playing key role in the management of common grazing lands and as sources of customary 
land tenure security. In Mkata plains the local elites influence most decisions made by 
formal village governments with regards to allocation of grazing areas. In pastoral villages 
there is a parallel customary leadership system, whereby important decisions regarding 
management of communal grazing lands are made by a council of elders (Ekingwana) 
chaired by a customary leader (Ole Laigwanani). 
 
In Ngorongoro area the, de facto, ownership and management of land at local level is vested 
in the local institutions, which are organised on basis of territories (Enkutoto) and age-set 
systems. Each neighbourhood has a council of elders (ekingwani) and age-set spokesmen 
(Ole Laigwanani). The enkutoto federates into a larger territorial section the (oloshoni). An 
individual has primary access to resources in his neighbourhood the (enkutoto). Recently 
there has been increased collaboration between customary leadership and the NCA official 
in mobilisation of local communities and resolving conflicts. 
 
The study further establishes that the local institutions in the study areas are strong with 
cooperative index score of 1.95 (+ 0.85) and 3.52 (+0.52) in Mkata plains and Ngorongoro 
area, respectively. The factors likely to enhance strength of local institutions in Mkata 
plains include high commercialisation level and strong local leadership, while factor likely 
to undermine the local institutions is household wealth differentiation. The factors likely to 
enhance the local institutions in Ngorongoro area include perception of range deterioration, 
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ownership of livestock and autonomy to make own decisions; while factors undermining the 
local institutions are household wealth differentiation and increasing family size. 
 
5.1.5 Resource - use conflicts and local mechanisms for conflict resolution 
The study indicates that resource-use conflicts in Mkata plains involve farmers and Maasai 
pastoralists over crop damages by livestock, competitions for wetlands and village boundary 
disputes. Farmers’ have customary claims to land while pastoralists have formal title deeds 
to disputed areas. The main determinant of resource-use conflict is increasing 
commercialisation in the area. The growing informal land market in the area has led to 
intensification of competition for land resources, closure of wetlands and commoditisation 
of crop residues in farmers’ villages, which the pastoralists previously had free access. A 
local mechanism employed to resolve resource-use conflicts is establishment of “conflict 
resolution committees” between farmers and herders. These were successful in agro-
pastoral villages, but have yet to form between pastoralists and farmers villages. Conflict 
resolution committees are a mix of local and formal institutions. 
 
Resource-use conflicts in Ngorongoro area involve the local Maasai and Ngorongoro 
Conservation Authority over expanding cultivation. The decline of per capita livestock 
number in pastoral prompted the Maasai pastoralist to start cultivation in order to improve 
their household food security. Expanding cultivation is threatening the coexistence between 
pastoralism and wildlife conservation. A local mechanism employed to resolve the conflicts 
in include a benefit sharing schemes in the form of annual disbursement of USD 500,000 (= 
TSh 500 million) by NCCA to finance community development projects; supplying 
subsidised grain during dry season; issuing of grazing permits to restricted areas during the 
dry season and allowing controlled cultivation in order to improve household food security. 
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5.1.6 Institutional innovations in Mkata plains and Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
The main institutional innovation in Mkata plains involves a combination of formal village 
government system and traditional leadership, whereby important decisions on management 
of land resources are made by local village elites based on traditional systems. The tendence 
among Maasai pastoralists has been increased centralization of more authority in both the 
traditional leader (Ole Laigwanani) and spiritual leader (Olo Laiboni) who are increasingly 
assuming administrative roles and providing the checks and balances to local elites. 
Furthermore, the Maasai pastoralists are increasingly forming formal organisations like the 
Trust Funds, registered Community Based Organisations and Pastoral Associations. This 
aims at increasing integration into formal administrative structures. 
The trend in Ngorongoro area has been centralizing the traditional authority in the overall 
tribal spokesman for the entire Kisongo section residing in Ngorongoro area, whose 
jurisdiction extends beyond the NCA boundaries to Loliondo Game Controlled Area. Such 
scaling up of the local authority has proved to be effective in advocating for the Ngorongoro 
Maasai rights. The customary leaders also serve as representatives of local pastoral 
communities in all political issues and when negotiating with high government organs.  
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5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 Need for policy changes  
Policy makers should take measures that will aim at improving and sustaining productivity 
of pastoral systems. One of the recommended measures is to establish secure tenure ship of 
common grazing areas to specific groups of users. This measure will limit the nomadic 
movements of pastoralists; it will also provide the incentives to user groups to invest in 
improvement of the rangelands and to set rules for access and limit the number of animals 
that can be grazed in their area. Policy measure should integrate and enhance the capacity of 
existing local institutions through their recognition by formal institutions. 
 
The multiple land use systems like the pastoral and agro-pastoral systems as well as 
conservation areas have high likelihood of resource-use conflicts. It is recommended to 
incorporating a “Conflict Management Assessment Tool” in all development plans for the 
multiple-use systems. This policy tool will aid in identifying and mitigating both potential 
and real conflicts that may arise due to development interventions. 
 
 
5.2.2 Need for further studies 
High livestock grazing intensities in the study areas has induced retrogressive ecological 
changes that led to conversion of grasslands into woodlands or invasion by unpalatable 
grass species. The changes have reduced primary productivity of rangelands. This is 
detrimental to pastoral economies as well tourism, which are dependent on healthy 
rangelands. It is recommended to carry out further research in order to establish the 
sustainable livestock carrying capacities in the two areas. The scientific data should be 
combined with indigenous pastoral knowledge to determine the sustainable grazing system 
in the study areas. 
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5.2.3 Need for long term studies on impacts of cultivation in Ngorongoro        
Conservation Area 
Another area that requires further studies is the conflicting demand for conserving wildlife 
and permission of cultivation in Ngorongoro area. Cultivation if not managed carefully it 
may jeopardize the traditional co-existence of pastoralism and wildlife conservation. This 
will be at detriment to both wildlife conservation and pastoralism. There is a need to 
conduct detailed and long term studies in order to establish the impacts of cultivation on 
Ngorongoro ecosystem. Then basing on study results an upper limit of cultivation in the 
area could be set. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1:A Checklist of Questions for Key Informants 
1) Administrative Issues: 
Village ……………………………………. Ward ……………………………….. 
Village registration number ………………… Date ……………………………… 
Village area (Ha) …………………………………….…………………………… 
Village population (Total) …………………………………….……………………… 
Number of  Households ………………………………………….. 
What is the ethnic composition …………………………………….………………… 
What is the migration trends? …………………………………….……………….. 
 
2) Economic Activities 
• What are the main economic activities? 
• How many households practicing pastoralism? 
• How may pastoral households practising farming? 
• What is the current herd size? 
• Do the pastoralists practice transhumant movement? 
• What are the main production constraints? 
 
3) Land Resource Tenure 
• Which land resources are owned communally 
• Which rules and regulations governing access and use of communal resources 
• How compliance to rules is monitored and enforced? 
• How land is acquired? 
• What is the current health of the communal rangelands ? 
• What are the current changes in land use and land resource tenureship? 
 
4) Local Institutions 
• Which customary institutions are  functional in the area? 
• Which roles and functions falls under customary institutions? 
• What roles played by customary institution in access and tenureship of land  
       resources? 
• Which other institutions operating in the area? 
 
5) Resource-use conflicts 
• Which are the main resource-use conflicts in the area? 
• When the conflicts first occurred in the area? 
• What is the main causes underlying the conflicts and who are the main  
• parties involved in the conflict? 
• At which period of the year resource conflicts are likely to occur? 
• What is the local mechanism that can resolve resource conflicts?. 
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Appendix 2: Farmer/Herder Household Structured Questionnaire 
 
Date……………………………….  Village…………………………..……… 
Ward……………………... ……...   Division……………………………….. 
Name Of Numerator……  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
You are required to provide information on the following questions.  All information will be 
treated confidentially. 
 
SOCIO-CULTURAL DATA 
 
Section A:  Household  Background Information. 
A. 1   Household number……………………….. 
A.2    Age of respondent…………………..........(Years) 
A.3    Who is the head of the  household ? 
  (1) Male       (2) Female 
A.4    What is your marital status ? 
1. Married   
2. Single 
3. Divorced 
4. Widowed         (        ) 
Others…………………………………………………………... 
 
A.  5   What is your level of education?………………. (Years of schooling) 
 
A. 6    What is your religion 
1. Roman catholic ? 
2. Moslem 
3. Lutheran 
4. Traditional        (        ) 
5. Other (specify) 
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A.7  What is your household composition? 
 
Category Number Number 
residing in 
household 
Number 
residing 
outside the 
household 
Adult male    
Spouse(s)    
Infants 0 – 5 years    
Children 6-  10 years    
Female youth 11- 15 years    
Male youth 11- 17 years    
Adult males 18- 65 years    
Adult female 16 –65 years    
Dependants > 65 years    
TOTAL    
 
A. 8  Give reasons for family members staying outside your household  
1. Employment in public service 
2. Wage labourer 
3. Transhumant movement 
4. Operating business 
5. New farming area 
6. Schooling         (        ) 
7. Others……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………….. 
 
A.  9    For how long you have resided in this village ?…………………………(Years) 
A. 10  What is your  ethnic group?…………………………………………………..... 
A.  11  What is the domicile area of your ethnic group ?……………………………… 
A.  12   What is your birth place ……………………………………...............(District) 
A.  13   Have you ever migrated ?  1)  Yes    2) No 
A.  14   If yes in Qn  A. 13, please indicate the frequency of shift 
Period Place Number of shifts Reasons for shifting 
0 – 5 years (past)    
6- 10 years    ‘’    
6- 15 years    ‘’    
> 15 years     ‘’    
 
A.15   What are the main reasons for migration?  
1. Searching for grazing lands 
2. Searching for water  
3. Searching for  agriculture lands 
4. Avoiding livestock disease 
5. Avoiding resource conflicts 
6. Easy access to marketing facility   (        ) 
7. Others (specify)………………………………….. 
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SOCIO – ECONOMIC INFORMATION 
 
Section B: Farmholdings 
 
B.1  What are your main economic activities 
 
1. Farming 
2. Livestock keeping 
3. Both farming and livestock keeping 
4. Charcoal making      (        ) 
5. Others (please specify) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… ……….. 
 
B.2  What occupations performed by other members in your family ? 
 
Family member Sex Age Education level Occupation 
Husband     
Wife 
 
    
Relatives 
 
    
 
B.3   Do you own any land in this village ?                   1) Yes 2) No 
 
B.4  If yes in Qn B.3  How did you acquire the land you own? 
1. Bought  
2. Rented  
3. Inherited        (        ) 
4. Allocated by government  
5. Other  (specify) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………… 
B.5  What is the total agricultural land you  own ……………………………………(Ha)  
 
B.6 Where is the location of  your farm  plots in the landscape ? 
1. Beside the stream/river  
2. Around homestead  
3. Near the grazing lands     (        ) 
4. Other  (Specify) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………… 
 
B.7  How far is your farm holding located from the village? ……………………..…(Km) 
 
B.8  Is your land holding adequate?                                                       (1) Yes        (2) No 
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B.9  If not in  Qn B. 8, give the reasons 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
B.10  How much additional land do you need? …………..………………………… (Ha) 
 
B.11  For how long have you been cropping the same field? ………………..……(Years) 
 
B.12  Do you think soil fertility in your farm have changed?                  (1) Yes     ( 2) No 
 
B.13  If yes in Qn B .12,  in which direction is the change? 
 
1. Decreased a lot  
2. Little decrease  
3. Little increase  
4. Increased a lot  
5. I don’t know       (        ) 
  
B.14   What property rights do you have over your farm holdings?  
 
1.  Have title deed  
2.  Have customary rights  
3.  Village protection  
4.  No rights       (        ) 
5.  I don’t know 
 
B.15  Does the land rights influence your investment decisions with regard to farm 
          production ?                                           (1) Yes  (2) No 
 
B. 16  If yes in Qn B.15 in which ways you are affected by the land rights? 
1.  Expansion of farm holding  
2.  Improving farming methods  
3.  Diversification of enterprises  
4.  Land conservation measures   (        ) 
5.  Others (specify) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
B.17  Is your village experiencing an influx of immigrants of other ethnic groups ? 
                                           (1) Yes             (2)  No 
 
B.18  Have the immigrants affected the land holdings you previously had traditional rights 
to?                           (1) Yes              (2)  No 
B.19   If  yes in Qn B.18, how did you manage the situation? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Section C:  Livestock Production 
 
C..1  Do you own livestock ?                                            (1) Yes                             (2) No 
 
C. 2  If yes in Qn C.1, what categories of  livestock your are owning ? 
      
Type of animal Number Feeding system Purpose for keeping 
the animal category 
Cattle    
Goats    
Sheep    
Donkeys    
Total (TLU)    
 
 
C.3  Where do you graze your livestock?  
1. Communal grazing lands  
2. Fallow lands  
3. Harvested fields  
4. Established pastures 
5. Privately owned pastures     (        ) 
  
C.4   Is the available grazing land adequate                       
                         (1) Yes             (2) No 
 
C.5  If no in Qn C.4, what is the main reason? 
1. Too many animals. 
2. Poor pastures  
3. Encroachment by farmers               (        ) 
4. Others (specify) 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
C.6  At what time of the year do you experience shortage of pastures for your livestock? 
1. Dry season 
2. Rain season 
3. All year round               (        ) 
4. Other (specify) 
     …………………………………………………………………………………………… 
C.7    Do you have access to crop residues on fields belonging to farmers?  
                                                    (1) Yes          (2)  No 
 
C.8   If yes in  Qn C.7, under which terms do you access to  the  crop residues?  
1. Freely available 
2. Purchase   
3. Exchange with livestock manure 
4. Negotiate with farmers    (        ) 
5. Other (specify) 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.9      Who decides on general grazing matters in this village? 
1.   Village government leaders  
2. Customary leaders 
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3.Grazing management groups  
4.Farmer groups      (        ) 
5.Others (specify)  
 
C.10   Are there any restrictions on stocking rates in this village?   
                                    (1) Yes           (2) No  
C.11   If yes in Qn  C.10, who  imposes there restrictions? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
C.12  Which institutions are involved with regulation of resource use in this village?  
1.Customary authority  
2.Farmer groups  
3.Grazing management groups  
4.Formal institutions set by the government  
5.Mixed  institutions      (        ) 
C.13  Which of the institutions in C.12, has legitimacy and exercise the real power over 
          Resource control? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………C.
14   Are there any by-laws which bar grazing in some areas?   
                                     (1) Yes          (2) No  
 
C.15 If yes in  Qn C.14, what are these areas? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.16  Is there any degradation of range resources ?                   (1) Yes             (2) No 
 
C.17  If yes in Qn C. 16, how do you rate the extent of range degradation ?  
1. Very high degradation 
2. High degradation 
3. Medium degradation 
4. Slight degradation 
5. Not sure                                                       (        ) 
 
C.18  What are the main causes of range degradation ? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.19  In your opinions how can the grazing lands be improved ?  
1. Demarcating grazing lands  
2. Restricting stocking rates  
3. Destocking  
4. Pasture improvement  
5. Imposing a tax on grazing lands   (        ) 
 
 
C.20   What incentives would attract you to participate in improvement of grazing  lands? 
1    Casual employment   
2. Granting grazing  rights  
3. Education on conservation values  
4. Re-introduce customary management            (         ) 
5. Other (specify) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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C.21   What are the main sources of  information on range management available to you ? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
C.22   How many numbers of visits by village extension officer per month ?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.23   Are you an immigrant into this village?                                (1) Yes              (2) No 
 
C.24   If yes in Qn C.23,  what incentives attracted you to migrate to this village? 
1.   Availability of  grazing lands  
2. Availability of water  
3. Land for cultivation  
4. Ecological stability  
5. Easy access to market               (          ) 
6. Other (specify) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.25    Does the immigrant pastoralists  have rights of access to the grazing lands in this 
village?                                                          (1)Yes        (2) No 
 
C.26  How do immigrant pastoralists  interact with farmers in the village? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.27   What are the attitudes of indigenous ethnic groups towards immigrants? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………C.
28   Do you have to  move your herd to grazing areas in other villages ?        
                                                (1) Yes               (2) No 
 
C. 29   If yes in Qn C.28 what proportion of  your herd is moved ?   
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
C.30   At what time of the year the herd is moved to other areas ? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.31   How do you gain access to grazing areas in other villages?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.32  Who are consulted before making decision on herd movement ? 
1.Youths involved in herding 
2. Relatives residing in neighbouring  villages 
3. Elders in the village 
4. Customary leaders                (          ) 
 
C.33  Does the herders in the village make collective decisions? 
                                                    (1) Yes            (2)  No 
 
C.34  If yes in Qn C.33, please explain 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.35  Does your household experience any labour shortage for herd management ? 
                                      (1) Yes          (2)  No 
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C.36  What are the main livestock production constraints you are facing? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C.37     Do you  combine livestock production with crop production ?    
                                              (1) Yes         (2)   No 
 
C.38     If yes in Qn C. 37, when did you start crop production?………………..(Year) 
 
C.39   What are the main reasons for your engaging in crop production ? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
Section D:  Social Interactions 
 
D.1  Do you belong to any social group ?                              (1)  Yes            (2) No 
 
D.2   If yes in Qn  D.1 what is the composition of this group ? 
         
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.3    What are the functions of the social group indicated in  Qn D.2 ? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………D.
4    What advantages do you get through your membership to this group? 
 
1. Enjoy social interactions 
2. Social support 
3. Psychological support 
4. Production benefits                      (          ) 
 
D.5   Are there any spiritual healers in this village ?    (1) Yes          (2) No 
 
D.6   If yes in  Qn  D.5, how are they regarded in the village community ?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.7    Are there any multipurpose institutions in the village ?   (1) Yes       (2) No 
 
D.8    If yes in Qn  D.7,  please explain 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.9    Do you observe any of your  tribal traditional ceremonies and rituals ?   
                                               (1) Yes        (2) No 
 
D.10  If yes in  Qn  D. 9,  please explain 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D. 11  Do you have a tribal leader in this village ?                           (1) Yes     (2) No 
 
D.12   If yes in Qn  D .11, what are the roles played by the traditional leader ? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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D.13  Does the tribal leader authority recognised by other ethnic groups ?    
                        (1)Yes   (2)  No 
 
D.14  Are there any inter-ethnic group marriages ?           
                       (1)  Yes   (2)  No 
 
D.15  If yes in Qn  D.14, which ethnic groups inter-marry ? 
 
D.16  Is there any inter-ethnic groups co-operation ?  
  (1) Yes    (2)  No 
 
D. 17  If yes in Qn  D.16, in which areas the different ethnic groups co-operate? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.18  Is there any resource use conflicts?                                   (1) Yes          (2) No 
 
D. 19 If yes in Qn D.18, which types of resource conflicts are common in the village? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D. 20   Which resource users are involved in conflicts? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.21 When the resource conflicts were first experienced in this village? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D. 22  During which time of the year the resource conflicts intensify? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D. 23  What are the main causes underlying resource conflicts? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D. 24   How the resource conflicts are resolved? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.25  Is there any local mechanism for resolving resource conflicts? 
                                          (1) Yes                 (2)  No 
 
D.26   If yes in Qn. D. 25, please explain 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.27  How do you rate the capacity of local institutions in resolving resource conflicts? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.28  How do you rate the capacity of local government in conflict resolution? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
D.29. In your opinions how best the resource conflicts can be resolved? 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 3 Range Survey Sheet 
 
Range Condition Assessment 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Region: ……………………………………  District: ……………………………. 
Ranch: …………………………………….  Organisation: ………………………. 
Paddock No: ………………………………  Site No: ……………………………. 
Ecological Zone: ………………………….  Vegetation type: …………………… 
Assessor: ………………………………….  Date: ……………………………….. 
 
 
Plant species 
 
Frequency Counts 
(Step – point Method) 
 
∑ 
 
% 
comp. 
 
 
Grasses: 
 
 
 
 
Forbs: 
 
 
 
 
Woody: 
 
 
 
Litter 
Bare ground 
   
 
Climax Portion: …………………………………….. Condition Rating 
    …………………………………….. ………………… 
    …………………………………….. 
    …………………………………….. 
Total:     …………………………………….. 
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RANGE SURVEY SHEET 
 
Parameter: RANGE CONDITION 
Method(s) SITE POTENTIAL 
Eco-climatic zone ……………………………. Site Name ………………………….. 
Vegetation type ……………………………… Transect No. ……………………….. 
Ranching Unit ……………………………….. Transect length …………………….. 
Location ……………………………………… Transect interval …………………… 
Examiner ……………………………………… Date ………………………………... 
 
Rating 
Poor(1) Fair(2) Good(3) 
 
Score 
  
 
Density of Plant cover ………………………….. 
Botanical composition 
Desirable grazing plants …………………… 
Less desirable grazing plants ………………. 
Undesirable woody plants …………………. 
Pioneers and weeds ………………………… 
Poisonous plants …………………………… 
Vigour 
Seedlings of desirable plants ………………. 
New vegetative growth of desirable 
spp…………………………………………. 
Dead tufts (litter) …………………………. 
Soil surface condition 
Bare areas …………………………………. 
Surface organic matter ……………………. 
Soil losses ………………………………… 
Surface crusting …………………………… 
Insect or rodent damage ………………………. 
    
                                                         TOTAL     
 
General Remarks ……………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix 4: Main land use practices in the study villages in Mkata plains  
 
Number of respondents  
Land use Twatwatwa Mabweger
e 
Msower
o 
Mbwade Total(n=267)
Farming  NA NA 69(40.6) 5(16.7) 74(27.7)
Livestock 
keeping 
9(24.3) 26(93.0) 17(10.0) 5(16.7) 59(22.1)
Farming and 
livestock keeping  
28(75.7) NA 59(34.7) 17(56.7) 104(56.7)
Others  NA NA 2(1.2) NA 2(0.8)
      Key:  Numbers in brackets are percentages 
                NA =Not applicable 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Ethnic composition in the study villages in Mkata  plains 
 
Key:  -Numbers in brackets are percentages       -NA = Not applicable 
 
Number of respondents 
 
 
Ethnic groups 
Twatwatwa
(n = 37) 
Mabwegere
(n = 30) 
 
Msowero 
(n = 170) 
Mbwade 
(n  =30) 
Total
(n= 267)
Malaysia  37 (100) 30 (100) 3(1.8) 17 (56.7) 87 (32.6)
Barbaig NA NA 6(3.5) NA 6(2.2)
Arusha  NA NA NA NA NA
Sagara  NA NA 23(13.5) 1(3.3) 24(9.0)
Kaguru  NA NA 4(2.4) 1(3.3) 5(1.9)
Pogoro  NA NA 81(47.6) 1(3.3) 82(30.7)
Gogo  NA NA 19(11.2) 9(30.0) 28(10.5)
Nyamwezi  NA NA 7(4.1) NA 7(2.6)
Sukuma  NA NA 8(4.7) 1(3.3) 9(3.4)
Nyaturu  NA NA 16(9.4) NA 16(6.0)
Others  NA NA 3(1.8) NA 3(1.1)
Total 37(100) 30 (100) 170(100.0) 30(100.0) 267(100.0)
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Appendix 6: Livestock ownership by respondents in study villages in Mkata plains 
Number of respondents Owning 
livestock Twatwatwa 
(n= 37) 
Mabwegere 
(n= 30) 
Msowero 
(n= 170) 
Mbwade 
(n = 30) 
Total
(n =267)
Yes 37(100.0) 21(70.0 ) 23( 13.5) 15( 50.0) 96( 39.3)
No  0.0 7( 23.3) 130( 76.5) 11(36.7 ) 148( 60.7)
 Key  -Numbers in brackets are valid percentages,  
- Percentages in some columns are not totalling to 100 because of missing data 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Response distribution on land availability in the study villages   in Mkata 
plains  
                               Number of respondents 
 
 
Land availability 
                               Twatwatw
a 
(n =37)  
Mabwegere 
(n=30)  
Msower
o 
(n=170) 
Mbwade 
(n=30) 
Total
(n=267)
Adequate 8 (21.6) 1(3.3) 86(50.6) 13(43.3) 108(54.8)
Inadequate  21(56.8) 1(3.3) 59(34.7) 8(26.7) 89(45.2)
• Numbers in brackets are percentages, Percentages in some columns are not adding to 100 because of 
missing data 
 
 
Appendix 8: Response distribution on land holding by study villages in Mkata plains  
Number of respondents  
Landholding  
category 
Twatwatwa 
(n =37)  
Mabweger
e 
(n=30)  
Msowero 
(n=170) 
Mbwade 
(n=30) 
Total
 (n=267)
0.5 – 1.0 ha 12(32.4) NA 54(31.8) 6(20.0) 72 (27.0)
1.1 – 2.0 ha 10(27.0) NA 43(25.3) 5(16.6) 58 (21.7)
2.1 – 5.0 ha 6(16.2) NA 28(16.4) 3(9.9) 37 (13.8)
5.1 – 10. ha NA NA 1(0.6) 2(6.6) 3(1.1) 
> 10 ha 2 (5.2) NA NA NA 2(0.7) 
Key  -Numbers in brackets are percentages, - NA = No answer 
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Appendix 9: Main land use practices by respondents in the study villages   in 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area  
 
Number of respondents 
 
 
Land-use Kakesio 
(n=35) 
Endulen
i 
(n =84) 
Naiyobi 
(n =105) 
Irkeepus 
(n=81) 
Total 
(N= 305) 
Farming  NA 49 
(58.3) 
56 (53.3) NA 105 (34.4) 
Livestock keeping 35 (100) NA NA 81(100) 116 (35.3) 
Farming and 
Livestock keeping  
 
NA 
 
35 
(32.4) 
 
49(46.7) 
 
NA 
 
84 (25.5) 
Key:   - Numbers in brackets are percentages,            -NA = Not applicable 
 
 
Appendix 10:  Livestock ownership by respondents in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Number of respondents  
Owning cattle Kakesio 
(n=35) 
Eduleni 
(n=84) 
Irkeepus 
(n=81) 
Naiyobi 
(n=105) 
Total 
( n = 305) 
Yes 35(100.0 ) 35(41.7) 81(100.0 ) 105(100.0 
) 
256(83.9) 
No  NA 49(58.3) NA NA 49(14.0) 
Key     : - Numbers in brackets are percentages, NA = Not applicable 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 11: Ethnic composition of respondents by study villages in Ngorongoro  
Conservation Area 
 
Number of respondents  
Ethnic 
group Kakesio 
(n = 35) 
Enduleni 
(n = 84) 
Irkeepus 
(n= 81) 
Naiyobi 
(n = 105) 
Total 
(N = 305) 
Malaysia  35(100.0)  80(95.2) 81(100.0) 105(100.0
) 
301 (98.7) 
Arusha  NA 4(3.7) NA NA 4 (1.3) 
    Key: Numbers in brackets are percentages 
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Appendix 12: Response distribution on land availability in study villages in      
Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Key -Numbers in brackets are percentages,     -Some data in the table are not adding to 
hundred percent because of missing figures 
 - NA = No answer 
 
 
 
Appendix 13: Land ownership by respondents in study villages in Mkata plains 
 
Number of respondents 
 
Land 
owner-ship Twatwatw
a 
(n =37 ) 
Mabweger
e 
(n=30) 
Msowero 
(n=170) 
Mabwegere 
(n=30) 
Total 
(N=267) 
 
Yes 
30 (81.1) 7 (23.3) 109 (64.1 ) 18 (60.0  ) 164(61.4) 
No 6(16.2) 23 (76.7) 42 (24.7 ) 12 (40.0  ) 72 (27.0) 
 
Key: - Numbers in brackets are percentages, Data in some columns does not total up to 
sample size because of missing data 
 
 
Appendix 14:  Distribution of landholding categories of respondents from study   
villages in Mkata plains 
Number of respondents Land hold  
Twatwatwa 
(n =37) 
Mabwegere 
(n=30) 
Msowero 
(n=170) 
Mbwade 
(n=30) 
Total 
(n=267) 
0.5 – 1.0 ha 12(32.4) NA 54(31.8) 6(20.0) 72(30.5) 
1.1 – 2.0 ha 10(27.0) NA 43(25.3) 5(16.6) 58(21.7) 
2.1 – 5.0 ha 6(16.2) NA 28(16.4) 3(9.9) 37(13.9) 
5.1 – 10. ha NA NA 1(0.6) 2(6.6) 3(1.1) 
 
> 10 ha 2 (5.2) NA NA NA 2(0.7) 
 
Key: - Numbers in brackets are percentages,   
-Data in some columns does not total up to 100 because of missing data 
Frequency of respondents 
 
 
Land availability 
                                Kakesio 
(n=35) 
Enduleni 
(n=84) 
Irkeepus 
(n= 81) 
Naiyobi 
(n=105) 
Total 
(N = 305) 
Adequate 33 (94.3) 84 (100.0) 76 (93.8) 53 (50.5) 246 (74.5) 
Inadequate  2 (5.7) NA 5 (6.2) 13(12.4) 20 (6.1) 
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Appendix 15:  Response distribution on land ownership in the study villages   in 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
 
 
Number of respondents 
 
Owning land 
 Kakesio 
(n=35) 
Endulen
i 
(n=84) 
Irkeepus 
(n= 81) 
Naiyobi 
(n=105) 
 
Total 
(N = 305) 
Yes 
 
NA 29( 26.6 
) 
NA NA 29(9.5) 
No   NA  ( 55 ) 81(100) 53(50.5) 189(62.0) 
 
Key  - Numbers in brackets are percentages,   - NA = No answer provided 
 
 
 
Appendix 16:  Land acquisition and tenurial security of respondents in Ngorongoro  
Conservation Area 
Key:  -Numbers in brackets are percentages,     -Some data in the table are totalling above 
100 because of multiple response,      - NA = No answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of respondents Land acquisition 
Kakesio 
(n=35) 
Enduleni 
(n=84) 
Irkeepus 
(n= 81) 
Naiyobi 
(n=105) 
 
Total
(n = 305)
Bought NA NA NA NA NA
Rented  NA NA NA NA NA
Inherited  33(94.3) 68(80.9) 74 
(91.4) 
37(35.2) 179(58.7)
Allocated by village 
government 
NA 36(10.3) NA 51(48.6) 120(39.3)
Land security  (n=35) (n=84) (n= 81) (n=105) 
 
(N = 305)
Title deed NA NA NA NA NA
Customary rights  35 (100.0) 80(95.2) 39(13.4) 37(35.2) 191(62.6)
Village government  NA 81(96.4) NA 51(48.6) 155(50.8)
No rights NA NA 7(2.4) 17(16.2) 24(7.8) 
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Appendix 17:  Institutional framework for management of rangelands and   
resolving resource-use conflicts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: CRC= Conflict Resolution Committees, VRMA= Village Rangeland Management Area, JVMA= Joint Village 
Range Land  management Area, VLT=Village land tribunal,  
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Appendix 18: Monthly rainfall (mm) from 1975 to 1998 in Central Kilosa 
 
Year  Jan Feb Marc Apr May Jun  July Aug Sept Oct Nov. Dec.  Total  
1975 84.2 46.6 245.9 297.7 91.6 6 1.2 1.8 19.2 10.2 0.3 182.1 986.8 
1976 89.5 156.4 148.6 220.5 89.2 39.4 5.8 23.6 0 12.3 3 10.3 798.6 
1977 306.4 130.4 72.4 154.1 26.2 1.6 3.5 17.2 103.8 23 153.8 346.4 1338.8 
1978 43.3 48.9 215.4 275.2 36.1 12.3 5.2 5.8 0 1 197 176.9 1017.1 
1979 193.1 170.4 279 299 77.8 32.3 1.9 2.7 8.2 19.8 31.2 98.2 1213.6 
1980 353.1 62.2 73.6 294.5 60.3 0 1.3 18.1 0.7 18.5 81.4 125.1 1088.8 
1981 89.5 199.6 131.7 171.6 217.6 18.4 14.3 6.6 12 26.7 49.1 361.4 1298.5 
1982 96.5 73.5 86 262.3 91.7 12.7 15 14.4 45 276.4 195.1 220.7 1389.3 
1983 116.4 97.4 340.6 103.2 152.2 9.3 30.3 0.7 8.7 4.6 0 104.2 967.6 
1984 171.4 108.1 100.1 168.8 96.2 11.1 65.6 42 26.5 64.1 212.8 117.5 1184.2 
1985 176.4 139.8 134.7 192.9 47.6 2.7 5 2.3 17.5 0 80.2 147.2 946.3 
1986 216.4 90.4 190.9 136 59.9 2.8 1.9 26 0.9 5.5 198.1 214.2 1143 
1987 165.2 221.8 122.1 133.1 83.8 5 48.4 21.2 2 68.6 64.7 59.2 995.1 
1988 220.8 71.2 119.2 148.4 36.4 88.5 1.9 13.5 21.5 10.1 34.2 86.3 852 
1989 146.7 52.6 129 179.4 91.5 56.9 4.7 20.1 1.3 78.4 60.8 153.9 975.3 
1990 75.4 147.9 276.6 185.8 25.7 0 1.7 18.8 14 12 79 43.1 880 
1991 244.4 43 261.6 121.9 85.9 4.3 68.9 25.8 97.8 2.4 79.1 27 1062.1 
1992 8.9 170.5 187.1 442.2 121.5 29.5 1.9 42.5 0.1 0 322.5 139.9 1466.6 
1993 96.5 90.6 301 370.8 115.1 1.8 2.6 6.7 4 8.3 45.5 0.7 1043.6 
1994 244.0 160.2 232.6 80.5 22.1 10.2 4.9 27.1 0.7 39.6 59.5 163 1044.4 
1995 182.6 83.1 204.2 104.6 61.5 2.3 0 26.8 14.6 76.9 0 70.5 827.1 
1996 61.5 175.1 86.3 159.6 175.2 3.4 6.8 3.4 16 12.5 8.1 31.5 739.4 
1997 78.3 82.9 151.1 214.7 28.1 54.4 1.3 50.9 3.8 81.2 168 716.3 1631 
1998 297.4 126.4 170.5 201.3 122.4 15.1 1 32.8 43.8 9.8 0 0 1020.5 
              
Mean 156.6 114.5 177.5 204.9 84 17.5 12.3 18.8 19.3 35.9 88.5 149.8 1079.6 
 
Appendix 19: Monthly rainfall  NCA- Head quarters 1963-2003  
 
YEAR JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC TOTAL 
1963 140.7 80.1 170.3 240.3 130.8 50.6 10 2.7 8.1 29 310.3 200.9 1373.8 
1964 40.6 140.4 190.4 290.2 30.1 10 20 10 5.5 6.3 30 150.1 923.6 
1965 100.7 70.1 120.9 150.4 70.1 11 7 2.5 50 10.8 2.5 50.5 646.5 
1966 20.2 70.6 140.3 30.7 50.8 50.1 37 1 4.5 10.7 10.5 60 486.4 
1967 50 80.6 60.8 250.7 260.1 70.6 100 50.1 50.5 70.8 170.7 200.3 1415.2 
1968 120.1 80.9 100.7 160.3 260.6 4.3 4.5 0.5 0.5 8.6 100.2 200.8 1042 
1969 94.9 129.6 13.9 16.5 11.4 5.4 22.8 43 46.2 160 245.3 76.2 865.2 
1970 251.3 88.1 191.2 115.7 94.7 22.5 23 9 5.5 6 105.4 177.9 1090.3 
1971 55.9 69.5 37.3 224.3 47.4 18.8 15.8 15.1 6 5 28.6 97.8 621.5 
1972 104.6 128.7 108.7 84.2 108.8 31.3 5.8 3 0.9 121.7 154.4 181.4 1033.5 
1973 303.8 278.8 5.4 181.4 39.1 13.1 7 4 8 10 34.4 38.8 923.8 
1974 51.6 56.6 308.4 39.5 48.9 41.5 7.2 10.4 10.4 2.7 42.1 82.1 701.4 
1975 66.1 32.2 142.8 121.1 118.2 3.6 28.9 3 8.7 15 4.5 117.9 662 
1976 54 90.8 112 206.2 42 27.3 3.5 6.2 15.5 16.5 57.3 81.8 713.1 
1977 133.1 173.2 103.1 300.8 85.6 2.3 1.9 10 14.4 48 112.8 145.5 1130.7 
1978 160 61.3 228.1 197.4 58.7 12.1 2.7 2.5 4 40.1 51.8 131.5 950.2 
1979 140.4 103.7 136.6 227.8 26.5 10.1 34.4 3 3 7 3 110 805.5 
1980 73.1 22.6 10.4 69.5 93.7 12.7 7 58.4 12.7 10.1 80.7 57.1 508 
1981 73 60.5 183.8 137.6 101 11 2.5 28.4 6 35 23.3 121.1 783.2 
1982 90.2 62.3 48.5 152.1 137.6 49.7 15.5 30 30.6 102.3 167.8 156.4 1043 
1983 352.8 75.3 287.2 329.1 299.4 80.5 13.7 4.9 14.4 16 45.9 87.9 1607.1 
1984 103.3 39.7 97.3 178.8 29.2 20.3 25.2 NIL 1.1 105.7 110.4 105.2 816.2 
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1985 28.8 96.5 282.4 203.9 79.4 5.7 5.3 2.5 NIL 15 129.5 71.4 920.4 
1986 86 20 189.7 191.1 139.5 11.1 NIL 2 1 81.5 99.5 179.5 1000.9 
1987 135.3 99 141.1 71 141.5 4.5 NIL 11.1 NIL NIL 37.7 72.2 713.4 
1988 215.2 56.7 93.7 176.3 10.5 28 0.5 17.3 6.1 23.4 29.9 87.2 744.8 
1989 117.6 122.4 203.3 318 180 21/1 NIL 10 20 118.3 NIL 187.4 1277 
1990 76.3 167.4 167.8 179 128 4 NIL NIL 2.5 NIL NIL 160 885 
1991 97.9 40 83 128,2 94.8 7.7 2.2 NIL NIL 43 38.2 284 690.8 
1992 NIL 91 67 330 14 NIL NIL NIL NIL 10.4 7 188.4 707.8 
1993 128 108 104 NIL 103 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 6 NIL 449 
1994 130 170 320 270 210 45 32 NIL NIL 66 87 76 1406 
1995 2 20 67 109 98 NIL NIL NIL NIL - - - 296 
1996 - 91 - 284 128.8 35.1 - NIL NIL NIL 15 204.4 758.3 
1997 0 0 274.9 428.6 258.4 47 15 NIL NIL 35 206 440.1 1705 
1998 292.3 - - - - 37 NIL NIL NIL 17 51 26.5 423.8 
1999 107.5 10.5 167 85.1 6 NIL NIL 32 8 0,5 35.5 51 502.6 
2000 38 89.7 79 78.8 73.2 16.5 1 33 NIL NIL 122 155 686.2 
2001 369 88.5 171.8 181.2 99.3 5.9 25 6 NIL 1 41 63.9 1052.6 
2002 145.1 123.9 142 234.6 147.1 0 2 16 0 60.5 56 216.6 1143.8 
2003 146 64 67.1 57.5 207.5 122 10.5 1 4.5 44.7 18 22.5 765.3 
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Appendix 20: Livestock population in the study villages in Ngorongoro conservation 
area 
 
Year, 1994 Year, 2000 
Village No. 
Cattle 
No. small 
stock 
(livestock 
units) 
Equivalent 
livestock 
unit 
No. 
Cattle 
No. small 
stock 
(Livestock 
units) 
Equivalent 
livestock 
unit 
kakesio 56,602 5,232 
(1,308) 
57,870 4,180 4,487 
(1,121) 
5,301 
Enduleni 110,073 9,884 
(2,477) 
112,544 13,926 14,485 
(3,621) 
17,547 
Irkeepus 10,271 93,338 
(23,334) 
33,605 8,111 4,955 
(1,238) 
9,349 
Naiyobi 16,133 11,106 
(2,776) 
18,909 7,134 13,859 
(3,464) 
10,598 
    33,351 37,786 42,795 
 
Key: 1 livestock unit = 4 goats or sheep 
 
 
Appendix 21: Livestock population in the study villages in Mkata plains 
 
Year, 1994 Year, 2000 
Village No. 
Cattle 
No. small 
stock 
(livestock 
units) 
Equivalent 
livestock 
unit 
No. 
Cattle 
No. small 
stock 
(Livestock 
units) 
Equivalent 
livestock 
unit 
Twatwatwa 60,732 30,406 
(7,601) 
68,333 13,495 2,559 
(639) 
14,134 
Mabwegere 37,064 47,402 
(11,850) 
48,914 9,375 1,268 
(317) 
9,692 
Msowero 1,116 2,429 
(607) 
1,723 1,116 569 
(142) 
1,258 
Mbwade 6,631 1,791 
(447) 
 
7,078 64,489 12,555 
(3,138) 
67,627 
    88,475 16,751 92,711 
 
Key: 1 livestock unit = 4 goats or sheep 
 
 
